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Abstract
The main argument of this thesis is that the social impacts of new developments are socially
constructed. Rather than simply being affected by impacts local people are active in
constructing them.
The thesis begins by providing an overview of the literature on social impacts and their
assessment, before moving on to outline what is meant by social constructionism and some
of the major debates about the approach. The application of a social constructionist
approach to environmental issues has been criticised by sociologists adopting a more realist
stance, on the grounds that it ignores the reality of environmental problems and has little
practical use. This realist critique is shown to be mistaken in several ways.
Two case studies were conducted to explore how social impacts are socially constructed.
Both focus on the impacts of roads; one study was of an area where a new road was
proposed and the other where a road had been recently constructed. In both case studies
a variety of data were collected. These data are analyzed to illustrate aspects of local
people's construction of the impacts of the road. Analysis explores issues such as why any
protest about impacts emerged and why it focused on particular issues. The rhetorical
strategies employed to construct impacts as real and serious are also examined. Particular
attention is paid to the role of identity in the construction of impacts. Participants are shown
to work to characterise themselves as ordinary people, as local people and as different from
the 'experts' in order to make robust claims about impact.
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Chapter 1
An Introduction to Social Impact Assessment
This first chapter provides an introduction to Social Impact Assessment (SIA). The basic
methodology of SIA is outlined, and some of the key issues and debates about how it
should proceed are reviewed.
The practice of impact assessment was established in the United States in 1969 with the
passing of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). NEPA requires that
Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) must be prepared for any government projects
which would significantly affect the quality of the human environment, and stipulates that
the preparation of an Environmental Impact Assessment (ETA) should be an
interdisciplinary process including contributions from social scientists as well as from
natural scientists and engineers (Freudenberg and Keating 1985). The Council on
Environmental Quality's (1986) Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions
of the National Environmental Policy Act elaborates on NEPA's requirements. These
regulations interpret the term 'human environment' as including 'the natural and physical
environment and the relationship of people with that environment'. Among the effects
listed as subjects for assessment are 'aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic, social and health
effects'. However the regulations provide little guidance about what exactly should be
considered within these categories or how social impacts should be assessed. Vanclay and
Bronstein write that SIA emerged as a distinct field a few years after the passing of NEPA
'largely because of the perceived deficiencies of NEPA to respond fully to social impacts'
(1995:xi).
Since the passing in 1985 of the European Community Directive on the assessment of the
effects of certain projects on the environment, more formal attention is being paid
throughout Europe to the effects of new developments. The directive divides projects into
Schedule 1 projects for which the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (ElS)
is compulsory, these are major developments such as the construction of motorways, waste
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disposal installations and power stations; and Schedule 2 projects for which an EIS has to
prepared if they will have 'significant effects on the environment'. In Britain the
assessment of the environmental effects of proposed developments has been an integral part
of the planning system since the passing of the Town and Country Planning Act in 1947.
The EC Directive has been implemented through statutory regulations of the Town and
Country Planning Acts and has not changed the existing procedures significantly (Gilpin
1995).
Wood (1995) claims that the EC Directive is only concerned with the physical environment
and 'eschews consideration of social and economic impacts' (1995:88). However it is
possible to interpret the wording of the Directive quite differently:
the environmental impact assessment will identify, describe and assess in an
appropriate manner, in the light of each individual case.. .the direct and indirect
effects of a project on the following factors:
-	 human beings, fauna and flora
-	 soil, water, air, climate and the landscape
-	 the interaction between the factors mentioned in the first and second indents
-	 material assets and the cultural heritage
(85/337/EEC Article 3).
The references here to assessment of the effects of projects on human beings, and on
material assets and cultural heritage, can easily be read as pointing to the importance of
considering social and economic impacts. Thus both NEPA and the EC directive provide
scope for a broad interpretation of social impacts, but provide little guidance for their
identification or assessment.
Since the implementation of NEPA a considerable literature has emerged dealing
specifically with the assessment of social impacts of developments. The bulk of this
originates from the US although this situation is slowly changing as legislation requiring
the assessment of environmental impacts is passed in other countries. The literature
contains general guides for practitioners as well as more academic social scientific research
on the theory and practice of social impact assessment. There are numerous definitions of
SIA within this literature. The most recent and comprehensive definition is probably that
provided in Guidelines and Principles for Social Impact Assessment (1994). This document
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was produced by a group of American social scientists who formed the Interorganisational
Committee on Guidelines and Principles for SIA in order to publish the first 'systematic
inter-disciplinary statement from the social science community as to what should be the
content of an SIA' (ibid:1). The Guidelines were intended to help agencies and companies
to understand the social consequences of projects, programs and policies and have been
referred to as 'the most significant event in recent SIA history' (Burdge & Vanclay
1995:3 1) as they represent the core body of knowledge about SIA. The definition of SIA
contained in the Guidelines is as follows:
we define SIA in terms of efforts to assess or estimate in advance, the social
consequences that are likely to follow from specific policy actions (including
programs and the adoption of new policies) and specific government actions
(including buildings, large projects and leasing large tracts of land for resource
extraction) particularly in the context of the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969. (ibid:1)
Although this definition includes the effects of policies as well as new developments, to
date SIA has been used far more extensively for the latter and most of the literature
concentrates on how to assess the impacts of new developments. SIA has usually been
concerned with the effects of changes such as the building of a new road, power station or
darn, and typically concentrates on the local level.
SIA - Science or Politics?
Much of the literature on SIA focuses on issues of methodology (see for instance textbooks
by Finsterbusch and Wolf 1977, Carley and Bustelo 1980, Finsterbusch et al 1983, Tester
and Mykes 1981). There is a broad consensus about how SIA should be done which
follows the model for Environmental Impact Assessment. This involves first providing a
description of the existing situation - this stage is often referred to as profiling - then
identifying the full range of possible social impacts which may follow from the project and
deciding which are most likely and most serious, and finally providing a comparison of the
situation with and without the project and possibly comparing the impacts of different
schemes.
However there is less agreement about the appropriate research methods to be used at each
stage or the sort of data necessary to provide reliable predictions of future impact. These
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differences largely stern from alternative perspectives on the role and aims of SIA. On one
hand are those who regard it as essentially a scientific enterprise, and on the other those
who emphasise its political character. Carley (1983) makes a similar distinction between
what he refer to as the numeric and participatory approaches. This distinction is an ideal
type, many discussions of how SIA should proceed contain elements of both positions.
However it is a useful model for introducing some of the key issues and debates in the
field.
SIA as Objective Science
The NEPA Regulations require information on impacts, not judgements or decisions about
the best course of action. Within this model SIA's role is conceptualised as a decision tool
providing information on the full range of benefits and disbenefits of a proposed action for
decision makers who are left with the responsibility of making the final decision (e.g.
Finsterbusch 1980, Freudenberg and Keating 1985). Meidinger and Schnaiberg (1980)
describe SIA as an attempt to 'scientize' public policy by providing rigorous information
about possible project outcomes. This emphasis on producing 'facts' for decision makers
is seen to lead to a preference for quantitative data. Loseke writes:
Formally, the purpose of measuring program impact is to allow policy makers to
engage in 'rational decision making' and it seems that popular assumptions equating
rational with 'scientific', and 'scientific' with 'precise measurement' favour
quantitative data... in brief when policy makers' preferences direct research, a narrow
range of methodologies and data are favoured (1989:203).
The use of quantitative methods provides the SIA with the appearance of objectivity and
presents social impacts in a form in which they can be more readily compared with other
impacts. Freudenberg and Keating (1985) explain that so long as quantitative and economic
methods are employed in SIA the task can be relatively straightforward. The assessors are
using techniques which are well developed, dealing with factors that are easily translated
into monetary terms, and providing decision makers with results that are easily understood
and clearly relevant.
This preference for quantitative data can lead to a concentration on some categories of
impact at the expense of others. A distinction is sometimes made between 'objective' and
'subjective' impacts. For instance Dietz writes:
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Subjective impacts are those perceived by, or of concern to, those affected, whether
or not an outsider finds those concerns realistic. Objective impacts are those
considered important by an outside expert whether or not those impacts are of
concern to those affected (1987:56)
Gold (1978) explores the close connection between the notion of 'objective' and
'subjective' impacts and 'objective' and 'subjective' data and methods of analysis. He
argues that data which are analyzed quantitatively is deemed to be 'objective', while
qualitative analyses are considered merely 'subjective'(1978:11). He points out that this
differentiation between 'objective' and 'subjective' data is essentially a status distinction,
with 'objective' data being considered superior. This prioritising leads some to argue that
even if data are being collected on 'subjective' impacts (for example on local people's
perceptions, attitudes and fears) every attempt should be made to produce 'objective' data.
For instance Finsterbusch writes that:
It is easy to criticise efforts to quantify the non-quantifiable.. .Nevertheless, impacts
that are not quantified, and quantified impacts that are not translated into monetary
terms, are slighted by decision makers. To make impacts count in assessments, they
must be quantified and priced. (1985:213)
Obviously some impacts are easier to quantify and price than others, for instance it is easier
to cost a reduction in property values due to the proximity of a new road (although even
this is likely to be speculative), than it is to cost the psychological trauma of those forced
to move out of their homes to make way for the road. The priority given to quantitative
data has been criticised as leading to a situation where oniy those impacts that can be
easily quantified are included and many other important effects ignored (Rohe 1982, Carley
1986). Reviews of published EISs in both the US and the UK reveal that the only social
impact considered in any detail in many statements is the project's economic impact (see
Friesema and Culhane 1976, Jobes 1985, Freudenberg and Keating 1982 and 1985).
Freudenberg and Keating (1982) noted that most studies to date had focused on economic
and technical considerations, often to the exclusion of other likely impacts, in particular the
social impacts. They substantiate this claim by referring to a review of impact statements
carried out by Wilke and Cain (1977) which revealed that the majority of statements
showed no evidence of social research techniques aimed at discovering the likely effects
of projects on local people. Indeed only eleven of the eighty statements that Wilke and
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Cain reviewed used surveys, interviews, documentary analysis, unobtrusive observation or
case histories. Freudenberg and Keating concluded that 'most social impact assessments
have very little to do with the ways in which human beings are reacting to the changes
being wrought'(1982:72). Glasson and Heaney's (1993) review of a sample of UK EISs
reveals that the situation in the UK is broadly similar. Of the 43% of their sample which
had considered any social or economic impacts the focus was more on the economic than
on social impacts. Where social impacts were considered these tended to be restricted to
such things as the impact of the development on local services and impacts on
accommodation.
Including Local People's Perspectives in SIA: an Alternative Model.
An alternative model for SIA is one which regards the struggle for 'objectivity' and
neutrality as doomed to failure, and argues for a recognition of the inevitably political and
value laden nature of the process. For example Torgerson (1981) criticises the tendency
to adopt an elitist or technocratic approach to the study of social impacts in which assessors
assume the role of experts engaged in detached scientific enquiry. He proposes an
alternative perspective which acknowledges that SIA is a social phenomenon, inevitably
informed by political commitments and having political implications. Consequently he
argues that SIA cannot be regarded as a science 'in the conventional sense of the word'
(1981:85). Carley argues similarly that 'the distinctive character of socio-political relations
renders a quasi-natural science approach inappropriate'(1986:l3) and advocates an approach
which acknowledges the centrality of values, both of those doing the assessing and of those
who will be affected by impacts.
Those adopting this perspective are critical of the reliance on quantitative analysis
characteristic of much SIA. Torgerson (op cit p71) criticises the 'profligate use of
numerical notation, mathematical signs and formulas, complicated charts and diagrams' as
creating a sense of confidence which is at odds with what he calls the 'intangible and
intuitive dimensions' of social impact. Dale (1981) supports Torgerson's critique of the use
of quantification arguing that 'the apparent certainty conveyed by checklists and
matrices... .may not reflect the relevant social issues (1981:47), however he takes issue with
the labelling of impacts that are not easily quantified as intangibles. He suggests that this
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inadvertently contributes to their continued dismissal:
Many social and environmental values are referred to as 'intangibles' as if there was
something vague or insubstantial about loss of one's community life, self reliance
or sense of place. This is misleading (1981:47)
Carley (1983) argues that some information cannot be quantified and argues for an end to
the practice of what he calls 'pseudo-quantification' of such data. In place of such
misplaced quantification a greater use of qualitative, ethnographic research methods is
recommended. Those taking this position argue that qualitative methods should not be seen
as less reliable or important than quantitative methods, and often have a greater chance of
addressing the complexity of the issues and of providing a more sophisticated understanding
of the social dynamics of the situation.
The use of qualitative methods involves more contact and communication with those likely
to be involved than in what Torgerson calls the 'technocratic' model. Emphasis is placed
on the importance of understanding local people's perceptions and expectations of impact
rather than leaving the task of identifying and assessing impacts to a supposedly neutral
assessor. Gold (1978) writes that the central question addressed in an SIA must be the
difference that the proposed development will make in the lives of local residents, and that
this must be addressed first and foremost from the point of view of local residents.
Gaining access to the understandings and perceptions of those who will bear the impacts
is recommended for two rather different reasons. First is the belief that unless this
information is available assessments will be incomplete or incorrect, and secondly there is
often a political commitment to enabling public participation in the decision making
process.
Jessen provides a good example of the first rationale when he argues that:
professionals who use only the narrow, specialist training of sterile quantitative
methods, without taking into consideration the qualitative aspects and the broader
understanding and insights of citizens regarding their world view in their own
situation or complexes, cannot adequately define the problem (1980:243)
Freudenberg and Olsen similarly draw attention to the importance of the insights of local
people:
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Local residents have an obvious contribution to offer such an assessment because
they are particularly important 'experts' on themselves (1983:70)
Taking into account the attitudes of the public may be expected to yield pay-offs for
planners. Local people have important knowledge about their locality which can inform
the design of more acceptable and workable developments (Cooper 1981, Armour et a!
1977). In addition as Rohe notes:
Community attitudes toward a project may be as important in determining the
impact of a project as ... economic or demographic changes'(1982:374).
For instance, when new road schemes are planned, underpasses are often included in the
plans to prevent people on one side of the road becoming isolated from amenities and
people on the other side. However, if people are fearful of using underpasses, and this fear
prevents them from crossing the road by this method, then the inclusion of underpasses in
the scheme does not fulfil the purpose for which they were designed. Thus the importance
of understanding the meanings local people attach to new developments is also emphasised.
Disanto et al explicitly adopt a symbolic-interactionist perspective and point out that:
Responses are not made directly to the actions of others but instead are based on the
meanings which they attach to such actions (1981:29)
The notion is that by taking into account the attitudes of local people, planners can ensure
that their plans are acceptable locally.
Seen in this light public participation is essentially a means to an end - a way of ensuring
that all relevant variables are included in the analysis. However public participation is often
advocated not simply to improve the data but because of a political commitment to
'democratise' (Dale 1981) or increase levels of participation in the decision making process.
Armour et al end a long list of reasons for increasing public involvement with the assertion
that:
those affected by a proposal have a right to contribute to its assessment (1977:29)
The incentive to include local people in the process is strengthened by a general pressure
from the public for more meaningful participation. Planners recognise that unless people
feel that they have been adequately consulted and their views represented, the planning
process will be more conflictual, time consuming and costly. SIA is seen as a tool for
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achieving political ends (democratisation) rather than simply as a detached fact finding
enterprise. Robe talks about the potential of SIA for empowering people 'enabling them
to enter the political arena with a more highly developed understanding of project
consequences' (p3 70).
Alongside the emphasis on public participation is a concern to ensure social equity.
Freudenberg and Olsen (1983) draw attention to the danger that encouraging public
participation may serve to strengthen the position of those members of the public already
best equipped to defend their interests. Research has demonstrated that it is the most
eloquent, educated and privileged members of communities who take up the opportunity
to participate and have the resources to do so effectively (see p92 for a fuller discussion of
this point) Rather than abandoning the emphasis on participation they make a plea for its
careful use, and for attention to equity issues:
It is vital.. .that public participation programs be employed carefully - that they are
used, but not abused - or else we run the risk that our presumably laudable efforts
will actually serve to make an already inequitable situation even worse. (p78)
In advocating public participation in the process of SIA most authors recognise that 'The
Public' are not a homogenous group, and that within any locality there are many different
'publics' who will have different perspectives on the proposed project and are likely to
experience impacts differently. Wolf writes that:
conceptual analysis and elaboration of categories such as 'community cohesion' is
a pressing need. The tacit assumption is one of a consensus model whereas
community conflict is often the situation of fact (1974:25),
and Dunning states that:
The public can be separated into numerous publics and interest groups occupying
different positions on the social scale and having different needs and goals
(1974:60).
Wolf concludes that the 'bottom line question for SIA is who benefits and who
loses'(l983:15) and Rohe describes SIA as providing a 'mechanism for assessing social
equity' (1982:369). The Guidelines and principles for Social Impact Assessment (1994)
illustrate that concern about equity issues is now considered to be of central importance to
SIA. These guidelines suggest that SIAs should pay particular attention to those groups
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which are likely to be affected most seriously by a project, drawing a rather shaky parallel
with the emphasis given in the biological sections of EISs to particularly endangered or
threatened plant and wildlife species.
As mentioned above these two models of SIA - as objective science or as a participatory
process - are ideal types which serve to illustrate some of the debates and tensions in the
field. A number of papers have been published which deal with these tensions explicitly.
For instance Freudenberg (1989) and Freudenberg and Keating (1985) discuss the difficulty
that SIA practitioners often experience in aiming to collect data in a neutral and unbiased
way while at the same time recognising that there is no neutral information about impacts,
with different groups and individuals having different perspectives on and different
exposure to impacts. They suggest that the best way forward is to recognise explicitly the
adversarial nature of the process of identifying and assessing impacts by ensuring that all
parties are equally represented. At present the usual procedure is for the SIA to be
commissioned by the developers and attempt to consider the views of all groups in the
community. Freudenberg and Keating suggest an alternative model where a number of
social scientists are involved in the process each representing different interests in the
community. They argue:
Somewhat ironically, it appears one way to strengthen the scientific component... is
for at least some social scientists to embrace the adversarial aspects of the role more
fully. Social scientists.. .may actually be able to do more to advance the scientific
quality of SIAs by taking on adversarial roles than by attempting to adhere.. .to the
traditional scientific model. (1985:600)
Dietz (1987) also explicitly addresses the relationship between science and politics in the
process of SIA. He follows Habermas in arguing for the desirability of greater public
participation in discussions of political and policy issues. He outlines Habermas' models
of the ways in which the relationship between science and politics in the process can be
dealt with. First is the decisionistic approach which subordinates science to politics, the
second model is the technocratic model in which politics is subordinated to technical
analyses, while Habermas' preferred model is a pragmatistic one where discussion by an
informed public integrates values and scientific information. Dietz sees this as the ideal
model for SIA and advocates setting up panels of experts and ordinary people who together
conduct the SIA considering both 'subjective' and 'objective' impacts.
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Theory and Practice
Social Impact Assessment is a practice, and as such is perhaps more influenced by features
of the context in which it is conducted than by the writing of social scientists about how
it should proceed.
As mentioned above when an SIA of a new development is conducted it is usually as part
of a more extensive EIA carried out or commissioned by the developers. Those who
commission assessments of social impacts are likely to be engineers who often have had
no previous contact with social science, and may even be hostile to it (Freudenberg &
Keating 1985). Their expectations and demands of SIA may differ substantially from what
a social scientist would consider appropriate, yet as a commissioned consultant the social
scientist's ability to influence the research design may be limited. Developers are likely to
want the SIA to be done as quickly and cheaply as possible and to provide easily
understandable results. They are unlikely to be interested in, or know how to make sense
of, more sophisticated sociological analyses of the situation.
In addition they may well be wary of including public participation in the process in any
meaningful way, fearing that it will prove expensive and make the process more lengthy
and difficult. Serious commitment to public participation involves a readiness to relinquish
control over the assessment and decision making process, something which developers may
well resist. As Rohe (1981) points out it also enables potential opponents of the proposed
development to protest more effectively, again something which the developers may well
prefer to avoid.
it is perhaps these factors, more than a carefully thought out commitment to the primacy
of quantitative analyses, that lead to SIAs relying on economic analyses, being largely
uniformed by sociological theory and showing little evidence of the use of social research
methods (see Dietz 1981, Freudenberg & Keating 1982, Friesema and Culhane 11976, Wilke
and Cain 1977).
SIA: The Current Situation
In a recent review of SIA Finsterbusch (1994) outlines changes in the rate of production
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and nature of SIAs in the US. He writes that during the 1970s over 1000 EISs were
produced a year, many of which had SIA components, but that since 1980 their production
has declined greatly with 352 EISs produced in 1980 and just 189 in 1993. This decline
is linked to the fact that during the 1980s few new major roads, dams or energy facilities
were constructed. The siting of waste facilities was one area in which EISs were required
in the 1980s, however due to what Finsterbusch calls 'political factors' (ibid:7) sites were
often eliminated after identification and the EISs' cancelled before completion (see p160
for a discussion of the difficulty of siting waste disposal facilities). However in the US
alongside this decline of SIAs dealing with local siting issues, new areas for its application
have emerged. The number of EISs commissioned for land and resource use management
plans have increased since the 1980s, and there is an increasing demand for impact
assessments of large scale development projects in developing countries. A shift is also
taking place away from a focus on the local impacts of discrete projects to a greater
concern with cumulative impact assessment (considering the effects of more than one
development on a locality) and strategic impact assessment (considering the impacts of
programmes and policies rather than individual projects). Thus although the character of
SIA in the US has changed since its inception in the 1970s, it remains an area of thriving
intellectual and practical concern.
Moreover as Finsterbusch (ibid) notes, as the practice of SIA has declined in the US,
interest in the practice has grown in other ca itres. ti. the UK ca(s ace e'c
systematic consideration of social impacts within EIAs. For instance Bond (1995) notes
that there is insufficient experience in carrying out SIA in the UK and that this needs to be
remedied as a consideration of social and economic impacts is integral to a complete
environmental impact assessment. Glasson and Heaney (1993) also note that to date social
impacts have received little consideration in British EISs and regard this situation as
unsatisfactory. In a review of 110 randomly selected environmental impact statements
produced between 1988 and 1991 they found that fewer than half of these had addressed
any social or economic impacts, and of those that had the consideration was usually cursory
and of low quality. They argue that
Socio-econornic impacts merit a higher profile; they are of relevance to the impacts
of most major projects. (p343)
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The need for SIA is also being recognised in other European countries. For instance Juslen
(1995) writes of growing interest in Finland since the passing of EIA legislation in
September 1994.
While there is now a substantial literature on SIA, coherent documents such as the
Guidelines and Principles for Social Impact Assessment which outline methods and
procedures for conducting assessments, and widespread recognition of the importance of
integrating the consideration of social impacts into EIA, it seems that in practice SIA has
little status within planning decisions. Burdge and Vanclay concede that:
The fact remains that in the two decades since SIA became a recognised subfield
of research and policy application, there are few examples where its use has made
a difference in the project/policy decision process.. .SIA is recognised as important
but has yet to be integrated sufficiently in the ETA process. (1995:37)
In his review of examples of SIA within Finland Juslen reaches the same conclusion:
at present impact assessment results seldom make a difference in decision making.
(1995:170)
In the UK interest in SIA is just beginning to emerge (see papers by Glasson & Heaney
1993, and Bond 1995). The experience of the US suggests that its integration into the
planning process will be a lengthy and difficult process. However as the siting of new
developments such as roads becomes increasingly difficult due to the extent of public
protest about impacts, the time is right for greater consideration of the potential of SIA.
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Chapter 2
Social Impacts and Social Constructionism
In this chapter I move on from the general discussion of SIA of the last chapter to consider
the whole notion of 'social impact', and argue that theory of the process of impact is
underdeveloped. Spector and Kitsuse's (1987) observations on the construction of social
problems are then applied to the sphere of social impacts, with the suggestion that this
social constructionist approach has the potential to provide fresh insights into the process
of social impact. Social Constructionism is a term which is often used without clarification
of its meaning. The final section of the chapter provides an introduction to some of the key
debates within social constructionism, and outlines the constructionist stance which will be
adopted throughout the rest of the thesis.
What are Social Impacts Anyway?
Although there are numerous definitions of SIA in the literature and, as illustrated in
Chapter 1, lengthy discussions about how it should proceed, there is surprisingly little
attention paid to the question of what social impacts actually are. Definitions of social
impact are few and far between, and where they do exist often do not consider social
impact separately from its assessment. This results in some rather unedifying definitions;
for instance Wolf (1983) states that 'what one does in SIA is to assess the social impacts'
(p16), and Porter et al (1980) define social impacts as those which sociologists,
psychologists and anthropologists assess. When attempts are made to spell out what is
meant by social impact, definitions are typically short and state simply that impacts are
effects or changes on some aspects of social life, brought about by a project. A selection
of such definitions are provided below:
(SIA assesses) social effects of changes in the physical environment. (Rohe
198 1:369)
A Social Impact Assessment is (1) an analysis of past and present impingements
upon local social conditions and processes and (2) a projection of proposed
interventions upon these aspects of life. (Gold 1978:107)
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In a nutshell impacts include the indirect as well as the direct effects of a proposed
action.. .the impacts, in short, include the full range of significant consequences of
the action - the effects or changes that take place because of the action and that
would not have occurred otherwise. (Freudenberg 1989:135)
Social assessment (is)... a process used to anticipate and manage social change
arising from policies and projects. (Taylor et al 1990:43)
One problem that is acknowledged about these definitions is the difficulty of knowing
which effects or changes are 'significant' enough to merit assessment (Meidinger and
Schnaiberg,1980). This is a problem which applies to ETA as a whole; Malcolm (1994)
criticises the EC directive's advice that projects which will have a 'significant effect' upon
the environment should be subject to ETA pointing out that whether a project will have a
'significant impact' often cannot be known in advance. Gilpin (1995) also notes that the
directive provides no definition of what constitutes a significant impact, and argues that the
concept of significance is inevitably subjective, and likely to be defined by those
responsible for carrying out the assessment.
While clear definitions of social impact are rare, extensive examples of the sort of changes
that should be considered in an SIA are often provided. For instance Finsterbusch (1977)
categorises impacts into those on individual quality of life, those on organisations and those
on communities, then further subdivides each category. The Guidelines and Principles for
Social Impact Assessment (1994) provides a much more elaborate categorisation dividing
impacts under the headings of population characteristics, community and institutional
structure, political and social resources, individual and family changes, community resources
and then listing variables to be considered under each heading. It advises that each variable
should be considered at the different stages of a project's life - planning, implementation,
operation, decommissioning. However, regardless of the extent of the list, providing
examples of impacts likely to be significant still does not constitute a definition of social
impact.
In his discussion of ETA Gilpin problematizes the term 'impact', pointing out that:
it is difficult to think of an impact..as being anything but a sharp blow.(1995:5)
and suggests that this does not fit well with the way in which environmental changes
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actually come about or are experienced. He does not however carry this criticism through,
but sticks with the term 'impact' as it has acquired such wide usage. A review of the SIA
literature reveals that this sort of definition of impact is implicit in much of it, and
explicitly stated in some of it. It is assumed that social impacts result in a direct and
mechanistic way from changes in the physical environment. This assumption is stated
clearly in the book by Taylor et al., who write:
It can be suggested that changes in the social-cultural system automatically follow
from bio-physical alteration. (1990:51)
Kroll-Smith and Couch make the same point:
tecimological degradation of the biosphere sets in motion organisational activities
and psychological processes that frequently result in personal, social and cultural
change. (1991:293)
This model of the relationship between environmental and social change is informed by the
ideas of Environmental Sociologists such as Catton and Dunlap (1978, 1980) who argue
that sociologists should consider the interaction between social and environmental variables,
and draw attention to the way in which changes in one sphere result in changes in the other
(for a fuller discussion of their work see p36-39). Proponents of this sort of Environmental
Sociology argue that this approach is based on an ecological worldview which emphasises
the interconnected nature of all aspects of life. However its origins can also be clearly
traced to functional sociology which shares an emphasis on the interdependence of
functional units. Functionalist approaches pervade much SIA a/though are rarely explicitly
presented as such (Disanto 1981). For instance the methodology outlined by Olsen et al
(1981) requires the assessor to identify 'community goals' aud çiredct 'commrk tcc&Lce
changes' as a result of the development, and that presented by Flynn et al (1983) involves
identifying 'principal functional groups in the community' and their 'interaction patterns'.
Disanto suggest that this functionalist orientation predominates as it is similar to systems
approaches familiar to the scientists or engineers who commission assessments. As a result
it is easier for them to understand and accept than other sociological approaches.
In viewing the community as a system made up of 'functional units' connected by
'interaction patterns' social impact can be conceptualised in a mechanistic fashion. The
assumption is that the community 'functions' until something 'impacts' upon it. The task
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of the impact assessor is to predict how the impact will change or damage the functioning
of the community and suggest ways of preserving its smooth functioning.
The functional model of social impact implies a particular model of the relationship
between environment and society. The 'environment' is conceptualised as outside of, or
separate from, society or the community. Although the two things are described as
interdependent and interactive with each other, they are clearly depicted as separate realms.
The social structure or system changes in response to changes in the physical environment
which surrounds it. This conceptualisation of the relationship between the environmental
and social spheres is implicit in the SIA literature; it is surprisingly hard to find any overt
consideration of the relationship or distinction between environmental and social impacts.
The assumption seems to be that the distinction between 'people impacts' (Wolf 1983) and
bio-physical effects is self-evident. There are several problems with this assumption of a
clear distinction between social and environmental impacts.
First, the assigning of the social and the environmental to separate spheres which impact
upon each other presents a model of social change which neglects the role of human
agency, meaning and interpretation. Social change is envisaged as a simple response to an
outside stimulus. Some of those writing in the field recognise this implicit assumption and
draw attention to its inadequacy. Disanto et al argue for the introduction of a symbolic
interactionist perspective to SIA which recognises that human beings are not:
merely organisms with some degree of organisation who respond to forces which
impinge upon them. (1981:30)
but instead are:
individuals or actors with selves... (who) act by making indications to themselves
of things in their surroundings which thus provide a guide to their actions. (ibid)
Secondly, such a distinction is hard to maintain on the basis of NEPA or the EC directive's
recommendations. Both present a definition of environmental impact which is profoundly
anthropocentric - the environmental effects to be considered are those which affect some
aspect of human life either directly or indirectly. The environment is not considered to
have an intrinsic value but deserves protection to the extent that its preservation is essential
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for human wellbeing. From this position there can be no environmental impacts which are
not in some sense social impacts - whether they affect health, deplete resources, pollute the
air, water or earth or change the appearance of a landscape, environmental changes affect
individuals and groups in society. Thus it becomes hard to maintain the idea of a natural
distinction between social and environmental impacts.
In addition the social impacts of a new development may well be defined to include issues
of concern to the local population. The impacts which people are prepared to protest about
and seek to avoid are often not only those which affect their lives in a direct way. For
instance in the recent protest against the building of the Newbury bypass in the UK (see
p68-69 for a discussion of recent road protests) much of the action was oriented towards
protecting trees. Although of course it can be argued that the presence of trees is important
to people for aesthetic and perhaps recreational purposes, part of the rationale was that the
trees themselves had intrinsic value. Cutting down trees may not appear to have a direct
social impact however it was an issue which generated considerable opposition and
consequently problems for the developers. In addition it was an issue around which groups
formed and divisions within the local community developed - thus it has an ongoing social
impact in the traditional sense of the term. For plairners and developers part of the
rationale for STA is to anticipate likely areas of concern amongst the local populace and so
to exclude environmental concern is likely to be counterproductive.
It is not that a distinction between social and environmental impacts carmot be made, but
that the distinction is not obvious or natural. Making a distinction between the two is an
analytic or definitional act. Spector and Kitsuse make a similar point in a critique of the
common assumption that 'physical conditioiis' such as earthquakes and floods do not
qualify as social problems. They argue that:
A flood is not a physical condition, but rather a condition that is defined as physical,
rather than for example, social or technological. Physical is a meaning that we
attach to a condition, and as such, a meaning that might shift and change (1987:46)
Similarly to describe some impacts as social and others as environmental is to impose a
categorisation or judgement, the distinction is not given.
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This treatment of social impact: a lack of a clear definition, provision of lists of social
impacts which have little in common, a lack of theory of the process of impact, and a
functionalist orientation to social change, echoes almost exactly Spector and Kitsuse's
(1987) criticism of the field of social problems research. Their book Constructing Social
Problems opens with the assertion that:
There is no adequate definition of social problems within sociolog y and there is not
and never has been a sociology of social problems. (1987:1)
They question what is gained by listing a diverse range of things such as drug addiction,
racism, divorce, pollution, war and community disorganisation as examples of social
problems, arguing that such things have little in common to justify their grouping in the
same category of 'social problems'. The parallels with SIA are striking both in the lack of
a definition of the subject matter and in the assumption that an extensive list of social
phenomena can be classified together as 'social impacts'. Spector and Kitsuse go on to
outline the functionalist orientation of much previous work on social problems which
involves identifying conditions or behaviours that 'impede the fulfilment of society's goals,
that interfere with the smooth functioning of society, or that throw society into
disequilibrium' (ibid:23). They argue that such a functional approach contributes nothing
to the study of social problems and it does not provide any clearer insight into their
distinctive nature:
even if the functional formulation were taken seriously and rigorously applied to
empirical research, it would not produce a sociology of social problems, but only
a sociology of social disorganisation, an explanation of social conditions, but not of
social problems. (ibid:39)
They suggest that a sociology of social problems should be concerned with the organisation
of activities and claims about social problems, rather than with the causes of or solutions
to the problems themselves. Analysis focuses on how a particular condition comes to be
identified as a social problem at a particular time, how that problem is defined and what
solutions are considered desirable.
In the following section the social constructionist approach is outlined in greater detail, and
finally recommended as a promising direction for sociologists interested in the impacts of
new developments.
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An Introduction to Social Constructionism
This section provides an introduction to social constructionism, focusing on some of the key
divisions and debates within the approach. As debates about social constructionism have
been most thoroughly developed within the field of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
(SSK), it is necessary to consider some of this work. However it should be emphasised that
the intention here is simply to introduce some of the key debates rather than to provide a
complete review of the use of social constructionism in SSK.
The term 'social construction' is widely used within the social sciences. Velody talks of
the 'ever growing spread of the theme of social construction' (1994:81) and Fuller writes
that: researchers in virtually every branch of the human sciences are currently 'applying'
constructivist principles and insights to a host of topics. (1994:87)
However it is often unclear exactly what is meant by the term:
'social construction' and 'construction' do not generally mean the same thing from
one author to another, and even within the same work the terms are meant to draw
our attention to several quite different types of phenomena. (Sismondo 1993:515)
While social constructionism has become a key term in sociological analysis, just
what it signifies remains an open question, and a clear formulation of its general
usage, and indeed of its lineage, has yet to be written. (Velody 1994:82)
Additional confusion is generated by the fact that some authors use the term 'social
constructionism while others favour 'social constructivism' or sin2p)v 'constructionism' or
'constructivism' without providing a rationale for their chosen terminology.1
In a recent review of social constructionism Sarbin and Kitsuse (1994) trace the approach's
roots to the works of Schutz (1967) and Berger and Luckmann (1967), social
interactionism, the work of Goffman and ethnomethodology. As a consequence of this
diverse heritage many different types of analysis are presented under the guise of social
constructionism. What these analyses share is their questioning or rejection of realist
approaches which take as given the reality or 'out-there-ness' of events, conditions and
At a recent conference on social constructionism (Constructing the Social, University
of Durham, April 1994) discussion about the various terms revealed no clear rationale for
preferring one term over another.
25
institutions. By contrast social constructionist approaches draw attention to the ways in
which these things are constructed through social action and interaction. Sarbin and Kitsuse
write that central to the approach is the conviction that:
Social objects are not given 'in the world' but are constructed, negotiated, reformed,
fashioned and organised by human beings in their efforts to makes sense of
happenings in the world. (1994:3)
The approach has been developed most notably within the fields of SSK and the sociology
of social problems. These fields have largely developed separately from each other, with
the work on science paying more attention to issues of epistemology and ontology while
the social problems field has been characterised more by case studies of particular social
problems.
Within SSK social constructionist studies emerged as a response to the recommendations
of the 'Strong Programme' formulated by Bloor (1976). Woolgar (1988) outlines the four
key principles of the approach; causality, impartiality, symmetry and reflexivity. The
principle of causality states that the aim of SSK is to discern the conditions which bring
about beliefs or states of knowledge, while the principle of impartiality recommends that
the beliefs or knowledge which are chosen for study should not be selected on the basis of
their perceived truth, rationality or success. The principle of symmetry proposes that
regardless of whether the knowledge studied is characterised as 'true' or 'false', the same
sorts of explanation should be used tQ explain it. Fnal'j the pncp 1 e c
recognises that in principle sociological analyses and arguments can be deconstructed and
explained in the same way as other scientific knowledge. Lynch (1994) notes that the
principle of causality is not entirely accepted within SSK, but that the principles of
symmetry and impartiality 'continue to be advocated in all major lines of
constructivist. . .inquiry' (p'75).
The implications of the strong programme have led to sustained debate within SSK, and to
the development of a variety of approaches all of which might broadly be described as
social constructionist. In a review of social constructionism in SSK Sismondo draws a
distinction between those adopting a mild constructionist position and those adopting a
radical constructionist position. Those he characterises as mild constructionists draw
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attention to the social processes that are involved in the development of scientific
institutions, epistemologies and knowledges. Sismondo describes such studies as useful and
suggests that they are relatively uncontroversial as they consider how social reality is
socially constructed:
Institutions are primarily social realities, not material ones, and it is social reality
that is socially constructed in Berger and Luckmann's sense. (1993:522)
These studies retain a distinction between the social and the material world - a position
which Sismondo himself adheres to:
the distinction can be drawn roughly along the line of meaningfulness: social objects
must be meaningful, whereas material objects are only meaningful when they are
incorporated into the social. Meaningfulness might be one way in which we could
characterise the difference between the social and the material. (ibid:524)
The work which he describes as radical constructionism denies that such a distinction can
easily be drawn between social and material reality, and argues that material stuff'
(ibid:534) can also be taken to be socially constructed. Sismondo illustrates this position
particularly by considering the work of Knorr-Cetina, Latour and Woolgar (1986) and
Woolgar (1988). Latour and Woolgar make a case for the social construction not just of
institutions but of material phenomena and facts themselves:
We do not wish to say that facts do not exist nor that there is no such thing as
reality...our point is that 'out-there-ness' is the consequence of scientific work rather
than its cause. (1986:180)
In Science the Veiy Idea (1988) Woolgar argues against the common sense notion that
objects precede representations suggesting instead that representation constitutes or gives
rise to the object (1988:65). Sismondo depicts this work as abandoning 'any commitment
to a world of things-in themselves'(p535). Thus he draws a distinction between mild
constructionism which draws attention to the social processes involved in the construction
of scientific knowledge and a more radical position which sees world views as actually
constructing material objects (p547).
A comparable distinction between fori-ns of constructionism exists within research on social
problems.	 Here the division is characterised as between contextual and strict
constructionjsm (Best 1989). Contextual constructionists are those who maintain a
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distinction between what participants believe or claim about social conditions and what is
'in fact' known about the conditions. This position is most clearly exemplified in Best's
work (1989, 1993) in which he makes it clear that contextual constructionists are interested
in 'objective conditions' (1993:136-137) and in assessing the relative merit of claims about
those conditions. Strict constructionists on the other hand avoid making any assumptions
about 'the reality' of conditions and focus entirely on the èlaims made about them:
The strict constructionist is not interested in assessing or judging the truth, accuracy,
credibility or reasonableness of what members say and do. (Schneider and Kitsuse
1 989:xii)
At times strict constructionism in social problems research comes close to the radical
constructionism of Woolgar et al - for instance Spector and Kitsuse claim that social
problems are the activities of those who assert the existence of conditions, rather than being
'actual' conditions (1987:74), and more recently Ibarra and Kitsuse have referred to social
problems as 'constituted by claims making activity' (1993:26). However the main thrust
of the approach seems to be that the sociologist should not engage with the question of
whether the asserted condition actually exists or not, or attempt to asses the validity of the
claims being made. Rather the sociologist's job is to attempt to account for the emergence,
organisation and maintenance of claims making activity. There is clear parallel here with
the concern of the 'Strong Programme' to account for the conditions which bring about
beliefs and to remain agnostic about whether those beliefs are true or false.
Although this distinction between contextual and strict constructionism within social
problems research differs from that between mild and radical constructionisni in SSK both
deal with the relationship between social activities and 'reality'. In SSK the debate is about
whether social forces or activities are simply involved in the construction of knowledges
or whether they can also be said to construct material reality. Within social problems
research debate centres on whether the sociologist accepts that the truth' about social
conditions can be known, or whether they hold that conditions are not of interest except to
the extent that they are said to exist or are talked about by members themselves (Schneider
and Kitsuse:xii).
Sismondo notes that within the social studies of science literature the majority of
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constructionist studies adopt a mild form of analysis, and even those which espouse radical
aims often end up providing a mild analysis (op cit:545). Similarly within social problems
research contextual studies are far more common than strict ones (see for instance the
collection edited by Sarbin and Kitsuse 1994). In a rare example of a cross-over between
SSK and social problems research, Woolgar and Pawluch (1985) observe that the vast
majority of constructionist studies of social problems make some assumption about the
reality of the condition they are discussing. They tend to claim that the incidence of the
'problem' under investigation has remained stable - whether it is coffee drinking, heroin use
or child beating - while claims making activities about the condition have changed.
all these works make claims of their own, the truth value of which is never
questioned. (p2l5)
Elsewhere Woolgar (1983) depicts the social constructionist as being on a 'greasy pole'
between realism and relativism - at times sliding towards making realist claims about the
nature of a condition, then sliding back to more relativist claims about the alternative ways
in which a 'problem' might be constructed.
Woolgar and Pawluch suggest that these 'lapses into realism' can be understood in three
ways. First they suggest that they might be read as a 'description for what passes for a
successful style of explanation of social problems'(p224). In order to develop a
constructionist account of a condition some 'objective' statement about the nature of the
condition is necessary so that the claim that definitions and representations of the condition
have changed can be strongly made. The second possibility is that this 'ontological
gerrymandering' represents a serious failing in constructionist studies, and that more caution
in such work is necessary. However their final possible reading of the phenomenon
suggests that even if social constructionists exercise more caution such inconsistencies will
remain. They imply that this sort of inconsistency - treating the ontological status of some
classes of object as given and others as questionable - is an unavoidable feature of social
problems arguments.
The successful social problems explanation depends on making problematic the truth
status of certain states of affairs selected for analysis and explanation, while
backgrounding or minimising the possibility that the same problems apply to
assumptions upon which the analysis depends. (1985:216)
They are particularly critical of the way in which social constructionists 'apply relativism
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to the definitional activities of others, but fail to consider its relevance for their own
explanatory formulations' (198 5b: 159)
Woolgar and Pawluch (1985b) go on to consider 'I-low shall we move beyond
constructivism?' and suggest that questions such as 'what rhetorical strategies do we use
to construct our explanations? what forms of presentation can be used to interrogate the
nature of those strategies' (p162) pose new and fruitful questions, and indicate a way out
of what they identify as the inevitable contradictions of social constructionism. Woolgar
has made similar pleas for greater reflexivity within studies of scientific knowledge and
practice (1983, 1988). While acknowledging that examining the rhetorical strategies which
constitute social problems explanations will not contribute to 'our understanding of the
world as we have traditionally conceived that pursuit' (Woolgar and Pawluch 1985b:162),
the rationale for greater reflexivity is that it offers the opportunity to 'reappraise traditional
conceptions of our pursuit of knowledge' (ibid). Thus the aim is not to contribute either
to an understanding of social problems activity or of scientific knowledge but rather to
contribute to a 'thoroughgoing sociology of knowledge' (Woolgar 1988:48). Not
surprisingly this belief in the benefits of moving towards greater reflexivity has not been
uncritically received either within social problems research or SSK.
In 1992 Collins and Yearley published 'Epistemological Chicken' in which they criticised
SSK for its ever increasing relativism, likening its proponents to participants in a game of
chicken where each tries to be the last to cross the road in front of passing cars. They
suggested that as participants in a game of chicken risk being run over, so those proposing
ever increasing relativism come close to 'self destruction' (p308). They acknowledge the
possibility of deconstructing their own accounts but question the usefulness of the
'progressive regress' (1992b:380). In contrast to Woolgar's identification of 'lapses into
realism' as a problem which dogs social constructionism, Collins and Yearley recommend
that such 'meta-alternation' should be accepted as a principle, rather than treated as a
failing. Their approach is pragmatic, accepting that analysts move from one dimension to
another in the course of developing explanations:
We say, choose the dimension upon which you want to work according to the goals
you have in mind. (1992b:378)
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Unsurprisingly Collins and Yearley's suggestions that reflexivity serves little useful
purpose, and their pragmatic response to the 'greasy pole' of social constructionism have
resulted in further debate and disagreement within SSK (see for instance, Woolgar 1992,
Callon & Latour 1992, Roth 1994).
In the social problems area Ibarra and Kitsuse (1994) argue that a clear distinction between
the practical project that members are involved in (making claims about a condition) and
the theoretical project that the sociologist is engaged in is fundamental to a constructionist
methodological stance (1994:29). They suggest that a contextual constructionist position
blurs this distinction and sociologists end up making claims about the 'truth' of conditions
in the same way as participants. This distinction between a practical and a theoretical
project perhaps provides an additional explanation of why so many studies fail to adhere
to a strict constructionist position. While attracted by the insights of social constructionism
and the possibilities it opens up for sociological exploration of domains that seem initially
entirely un-social, many sociologists find it hard and perhaps undesirable to eschew totally
any practical project. This is likely to be more of a dilemma for those involved in providing
analyses of social problems than for those interested in scientific knowledge.
Even where social constructionist analyses of social problems attempt to adhere to the
theoretical project of accounting for the emergence and maintenance of claims making
activities, the very act of selecting claims making activities to focus upon may be seen as
participating in a 'practical project'. Social constructionist analyses of social problems
often serve to provide an alternative to the established account of the phenomena. The
collection by Sarbin and Kitsuse provides a clear example of this with many papers serving
to present, and implicitly support, the view of 'the underdog'.
Thus, reports of constructionist research often present arguments that are infused
with various moral perspectives. (Sarbin & Kitsuse 1994:9)
Lynch (1994) also notes how, in their efforts to adhere to the principles of symmetry and
impartiality, constructionist studies:
may seem to promote a vanquished or marginal theory at the expense of the
victorious or established program. (p78)
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The recommendation to attempt to adhere to a theoretical project is made while recognising
that in everyday life 'we presume a reality independent of our accounting procedures'
(Woolgar 1983:246). Thus the social constructionist position is counter-intuitive and
sometimes appears to run counter to common-sense - of course there is a 'reality' out there.
1-lowever it is this very feature of social constructionism - questioning what seems to be so
obviously given - which provides it with its analytic potential. It takes the sociological
charge to show that things might be other than they appear to its very limits.
Social constructionism continues to be popular, as the incorporation of aspects of the
approach into many sociological analyses of environmental issues demonstrates (see Ch3).
Before moving on to examine this body of work more closely, some outline of the
constructionist position which will be adopted in this thesis is necessary. First, while
understanding the objections raised by Sismondo against the consideration of material
reality as socially constructed I do not accept that this involves 'abandoning any
commitment to things in themselves' as he suggests. It is possible to concede the reality
of 'things in themselves' while maintaining that what those things are, what they are called,
and what they mean are socially constructed. Secondly, with Collins and Yearley I take a
pragmatic approach to the shifting between different levels of analysis which characterises
social constructionist accounts. Their recommendation to be clear about the goals of the
analysis that you are producing seems to be a good one. This recommendation can also be
applied to the issue of whether social constructionist analyses are implicitly pursuing moral
or political goals while claiming a neutral or impartial position. The advice routinely made
to researchers to be aware of and to acknowledge the commitments which inform their
research should apply to those producing social constructionist analyses as much as to any
other sociologist. Finally, with regard to the issue of the usefulness of social constructionist
analyses, while supporting attempts to adhere to a theoretical project I do not accept the
criticism that sometimes follows that social constructionist analyses serve no useful purpose.
In presenting an alternative account of a 'problem' some contribution is inevitably made
to the 'practical project'. In addition even in cases where no policy or practical
implications are clear at the time of writing, the analysis may well prove useful at a later
date. The relationship between research and policy will be considered in more detail later
(p60), with particular regard to social constructionist analyses of environmental issues.
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Conclusion - The Social Construction of Social Impacts
Despite the development of a substantial literature on the assessment of social impacts little
attention has been paid to developing a definition of the concept. Most of the literature
implicitly adopts a functional model of impact and assumes an unproblematic distinction
between social and environmental impacts. In sum the process of social impact is under
theorised. Social constructionism provides an ideal approach for developing a better
understanding of the process of social impact. It offers a way of exploring questions such
as how some things get identified and responded to as impacts while others do not, and
provide a richer understanding of how impacts are constructed as serious.
As outlined in Chapter 1 one of the key debates within the SIA literature has been the
extent to which SIA should consider 'subjective' impacts such as local people's feelings
about new developments, and also the place of 'subjective' or qualitative analysis in the
assessment. To date most SIAs have focused on economic data and employed quantitative
analysis - a situation considered undesirable by those who claim that understanding what
a development means to local people is essential for the assessment of its impact. The
social constructionist approach to social impact developed in this thesis enables a detailed
exploration of local people's claims about social impacts - as Sarbin and Kitsuse say
'members' stories are the raw materials for constructionist research' (1994:8). However this
does not mean that the analysis is confined to what have been previously deemed to be
'subjective' impacts. In line with the recommendations of the strong programme and strict
constructionism, no distinction is made between those impacts that can be measured and
those that people perceive to be real. What is considered here are those things which local
people consider to be impacts whether these are 'objective' impacts such as noise or
pollution, or 'subjective' impacts such as changes in the 'feel' of the place in which they
live. Participants claims are not assessed on the basis of whether they are true or false but
are analyzed in order to understand how social impacts are constructed.
The aim here is to provide a sociological analysis of social impacts and particularly to
demonstrate how they are socially constructed, rather than to contribute directly to
methodologies for the assessment of social impacts. It is probably fair to say that most of
those writing in the SIA field are not particularly concerned with developing a sociology
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of SIA, but raiher with making contributions to its effective practice. As such to illustrate
how social impacts are socially constructed may seem of little consequence. However
drawing such a distinction between sociology and practice is unhelpful and rules out fruitful
interaction between the two (see page 60 for a discussion of the complicated relationship
between theory and practice). Although it is not the primary aim of this thesis, the
opportunity to reflect upon and theorise the process of social impact may yield insights
which prove useful to those concerned with the development of SIA methodology.
An analysis of the social construction of social impacts also contributes to the developing
field of the sociology of the environment. The following chapter introduces this area and
draws particular attention to the debate which is proving to be central in the area about the
relative merits of realist and social constructionist approaches to environmental issues. To
date the literature on SIA has developed more or less in isolation from the wider theoretical
debates pursued in the sociology of the environment. This thesis provides an opportunity
to integrate the two areas and thus contribute to both.
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Chapter 3
Social Constructionism and the Sociology of the Environment
This chapter provides a review of the sociology of the environment, outlining both realist
and constructionist approaches. The field is depicted as emerging with a strong realist and
moral agenda and as a consequence the development of constructionist studies of
environmental issues has met with some hostility. The realist critique of social
constructionist studies of environmental issues is examined and then rejected on the basis
of a variety of counter arguments. It is concluded that social constructionism provides a
useful and exciting contribution to sociology of the environment, and the approach could
usefully be applied to develop a better understanding of social impacts alongside other
environmental issues.
Although the sociology of the environment is a comparatively new and small area within
the discipline, in recent years publications in the area have proliferated. It is difficult to
provide an exact assessment of the size of the field in terms of number of books or papers
published, however some idea of the growth in the area can be given by the observation
that Routledge (one of the foremost social science publishers in the UK) now has two book
series devoted to the area - the Global Environmental Change Series and the Environment
and Society Series. An indication that sociology of the environment is now considered to
be an important subfield of the discipline is also provided by the recent (1995) publication
of a collection of 97 papers on the subject in a volume entitled The Sociology of the
Environment, published as part of a series entitled 'The International Library of Critical
Writing in Sociology' (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited). Given the rapidly expanding
nature of the field it is not possible to provide a comprehensive review of the entire
literature. However what follows aims to illustrate the main foci of studies and debates
within the area.
The Emergence of Environmental Sociology
In February 1991 Howard Newby, then chairman of the UK Economic and Social Research
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Council (ESRC), gave a lecture to mark the fortieth Anniversary of the founding of the
British Sociological Association (BSA). The lecture was entitled 'One World, Two
Cultures: Sociology and the Environment' and paved the way for the announcement later
in the same year that the ESRC was to fund a major research programme into Global
Environmental Change (GEC). The central theme of Newby's lecture was that the social
sciences are central to the study of the environment but that:
The contribution of Sociology to the public debate on environmental change, and
even to debates within the social sciences has hitherto been negligible.. .(Newby
1991: 1)
1-le outlined a variety of possible reasons for this state of affairs concluding that the main
reason was sociologists' reluctance to re-examine and re-conceptualise the link between
society and nature (ibid:7).
Within his lecture Newby conceded that his claim was 'exaggerated for effect' (p6) and
acknowledged the contribution of a handful of British writers. However he maintained that
overall the contribution of sociology 'has been negligible' (p6). He argued that sociological
research on environmental issues had focused on the study of environmental values and
environmental organisations (see Lowe and Goyder 1983) and had not engaged with the
'material aspects' (p7) of environmental change. Although this claim had some truth in
terms of British Sociology, it ignored a substantial body of work initiated by American
sociologists who had begun to address these issues over a decade earlier.
Most notable of these were William Catton and Riley Dunlap who, like Newby, were
convinced that Sociology should respond to environmental change. In a series of papers
published in the late 1970s and early 1980s (e.g. Catton and Dunlap 1978, 1980, Dunlap
and Catton 1979) they outlined the grounds for the development of an Environmental
Sociology which they believed would constitute a paradigmatic shift for the discipline. The
crux of their argument was that:
The changed ecological conditions confronting human societies seriously challenge
sociology, for the discipline developed in an era when humans seemed exempt from
ecological constraints. Disciplinary traditions and assumptions that evolved during
the age of exuberant growth imbued sociology with a woridview or paradigm which
impedes recognition of the societal significance of current ecological realities. Thus
sociology stands in need of a fundamental alteration in its disciplinary paradigm
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(Catton and Dunlap 1980:15).
Catton and Dunlap characterised the 'Dominant Western Woridview' as strongly
anthropocentric and optimistic about the possibility of continual progress. They argued that
sociology has been informed by this profoundly un-ecological woridview - being premised
on a belief in the firm distinction between humans and other animals, and faith in continual
social progress. In addition they drew attention to the contribution of two of sociology's
founders - Durkheirn and Weber - in ensuring that the discipline was based on 'an
ecologically unsound set of assumptions about human societies'(1980:18). Durkheim's
legacy was his insistence on the distinction of the social from the natural world, embodied
in his assertion that the cause of a social fact must always be another social as opposed to
a biological, psychological or physical fact. Catton and Dunlap suggested that this had
translated into a general taboo within the discipline against the reduction of social facts to
biological and physical variables, and had affected the choice of variables which
sociologists were able to consider as explanations for human behaviour. In his 1991 lecture
to the BSA Newby reiterated this point arguing that:
The very character of sociology in the nineteenth century emerged out of attempts
to delineate the 'social' from 'human nature', and to assert the dominance of the
cultural (nurture) over the evolutionary (nature). (op cit:7)
Weber's contribution to the un-ecological bias of the discipline was his emphasis on the
importance of understanding how individuals define their situations. Catton and Dunlap
argued that within this interpretive tradition actors' definitions of their situation have been
taken to be influenced by their interpretations of the actions and beliefs of other people
around them, rather than by the physical characteristics of a situation. Physical properties
become relevant only if they are identified as such by actors.
Catton and Dunlap concluded that together these influences constitute a 'set of conceptual
blinders' (1980:22) which have made it difficult for sociologists to recognise the importance
of the environmental problems that are now the subject of considerable public concern
(ibid:22). They referred to this outlook as the Human Exemptionalist Paradigm (HEP) as
it treats human societies as if they were exempt from environmental constraints - humans
are seen as distinct from other forms of life, their behaviour is not seen as constrained or
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facilitated by aspects of the natural environment and it is assumed that human progress can
continue indefinitely with no acknowledgement of any natural limits to growth.
Catton and Dunlap argued that if sociology is to contribute to understanding and addressing
environmental problems it needs to shake off its anthropocentrism and to acknowledge
natural limits to growth. They were optimistic that such changes were already underway.
Indications from surveys that public values and attitudes were beginning to shift and
become more environmental provided them with hope that the dominant western woridview
was being eroded. In addition the emergence of sociological research on the interactions
between humans and the environment (for example Schnaiberg's (1975) work on the
societal impacts of resource scarcity and Burch's (1976) study of the links between social
inequality, environmental degradation and health) heralded a parallel change within
sociology. For Catton and Dunlap this emerging sociological literature signalled an
important development within the discipline:
by their acceptance of environmental variables as relevant for understanding human
behaviour and social organisation...(they) implicitly challenge the HEP. (1980:32)
They claimed that the HEP was on the verge of being replaced by a New Ecological
Paradigm (NEP). The image of human societies provided by the NEP is fundamentally
different from that provided by the HEP. In sharp contrast to the anthropocentric bias of
the IIEP it stresses the ecosystem dependence of human societies. Its main departures from
the HEP are the ideas that: while humans have exceptional characteristics (culture,
technology etc.) they remain one among many species that are interdependently involved
in the global ecosystem; that social life is influenced not only by social and cultural factors
but also by environmental ones; and that resources are finite and thus there are absolute
limits to growth. Dunlap and Catton claimed that the distinguishing feature of the emergent
Environmental Sociology is the willingness of its practitioners to examine relationships
between social and environmental variables, thus breaking the traditional taboo against
including 'nonsocial' variables in sociological analyses. They suggested that environmental
sociologists should examine the probable societal impacts of nonsocial phenomena, both in
terms of individual effects (e.g. of pollution on health) and wider societal consequences
(e.g. effect of resource scarcity on patterns of conflict and competition). The sociological
programme they outlined was one in which the discipline would become 'greener', paying
38
more attention to the causes and consequences of environmental changes.
Newby's (1991) lecture can be seen as an important landmark in the development of
Environmental Sociology in the UK, not only for its exhortation to sociologists to pay
attention to environmental issues, but preceding as it did the availability of substantial funds
to enable that research. The agenda Newby outlined was clearly a realist one. Like Catton
and Dunlap he stressed the reality and severity of environmental problems paying particular
attention to issues of resource depletion and their implications for society. Echoing Catton
and Dunlap's critique of Weber's legacy, he criticised existing sociological work on the
environment, for instance that on environmental values and organisations, for failing to
engage with the material dimensions of environmental change:
The environment' is interpreted not materially, but culturally, as a set of symbols
which furnish, in the contemporary world, the predominant vocabulary of discontent.
Environmental change is analyzed, not for what it is, but for what it symbolises.
(199 1:6)
This appeal for sociologists to contribute to debate on the causes and consequences of
environmental change has been taken up by a number of British sociologists. For example
Luke Martell's (1994) book 'Ecology and Society; an introduction' is an attempt to
demonstrate how social and political thought can enrich ecology, while ecology, in turn, can
bring fresh and useful insights to the social sciences. 1-us commitment to environmentalism
is clear and he stresses the importance of sociological approaches which acknowledge the
objective nature of environmental problems (ibid:124). For instance he outlines the
relationship between industrial systems and the environment, drawing attention to the
environmental impacts of industrialism, and the ensuing implications for industrial
economies of resource depletion and environmental degradation.
Dickens (1992) is less concerned with environmental problems than with the reciprocal
relationship between society and nature. He presents his book Society and Nature: Towards
a Green Social Theoiy as an attempt to respond to Catton and Dunlaps challenge to
produce sociology grounded within an ecological paradigm. His too is an explicitly realist
agenda being concerned to illustrate the degree of reciprocity between the social and the
natural spheres. In common with Catton and Dunlap, Newby, and Martell he criticises
sociological approaches to the environment which have:
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remained almost entirely social, or what scientists might call cultural (1992:6)
and argues that sociology is unable to respond to environmental problems as it insists on
a rigid division between the social and the natural. Dickens' proposal is for the
development of new alliances between the natural and social sciences which would enable
the integrated study of environmental issues:
A way forward is the development of a unified approach, one which.. .recognises that
people are part of nature and vice versa. (ibid:15)
He is optimistic that this proposal is workable, drawing attention to the early work of Marx
and Engels in which nature is conceptualised as man's inorganic body; to the 'new biology'
of Goodwin et al. (1990) which draws attention to the reciprocal relationships between
organisms and their environment; and to elements of contemporary psychology such as
Harre et al.'s (1985) work which draws attention to the 'development or unfolding of
individuals' capacities within distinctive types of environment' (Dickens op cit:134).
Dickens is not alone in the desire to see an end to the split between natural and social
science. Benton (1991) similarly argues for a reconsideration of the relationship between
biology and social science. He argues that when considering subjects such as gender,
inequalities in physical health and mental illness, maintaining the segregation of biological
and social scientific research is counterproductive. He argues for the development of new
models which recognise the interactions between the social and the biological. Similarly
in the sphere of environmental research he argues that:
the constitutive duali sms of biology/society, nature/culture and cause/meaning
obstruct the sociological investigation of the relations between these abstractly
counterpoised domains. (1991:7)
Newby (1991) acknowledges that there have been good reasons for sociologists to fight shy
of explanations which draw on natural or biological factors. He writes that awareness of
the political misuse of biological determinism has resulted in a situation where even to
begin to discuss the possibility of the natural or biological affecting the social is to run the
risk of 'being tainted with an abhorrent political philosophy' (199 1:7). He too argues for
the need for a thorough reconceptualisation of the relations between the social and the
natural in order to find solutions to 'our pressing environmental problems' (ibid:8). Again
these argument had been made earlier by Dunlap and Catton (1983) in their emphasis on
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the need for environmental sociologists to 'overcome their fear of being charged with
reductionism and environmental determinism' (1983:125) in studying the reciprocal
relationships between society and the environment.
These authors all share a conviction of the reality of environmental problems. They argue
that sociology needs to change in order to respond to debate about the causes and
consequences of these problems, and hopefully to help to mitigate or avoid their effects.
They consider a reconceptualisation of the relationship between the social and natural to be
imperative; arguing that sociologists need to overcome their 'phobia' (Dunlap and Catton
1983:124) of engaging with issues of nature. They also share a critique of sociological
approaches which they consider to be concerned only with the symbolic, cultural or social
aspects of environmental change rather than their material reality. Those adhering to this
position are Environmental Sociologists - they are committed to developing a more
ecological or environmental sociology. Thus the agenda for sociologists interested in
environmental issues was set up as a distinctly realist and moral one - environmental
problems have serious implications for society, and sociologists should do what they can
to help understand and address them.
Social Constructionist Analyses of Environmental Issues
Alongside the emergence of this realist Environmental Sociology has come a proliferation
Terminology is confusing in this area too - Environmental Sociology emerged with
a clear realist agenda and was an attempt to develop a more environmental, or greener,
sociology. Other sociologists (e.g. Yearley 1991) argued that sociology is capable of
providing useful analyses of environmental issues in its current form and characterised their
work as sociology of the environment - the sociological study of environmental issues
rather than sociology informed by environmental issues. Dunlap & Catton (1994:7) adhere
to this distinction characterising work on the socially constructed aspects of ecological
problems as sociology of the environment, and that concerned with analyzing the social
causes and consequences of such problems as environmental sociology. However some
sociologists have produced constructionist studies of environmental issues yet characterise
their work as contributing to environmental sociology (for instance Hannigan (1995)
Environmental Sociology: A Social Constructionist Perspective and Greider and Garkovitch
who consider the social construction of nature and the environment but position themselves
'as environmental sociologists' (1994:5)). To avoid further confusion I use Environmental
Sociology to cover the more realist approaches, while constructionist studies are taken to
be contributing to a sociology of the environment.
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of social constructionist studies of environmental issues. Although the two bodies of work
have developed in parallel few of the constructionist studies are contributions to, or
critiques of the field of Environmental sociology. Rather the majority of studies have their
roots in existing research areas within sociology, notably, the study of social problems,
SSK, research on the media, and in the emerging field of risk. There is not yet a coherent
body of work on the social construction of the environment and environmental issues, rather
a disparate array of studies addressing different substantive topics, and employing different
forms of constructionist analysis.
Environme,ztal Problems as Social Problems
From the beginning of the social constructionist approach to social problems its
applicability to the analysis of environmental problems was acknowledged. In one of the
papers which Spector and Kitsuse (1987) cite as an important precursor of their own work,
Blurner (1971) lists environmental pollution and ecological destruction among a long list
of issues recognised as social problems by and in a society. Over the years Social
Problems (the journal in which many exemplars of social constructionist analyses of social
problems, and key debates about the approach have been published) has included a number
of constructionist analyses of environmental issues. The approach is particularly appealing
for analyzing environmental problems as they are often only manifest through the claims
made about them. Beck (1992) points out that one of the distinguishing features of the
environmental dangers or risks that have become the focus for contemporary public concern
is that they are not perceptible to the senses. He paints a graphic picture of how the
environmental hazards of the past, such as open sewers, could be seen and smelt, whereas
the hazards now of concern, such as pollution and radiation, are not readily perceptible.
People only know about these hazards and become concerned about them as a result of the
claims made by scientists and taken up by the media. Similarly Best (1989) draws
attention to the key role played by the claims of politicians and the press in placing ozone
depletion on the list of contemporary social problems:
Suppose that no-one noticed the declining ozone levels, or that politicians and the
press refused to take the issue seriously...it would not be on anyone's list of social
problems. (1989:xvii)
and Tester makes a more radical claim about global warming:
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If we take a problem like global warming, the point is precisely that this process is
not readily amenable to any kind of empirical proof. The case for an environmental
problem.. .can only be stipulated.. .the case for global warming can only be asserted
and it is accepted purely as a matter of faith. (1994:4)
In common with other social constructionist studies of social problems, studies of the social
construction of environmental problems tend to be characterised by the 'ontological
gerrymandering' identified by Woolgar and Pawluch, and also display the difficulty of
adhering to a theoretical project when analyzing environmental issues (see p29-32).
For instance Schoenfeld et al (1979) examine the role of the national press in the USA in
the initial construction of 'the environment' as a social problem. They concentrate on the
evolution of the terminology of 'environment' reviewing newspapers, periodicals and \oo\
indexes from the late 1950s to early 1970s. They suggest that as early claims makers
attempt to attract others to their proposed point of view, they are aided significantly if they
can find a distinctive term for their overall concern, if only for the convenience of headline
writers. Thus the examination of the evolution of a particular term can provide some clues
to the recruiting activities of claims makers in the early construction of a social problem.
Their research suggested that prior to 1969/79 the press were slow to report the views of
early environmental claims makers. In explaining why this situation changed at the end of
the 1960s they draw attention to external events and the rise of public concern:
by 1969-70, the environment imperative in all its manifest interdependencies had
become so compelling of attention that the press simply had to respond more
comprehensively. Hence the appearance o envronmena\ repore'cs, erNe'r
columns, even environmental sections. (1979:54)
Schoenfeld et al present their work as informed by Spector and Kitsuse's argument that
'social problems are products of particular constructions of social reality, rather than,
necessarily of actual physical conditions' (p138). However while concentrating on the
development of claims in the press, in their acceptance that 'the environment imperative'
has become 'so compelling of attention' they clearly retain a commitment to the 'reality'
of environmental change.
Capek's (1993) exploration of the emergence and application of the concept of
'environmental justice' in a campaign about contaminated land in Texas provides another
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clear example of the prevalence of contextual constructionist analyses. She makes no
attempt to 'background' either the existence of a 'real' problem or the seriousness of the
condition. For instance she writes:
Many residents were unaware of the seriousness of the contamination until they read
about it in the newspaper or were informed by a local environmental organisation.
(plO)
In addition Capek clearly favours residents' accounts that their neighbourhood is polluted
over those of the corporation who own the site whom she depicts as giving residents 'false
assurances' (p12) about the safety of the area. Thus in some important ways she adheres
to a realist position. However in focusing on the framing of the issue she takes a clearly
constructionist position. She points out that drawing attention to the symbolic dimensions
of protest is important because:
symbols themselves become resources to movements (p6)
Thus her analysis can sit alongside more realist analyses of the way in which structural
features such as the social class of participants influence the course and outcome of
campaigns. She draws attention to the practical importance for protestors of finding a
successful way of framing their claims:
residents' ability to mobilise effectively for social change was intimately linked to
their gradual adoption of an 'environmental justice' frame. (p6)
and argues that:
Defining a situation as unjust is more than an act of categorisation; it implies a
strategy for action. (p'7)
Aronnoff and Gunter (1992) also consider a case study of local responses to the chemical
contamination of land. Like Capek they are interested in the social structural context of
environmental disputes as well as the construction of claims about the issue, and they
attempt to address both aspects:
Social constructivist approaches to social problems can expand our understanding
of local actors' responses to contamination... (and) counter deterministic assumptions
of local disempowerment, (but) if they focus exclusively on the claims making
activities of local actors they may understate the debilitating impacts of these
diasters. (1992:346)
Thus they too are interested in the construction of an environmental problem, but maintain
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a realist stance towards its 'the debilitating impacts'. In order to deal with both dimensions
they advocate using Giddens' theory of structuration (Giddens 1984) to provide a
framework within which the relationship between structural elements and action in such
disputes can be conceptualised.
SSK (111(1 the Social Construction of Environmental Issues
Other social constructionist analyses of environmental issues have their roots within the
sociology of scientific knowledge. The focus within the field on the social processes by
which scientific 'discoveries' come to be taken as facts, and on the factors which inform
the development of research programmes has been applied to environmental problems. Hart
and Victor (1993) focus on climate change policy and are interested in how issues get
turned into problems, specifically how programmes of scientific research are initiated and
develop. They conclude that:
The threat of global warming was only one motivation for these research
programmes. (p667)
and indicate that social factors such as scientists' need to secure research funding may well
have been more important. Boehmer-Chrisiansen (1994) also explores the global warming
debate, and like Hart and Victor draws attention to the interests which lie behind the
construction of this problem. She asks how and why scientists created concern in the first
place, and how the research topic of climate change came so quickly to be enshrined in the
Framework Convention on Climate Change signed at the earth summit in Rio in 1992. Her
answer suggests that global warming was attractive for different reasons to politicians,
scientists and environmental networks all pursuing their own distinct goals.
Mazur and Lee (1993) focus on the role of the media in influencing public concern about
environmental issues. They adopt a 'quantity of coverage' theory which states that it is the
amount of coverage an issue receives in the press, rather than the actual content of the
stories, which has most influence on public concern about the issue. They take the issues
of ozone depletion, the greenhouse effect and 'problems of the biosphere' (p700) carefully
considering the factors which led to each receiving extensive press coverage. Their
conclusion that there is no clear link between scientific findings on environmental matters
and the development of coverage of the issues in the press has much in common with both
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1-lart and Victors' and Boehrner-Christiansen's analyses:
Problems that do attract heavy news coverage usually do so for non-scientific
reasons, either through powerful manipulation of reporters by activists or by luck.
(p713)
Others have focused on the relationship between scientific findings and environmental
policy formation. Herrick and Jamieson (1995) take as their topic the National Acid
Precipitation Assessment Programme (NAPAP) set up by the US congress to investigate
acid rain and to recommend strategies for dealing with it. They note that the stated
objective of the programme was to produce an unbiased scientific understanding upon
which to develop policy, but argue that:
it is a mistake to suppose that 'good science' can always provide a 'right answer'
for science based policy disputes. (p105)
This claim derives from their clear constructionist position which draws attention to the
existence of competing definitions of problems:
There is no such thing as a generic problem. Problems are defined characterised and
constructed, not given to us by brute nature alone.(p108)
In applying this approach to acid rain they note that a number of different scientific
perspectives can be drawn upon to explain it (e.g. chemical, meteorological, biological,
ecological, social) and each would define, characterise and measure the 'problem' in
different ways. Thus the science itself will not lead to clear conclusions, value judgements
are necessary in deciding which findings are relevant and which strategies appropiiate.
They conclude that:
A global change research programme should not simply fall out of what a science
or policy community regards as important. For such a policy to be successful there
must be widespread agreement on what questions are being asked, why they are
important, what counts as answers to them, and what the social use of these answers
might be. (p112)
All of these studies focus on the social factors and interests which inform whether a
problem comes to prominence. In common with the studies of environmental issues which
have developed within the social problems arena they do not pay much attention to the
reality of the conditions, yet make passing references which suggest an acceptance of them.
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For instance: Hart and Victor claim that 'the threat of global warming' was only one
motivation for the development of research programmes in climate change; Boehemer-
Christiansen and Herrick and Lee are concerned to improve the way in which
environmental policy is currently made; and Mazur and Lee make their acceptance most
explicit of all stating that:
it is well established on reasonably objective grounds that CFCs deplete stratospheric
ozone under certain conditions, that global temperatures have reached record highs
during the 1980s as concentrations of greenhouse gases increase, and that rain
forests and species are being lost. (1993:714)
The Social C'o,zstr:iction of Environmental Risk
Environmental risk is a concept that is receiving increasing interest from psychologists,
geographers and sociologists as well as engineers and scientists. Studies which draw
attention to the social construction of risk issues have begun to emerge amongst the variety
of other perspectives on offer (e.g. those exemplified by White 1974, Tversky &
Kahnemann 1973, Douglas & Wildavsky 1982, Renn 1991). These share the concern
evident in the social constructionist studies which have developed within SSK of
elaborating the social issues that lie behind particular constructions of risk.
Tierney (1994) provides a comprehensive review of sociology's contribution to risk
research, which she characterises as being divided into two general areas with work
focusing either on the social and cultural factors which influence the selection of 'risk
objects' (see for instance Johnson and Covello 1987), or seeking to identify the social
factors that influence the formal risk analysis process. In the second of these areas social
constructionism is applied to risk analysis in the way that it has been applied to other sorts
of scientific enterprise, focusing particularly on the institutional constraints that influence
how analyses are conducted. Much of the work Tierney discusses draws attention to the
way in which organisational interests are served by supporting a particular construction of
risk, for instance Kendall's (1991) research which examines the organisational interests
behind the construction of nuclear power as safe, and Clarke's (1990) on the role played
by key institutional actors in framing estimates of the risks associated with oil spills. In
contrast much research within the risk field concentrates on the individual and
psychological factors which determine how people assess and respond to risks (e.g. Slovic;
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1987). Tierney argues that public judgments of risk and safety are influenced by
organisational strategies that seek to frame risks in particular ways. She identifies
institutional power and resources as key determinants of the power to persuade people
effectively. Tierney maintains that:
this constructivist approach does not claim that there is no objective basis for
believing that certain risks exist. (1994:8)
but that the key sociological emphasis should be on how certain things are identified as
risky.
Stallings (1994) addresses the same question of how a certain definition of a threat or
danger is produced and maintained. He concentrates specifically on the threat of
earthquakes in the USA and asks why there is so little public attention to the threat. His
conclusion is that the lack of public concern is a consequence of the general construction
of earthquakes as acts of nature rather than catastrophes which have their roots in human
action, and argues that this limits the potential for grass-roots mobilisation for protection
from the threat as it is placed in the realm of nature rather than that of human agency. His
implicit acceptance of the reality of the risk is evident in his question of why there is little
public interest in this 'tlireat'.
The Role of the Media in the Social onstriiction of Environmental Problems
Another focus within the literature is on the role of the media as it clearly plays a key part
in the development and elaboration of environmental claims whether they are being made
by scientific experts or environmental groups. A particular interest is in the relationship
between media representations or framing of issues and public opinion on them. Gamson
and Modigliani (1989) stress that the link between public opinion and media discourse
should not be conceptualised as a one way process but is interactive, the media is just one
part of 'the public's tool kit' (plO) in making sense of and deciding on an appropriate
response to, current affairs. They take the case of nuclear power and trace the 'careers'
of different 'interpretive packages' used since 1945, and account for the greater public
appeal of certain 'packages' in terms of their ability to resonate with wider cultural themes.
They also pay attention to the social and political factors behind different packages, drawing
attention to the way in which environmental organisations have sponsored anti-nuclear
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packages and public officials have sponsored pro-nuclear ones. Gamson and Modigliani's
work concludes with some practical recommendations. They argue that if a better
understanding is to be developed of the relationship between press coverage of and public
concern about environmental issues then changes need to made to the methodologies used
to gauge public opinion. They criticise the fixed choice questionnaires which are generally
used as they obscure ambivalence and tend to conflate those with no attitude on a given
issue with those whose attitude does not fit into the given categories. They suggest that it
is:
Oniy by methods that elicit more of the interpretive process will we be able to see
the extent to which different media packages have become part of the public's tool
kit in making sense of the world of public affairs. (1989:3 6)
Hansen (1991) agrees with Gamson and Modigliani that the relationship between media
coverage and public opinion should not be seen as a deterministic one. He argues for a
more sophisticated exploration of the ways in which different publics negotiate and interpret
the environmental meanings offered by the media. A good empirical example of this
process is provided in Burgess and Harrison's (1993) study of a development consortium's
plans to build a theme park on a site designated for nature conservation. They explored
both how the local and national media reported the competing claims about the proposed
development and also how these claims in all their different forms (press, TV, radio, public
meetings) were appraised and interpreted by local people. They conclude that media texts
are seldom instrumental in opinion formation and point to the importance of 'practical life,
lived locally'(1993:218) in determining what sense people make of the competing claims
they are presented with.
Hansen takes up Gamson and Modigliani's suggestion that certain ways of framing issues
contribute to their public appeal, and suggests that if issues can be cast in terms which
resonate with existing and widely held cultural concepts this is likely to result in them
receiving wider media coverage. He draws attention to the way in which some issues link
into powerful, historically established symbolic imagery. He provides the example of the
way in which nuclear power and radiation related issues are marked out from other
environmental issues as they draw on deep seated and long standing public fears associated
with anything nuclear. Not all environmental issues 'benefit' from a culturally deep seated
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imagery of the same symbolic richness as the nuclear issue and Hansen suggests they are
disadvantaged by this in competition for elaboration in the media:
The extent to which they can be anchored in and made to activate chains of cultural
meaning.., helps determine whether they become part of media coverage and wider
social elaboration. (1991:453)
These social constructionist analyses of environmental issues have emerged as extensions
of existing traditions within sociology, and do not present themselves as explicit
contributions to the field of Environmental Sociology. There are relatively few social
constructionist analyses of environmental issues which do locate themselves as part of
Environmental Sociology, or at least a Sociology of the Environment. Yearley's (1991) The
Green Case: A Sociology of Environmental Issues, Arguments and Politics, was perhaps the
first attempt to develop a wide ranging and clearly constructionist Sociology of the
Environment. His work is informed both by the social problems approach and by SSK.
The social problems approach is most marked in his analysis of the green movement as a
collection of agencies making social problems claims. Through a series of profiles of
environmental groups (Royal Society for Nature Conservation, Greenpeace and the Royal
Society for the Protection of Birds) he draws attention to the social and political factors
which enable or constrain a group in making social problems claims which come to taken
as credible. His interest in how environmental organisations get to frame the environmental
agenda complements Tierney's interest in identifying how organisations come to have the
power to influence public perceptions of which risks are serious. Both conclude that the
focus of public and political concern on certain environmental problems and risks is the
result of a social process and attempt to identify the resources which facilitate the ability
to persuade others. Insights from SSK are drawn upon in his consideration of the
implications for the green movement of its reliance on science. Here he draws attention to
the conclusions of studies which demonstrate the socially constructed nature of scientific
facts, to the existence of disputes over what the 'facts' are, and to the lack of a
straightforward link between scientific findings and policy recommendations, to suggest that
science does not offer the definitive answers to environmental problems which the
movement seeks. Despite being explicitly geared towards developing 'A Sociology of
Environmental Issues' Yearley makes no mention of the Environmental Sociology of
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Dunlap and Catton et al.
Hannigan (1995) however does locate his social constructionist analysis of environmental
issues within the existing field of Environmental Sociology. His book Environmental
Sociology: A Social Constructionist Perspective is probably the most fully developed social
constructionist analysis of environmental issues. He is critical of Dunlap and Catton's
approach which he characterises as paying insufficient attention to the process of social
definition of environmental problems, and suggests that social constructionism offers an
approach which is able to:
adequately account for the manner in which environmental problems are defined,
articulated and acted upon by social actors. (1995:30)
To demonstrate the scope of the social constructionist approach he considers the roles of
both science and the media in constructing environmental problems and discusses the
construction of environmental risks and the construction of nature or the environment itself,
before analyzing the social construction of three environmental problems in depth: acid rain,
biodiversity loss and biotechnology. He concludes that:
The core of a new environmental sociology should principally lie not in
documenting the social distribution of environmental value clusters nor in fleshing
out a 'new human ecology' for the 1990s but rather in understanding how claims
about environmental conditions are assembled, presented and contested. (ibid:187)
This idea that social constructionism provides the best way forward for environmental
sociology is shared by Greider and Garkovitch (1994). They identify themselves as
environmental sociologists but state that:
we believe the field needs to move away from an objectification or reification of
natural meanings...and away from an increasingly dominant focus on the world that
is there. (1994:5)
They provide an analysis of the social construction of nature and the environment which
draws attention to the importance of what physical changes to the environment mean for
different cultural groups. Along with Hannigan they conclude that social constructionism
provides the best way forward for Environmental Sociology as:
it emphasises a well-established school of thought in sociology and role for the
discipline in the debates over environmental issues. (ibid:21)
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Overall then a body of social constructionist analyses of environmental issues is emerging,
whether or not the authors of studies sees themselves as contributing to, the field of
Environmental Sociology/Sociology of the Environment. These analyses are characterised
by an interest in the social and cultural factors behind the construction of a particular
problem, in the way in which claims about a problem are framed, and in the responses
which different framings receive. Their focus is on the claims made about environmental
issues rather than on the effects of environmental changes on society. In this they diverge
from the strong realist orientation and moral agenda of Environmental Sociology, and as
a consequence have come in for sustained criticism from those who locate themselves
within this camp.
The Critique of Social Constructionist Analyses of Environmental Issues
In a discussion of the 'intellectual vitality' (1996:1) of Environmental Sociology, Dunlap
notes that:
The vitality of our field is ...reflected by a growing number of journal articles, both
empirical and theoretical. In terms of the latter, the relative merits of adopting a
social constructivist/relativist versus an objectivist/realist perspective on
environmental issues is receiving increasing attention. (ibid)
Realist environmental sociologists express impatience with the social constructionist
approach to environmental issues claiming that it is simply the response of those who are
resistant to the challenge of reconceptualising the relationship between the social and
natural, and results in a dangerous solipsism and avoidance of real problems. Dunlap and
Catton (1994) are clearly concerned that environmental sociology is straying away from the
realist agenda which they outlined. They describe the emergence of social constructionist
studies of environmental issues as 'unfortunate' (p5) as they divert attention from the
'fundamental subject matter' (ibid) of environmental sociology which is to understand the
cause and consequences of environmental problems. Dunlap (1994) reiterates this criticism
in a paper entitled 'Limitations of the social constructionist approach to environmental
problems' in which he claims:
A staunchly constructivist approach to environmental sociology has significant
shortcomings: (1) a reluctance to acknowledge the importance of objective
conditions leads sociologists to avoid major issues e.eg. human causes and
consequences of global environmental change. (1994:abstract)
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Martell argues similarly that:
It is important that a focus on the social definition of environmental problems should
complement rather than be counterpoised to explanations based on the objective
existence of environmental problems and wider economic and social processes
involved in their articulation into socially defined issues. (1994:124)
He criticises social constructionist studies of environmental issues (e.g. Yearley's (1991)
analysis of environmental groups and Tester's (1991) work on the discourse of animal
rights) as being 'too sociological' and 'overly social' as they fail to acknowledge the
'reality' of the issues involved. Similarly Benton criticises 'over socialised views of
humanity and nature' (1994:44) which
yield a perspective in which the independent presence of the non-human world in
our lives is marginal to the point of disappearance. (ibid:45)
Murphy's (1996) critique of social constructionism is aimed primarily at SSK which he
accuses of failing to take account of the influence of nature on scientific knowledge. He
claims that 'social constructivism has gone overboard' (p970) in ignoring nature, and
characterises the approach as 'pre-ecological sociology'(p972). In common with other
environmental sociologists he argues that sociology, and the sociology of science in
particular, must change in response to the existence of environmental problems:
Through environmental problems and the environmental movement, the sociology
of science is now confronted with the question of its capacity to go beyond the
radically anthropocentric, restricted, and false premise of the social construction of
reality in order to integrate into its interpretations the embeddedness of social action
in nature and dependence on nature. (994.972
What these authors oppose are studies which they consider take social constructionism too
far and ignore the reality and independent effects of the environment on human society.
However despite their criticism they do not dismiss social constructionism out of hand, they
are in favour of approaches which combine the insights of social constructionism alongside
an acknowledgement of the independent effects of nature or the environment. So for
instance Benton while criticising 'oversocialised views of humanity and nature' (1994:44)
describes moves within sociology away from considerations of how material conditions
affect social life to a 'cultural analysis of the conceptual frameworks and valuations through
which the society under consideration thinks and lives in relation to those conditions' as 'an
absolutely indispensable moment, or aspect, of social analysis' (1994:45). However he
53
claims that such an approach:
remains insufficient in so far as it is unable to grasp the ecological and social
consequences of unacknowledged conditions of social practices in relation to nature,
and their unintended or unforeseen consequences. (1994:45)
Catton and Dunlap argue similarly:
we certainly do not wish to deny that there is a definitional or constructivist
dimension to environmental problems.. .nor that constructivist phenomena warrant
sociological consideration. Rather our concern is that sociological investigations not
he limited to such phenomena. (1994:20)
Martell also acknowledges some of the 'strengths' of social constructionist analyses, but
argues that:
it is important that a focus on the social definition of environmental problems should
complement rather than be counterpoised to explanations based on the objective
existence of environmental problems and wider economic and social processes
involved in their articulation into socially defined issues. (1994:125)
and Murphy says that he:
take(s) as confirmed the claim that ideas intervene between nature and its
description, and that interests, values, conflict and power - in short, the social -
shape our conceptions of reality and influence its formation. (1994:969)
but deplores the extent to which social constructionism has 'lost sight of nature' (ibid:958).
Responses to the Realist Critique of Social Constructionist Analyses
There are number of different ways in which one can respond to the realist critique of
social constructionist analyses of environmental issues. Taken together these comprise a
comprehensive rejection of its main points. First the assumption that social constructionist
studies aim to throw doubt upon the reality of environmental problems can be shown to be
a misreading of the constructionist project, and, as the review above illustrates, although
the causes and consequences of environmental problems are not the focus for constructionist
analyses, few of the available studies question their existence. Secondly, the insights of
social constructionism can be turned in on this critique and used to demonstrate that it is
problematic to take the existence of environmental problems or even the concepts of
'environment' or 'nature' as objective. Finally, although constructionist studies do not
generally address themselves to the task of finding ways of mitigating the effects of
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'environmental problems', this does not mean that they have no implications for
environmental policy or practice. These points will be considered in turn.
Social Constructionisni and Environmental 'Reality'
The social constructionism at which realists aim their criticisms is an approach which
claims there is no external environmental reality which is -capable of affecting human
society (Murphy 1994) or that 'at most the notion of a reality external to discourse is
acknowledged as an unknowable ghostly presence'(Benton 1994:45). Much of the
animosity towards the approach seems to spring from a subtle misreading of its intentions.
Even those arguing for a strict constructionist position do not doubt the existence of
external reality, the point is that what this reality 'is', what it means, is socially constructed.
For instance Woolgar (1988) talks of representations constituting objects. This assumption
that a strict constructionist approach amounts to trying to prove that there is no reality is
evident not only in the realist literature, but also pervades social constructionist accounts
of environmental issues. So for instance Mazur and Lee claim:
We are not attracted to an extreme constructionist position - namely that the global
ensemble of problems is primarily a creation of the media with little basis in
objective conditions. (1993:714)
and 1-lannigan echoes them:
I am not by any means attracted to an extreme constructionist position which insists
that the global ensemble of problems is purely a creation of the media (or science
or ecological activists) with little basis in objective conditions. On the contrary.. .1
fully recognise the mess which we have created in the atmosphere, the soil arid the
waterways. (1996:3)
The distinction between a strict and a contextual constructionist position is muddled in these
accounts. A contextual constructionist approach assumes that what is known about the
reality and extent of environmental problems can be used to gauge the truth of the claims
made about them (Best 1989). In contrast a strict constructionist position adheres to
Spector and Kitsuse's recommendation that the sociologist should remain agnostic about the
existence and extent of the conditions and simply consider the claims made about them.
This does not amount to denying their existence. While both Mazur and Lee and Hannigan
adhere to this position in their empirical analyses the pervasive caricature of strict
constructionism as a denial of reality leads them to make these rather odd declarations of
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their personal belief in the existence of environmental problems. The difficulty of
adhering to a theoretical project when considering an issue about which there is widespread
concern has been outlined earlier (p31). It may be that this difficulty is particularly acute
in relation to environmental problems where being green has come increasingly to be
equated with being good (Yearley 1991:1).
Not all authors of constructionist studies of environmental issues make such explicit
declarations of their belief in the existence of environmental problems. For the majority
the existence or severity of the problem is backgrounded - it is not the issue at hand.
However as the review above shows, most implicitly accept the existence of the problems
whose construction they study. In addition they do not necessarily advocate the use of
social constructionist analysis to the exclusion of other approaches. As already noted
Aronoff and Gunter (1992), and Capek (1993) provide analyses in which a consideration
of the socially constructed nature of environmental issues is considered alongside their
structural causes and consequences. Yearley makes a similar point:
In studying the shaping of the environmental movement it is important not to restrict
one's enquiries to the actions of players in the environmental game. One should
also take account of the influence exerted by structures and institutions (1991:7)
Despite these exceptions it is correct to say that most constructionist studies of
environmental issues do not use the approach in conjunction with other modes of analysis.
However this does not imply, as the realist critics seem to assume, that those producing
social constructionist analyses believe that they should be the only contributors to a
sociology of the environment. If the critics are concerned that social constructionism alone
offers insufficient insights into environmental problems then a logical response is for them
to continue to contribute alternative perspectives. The environment, in common with other
topics of interest to sociologists can be approached in numerous ways, and debate and
understanding about it will benefit from the inclusion of a variety of approaches.
The Social Construction of Environmental Problems and of the Environment
Realist environmental sociologists berate social constructionists for not accepting the
objective existence of environmental problems or appreciating their severity. However there
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is often no scientific consensus about the 'objective nature' of environmental problems, so
it is far from straightforward for sociologists simply to accept scientists' pronouncements
and concentrate on the social causes and effects of problems. They often have to decide
which scientific position to accept and it is unclear on what grounds this can be done.
Furthermore as social constructionist studies of the science of environmental change have
shown (Hart & Victor 1993, Mazur and Lee 1993, Boebmer-Christianson 1994. Herrick and
Jarnieson 1995) scientific consensus can itself be regarded as socially constructed or
actively produced and is not simply the outcome of indisputable 'facts'.
In addition even if sociologists are concerned with the 'reality' of environmental problems
accepting those currently on the scientific, media, or public agendas as those worthy of
sociological attention is problematic. As the review above has demonstrated there are
important social, political, institutiona anà cutura factors beliinà ftie promoon th
particular problems and relative neglect of others - those given the most attention are not
necessarily those that will be seen to be the most damaging at a later date.
Critics such as Murphy (1994) reprimand social constructionists for ignoring 'nature' and
'the environment' as though the concepts were unproblematic. Social constructionist studies
illustrate that this is not the case. Shoenfeld's at al's (1979) focus on the evolution of the
terminology of 'environment' in the US press has already been mentioned. Tester (1994)
is less concerned with the terminology and more interested in how the meaning of
'environment' and 'nature' have changed. He notes that a serious concern with the
environment is restricted to certain times and places and has been particularly evident in
advanced capitalist states since the 1960s. His task is to specify the nature of the affinity
between advanced capitalist arrangements and the notion of 'environment'. What he
proposes is that:
the environment is a category which stands. .specifically as the negation of the
category of technology (ibid:6)
As technology has come to be seen as increasingly powerful and mysterious with the
potential to take on what can be experienced as a subjective life of its own, so the category
of 'the environment' has emerged as a direct counter to it. He suggest that while the
category of nature is socially constructed as passive:
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the category of the environment implies a re-definition of nature as something in and
for itself. (ibid:14)
Greider and Grakovitch (1994) also address the social construction of nature and the
environment. Their interest is in how people 'transform the world that is there into
meaningful subjective phenomena' (p4 .), how the same field, river or rock comes to be seen
differently to and mean different things to different groups:
The open field is the same physical thing, but it carries multiple symbolic meanings
that emanate from the values by which people define themselves. The real estate
developer, the farmer, the hunter are definitions of who people are, and the natural
environment - the physical entity of the open field - is transformed symbolically to
reflect these self definitions. (ibid:1)
What these rather different analyses of the social construction of the environment indicate
is that the identification of 'nature' or 'the environment' as having certain characteristics,
and being important in and for itself is the result of social construction and interpretation.
For social constructionists the argument that we should be concerned about the
environment, or care for nature is a claim to be explained like any other. Realist
environmental sociologists object particularly to this as illustrated particularly by the fierce
criticisms made by Benton (1994) and Martell (1994) of Tester's (1991) argument about
animal rights that:
it is misplaced and not very useful to think that the truth of animals exists 'out
there', waiting to be directly and unproblematically appreciated. ..anirnal rights is a
social construction and exclusively a social practice. (ibid:194)
The problem is that environmental sociologists are engaged in a practical moral and
political project to draw attention to human mistreatment of the environment (including
animals). If environmental sociologists are understood as part of the environmental
movement (as their concern to attend to the causes and consequences of environmental
problems would suggest) then their antipathy to social constructionism can be understood
more easily. Yearley (1991) notes that the environmental movement sees its claims as
being grounded in facts in contrast to the claims of other movements (e.g for life or peace),
and so to examine their 'claims' seems irrelevant and irresponsible. He also notes that
environmental activists tend to argue that those who are not contributing to the solution are
part of the problem, and this too characterises well the response of environmental
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sociologists to those pursuing social constructionist analyses.
Tue Usefulness of Social constructionist Analyses
Related to the criticism that social constructionist approaches ignore the reality of
environmental problems is the perception that they are overly theoretical and hence of little
practical use. 1-lowever although constructionist studies concentrate on questions such as
why the environment has become an issue of concern, or why some issues rather than
others attract media and public attention, these questions are by no means of exclusively
theoretical interest. In drawing attention to the social cultural and institutional factors that
underpin the environmental agenda they address (if implicitly) practical questions such as:
the factors which contribute to campaigning success (Yearley), the factors which inform
whether an issue receives media attention (Schoenfeld, Hanson, Gamson & Modigliani), the
factors which influence public responses to media and expert c\aims urgess aná arñson
the factors which lead to some risks being emphasised while others are downplayed
(Tierney), the appropriate methodologies for understanding public perceptions of
environmental threats (Gamson and Modigliani) and the relationship between scientific
research and environmental policy (Herrick and Jamieson). These may be different
questions from those which their more realist critics would choose to address, but they
clearly advance sociological understanding of environmental issues and provide insights
which could be practically applied (for instance in designing campaigning strategies or
developing better forms of risk assessment).
Those producing constructionist studies of environmental issues tend to steer clear of
making such practical applications explicit, wary perhaps of falling into the trap of which
Spector and Kitsuse warn, of leaving the analyst's role behind and joining with participants
in making claims. In order to try and produce a rigorous constructionist account it is
necessary to attempt to maintain a position of indifference to the truth status of participants'
claims - however this does not mean that such analyses have no practical use.
The few studies of environmental issues that do attempt a stricter form of constructionism
(e.g. Tester's (1994) which explicitly questions the 'reality' of environmental problems or
the notion of 'environment' itself), may be described correctly as having no immediate,
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obvious practical application. However this is not sufficient grounds on which to dismiss
them. Theoretical considerations and critiques of notions that might be assumed to be
unproblematic comprise an important part of sociology.
In addition, to dismiss a study as having no practical application is to adopt an overly
simplistic notion of the way in which research is used. The relationship between
sociological research and policy or practice is a complex one. Few studies have immediate
practical implications, and of those which do few can be demonstrated to directly affect
policy and practice. Bartley (1996) considers the relationship between sociological research
and social policy as a social problems process in just the way that Hart and Victor
conceptualise the development of scientific research programmes on global warming. The
relationship between research and policy is not simply that research leads to changes in
policy, the influence is often in the other direction with research developing in areas in
which policy makers are clearly interested. In addition whether research findings get taken
up by policy makers is dependent on a range of social factors.
Social research is a cumulative process, and the contributions of theoretical work inform
more applied and practical projects which may in turn influence practice. These
applications are often not apparent at the outset and may not even be deemed desirable.
However to argue against research on the grounds that it is 'too sociological' and not
practical enough is potentially to deprive the discipline of intellectual growth and
stimulation, and of the development of new directions and approaches.
Conclusion
This chapter has aimed to provided an introduction to the debate about whether a sociology
of environmental issues should adopt a realist or a social constructionist stance. Examples
of studies using both perspectives have been outlined, and the realist critique of social
constructionist studies rebuffed on a number of fronts. Social constructionist analyses of
environmental issues comprise an important and insightful contribution to the sociology of
the environment.
This contribution can be expanded by extending the approach to consider the study of the
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social impacts of new developments. Catton and Dunlap (1979) characterise work in social
impact assessment as one sub-area within environmental sociology. As the previous chapter
illustrated, to date this sub-area has been little informed by sociolog y. Where research is
explicitly informed by sociological theories or concepts this tends to rely on either
functionalism (See p21-22) or the environmental sociology of Dunlap and Catton (e.g.
Taylor et al 1992). This general absence of sociological insight, and adoption of realist
approaches is not surprising given that SIA is a practical endeavour. However as indicated
in Chapter 1 a recurrent theme in the literature is the need to pay more attention to the
viewpoints of those likely to be affected by developments, and to understand more about
the process and experience of impact (see for instance Gold 1978, Rohe 1982, Jessen 1980,
Cooper 1981, Disanto 1981). There is space here for research which puts aside the
practical aims of assessing impacts or directly contributing to methodologies for assessment,
and concentrates instead on better understanding the process of social impact. and members
responses to, and claims about it. Social constructionism provides a ideal approach for such
work. It offers a way of exploring questions such as how some things get identified and
responded to as impacts while others do not, and which factors inform claims making about
impacts. The analysis that is generated may deliberately eschew any practical commitment
to the identification or amelioration of impacts, and need not evaluate the validity of the
claims made about impacts. However by contributing to an understanding of how social
impacts are socially constructed insights and implications for practice may arise.
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Chapter 4
Road Building: Background and the Case Studies
Introduction
The research carried out for this thesis comprises two case studies of debates about trunk
road schemes. Because both studies were undertaken as funded research projects, not all
of the issues raised or data collected during those studies will be considered in the thesis.
The first study took place during the planning of a stretch of the A27 of approximately six
miles between Lancing and Worthing in West Sussex, and was carried out between
September 1990 and September 1991. This research was commissioned by the Department
of Transport (DoT) via their consultants, Acer Consultants Ltd (Acer), and aimed to assess
the likely social impact of alternative routes. As part of the social impact study interviews
were conducted and documents collected in order to gain access to local responses to the
plans, with particular attention being paid to anticipated impacts. The second study took
place five years after a section of road had been completed and was carried out between
October 1991 and January 1994. This study was funded by the ESRC and explored the
relationship between the impacts anticipated by local people during the planning stages and
those they experienced as problematic once the road was operational. The road considered
in this second study was also part of the A27; a stretch of approximately eight miles
between Havant in Hampshire and Chichester in West Sussex.
The second study involved more extensive social research than the first one. This is both
because of the time scale (two years and three months for the second, one year for the first)
and because of the constraints imposed by consultancy work. The research carried out for
Acer comprised part of their environmental impact assessment of alternative routes for the
A27, and as such was an essentially practical project. In addition, as with many SIAs (see
p16) the engineers commissioning the research largely determined the scope and content
of the SIA, with the result that much of the work carried out, although useful for their
purposes, is of limited sociological interest. In contrast the ESRC project allowed much
greater freedom in terms of research design and data collection. As a result this thesis is
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based mostly on research carried out during the ESRC project although the Acer project
also generated some useful and interesting data.
This chapter begins by outlining the wider context of road building policy in the UK, the
process of planning and consulting about the line of a proposed road and criticisms of the
process, before returning to the case studies and providing a history of each and information
about research methods used and data collected.
Road Building in the UK
Assessing the Need for New Roads
Adams (198 1:129) describes the plaiming of road schemes as a sequence in which a highly
generalised concept of need is progressively refined into a highly specific construction
project. The DoT assess national need on the basis of traffic and car ownership forecasts
while pressure from the public, MPs and Local Authorities may be instrumental in
establishing the need for particular stretches of road (DoT 1994:23 1).
Adams (1981, 1990) explains that the need for new roads is assessed on the basis of road
traffic forecasts. These forecasts are based on forecasts of car ownership per capita,
distance travelled per car and population. Of these most importance is attached to forecasts
of car ownership. The DoT's method of forecasting ownership assumes that ultimately
every household will own at least one car and 85% of aD hoz2seho)ds wi)) J?ave wo ormoie
cars (Adams 1990:136). The 1989 White Paper Roads for Prosperity predicted faster traffic
growth than previous forecasts, estimating that traffic would increase by between 83% (if
the economy grew at a rate of 2% per year) and 134% (if the economy grew at a rate of
3% per year) by the year 2025, compared with 1988. In 1990 there were about 18m cars
in Britain, and the DoT's model anticipates that there will be 38m by 2025. These figures
were used to justify a greatly expanded programme of road building.
Adams (1981, 1990) provides a varied critique of the way in which the DoT forecasts
traffic growth. He draws attention to the uncertainty inherent in forecasting, and the
problem of assuming that future behaviour will mirror that of the past. With regard to car
ownership he is particularly critical of the DoT's failure to consider the way in which
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environmental and social considerations may affect the forecasts. He argues that resource
shortages may lead to increased fuel costs which will in turn affect traffic, and suggests that
the environmental and social impacts of increased traffic should be considered in the
forecasting process. He points out that:
The extra future traffic.. .is entirely hypothetical. It is traffic that would materialise
only if future travellers were not confronted with the social and environmental costs
of their travel. (1981:150)
The environmental costs he draws attention to are resource depletion, pollution (which has
both local and global consequences) and the depletion of land. In terms of social costs he
focuses on the problems for those who do not have cars, especially children and the elderly
who experience greater danger on the roads and often a subsequent loss of independence.
1-us main argument is that:
The rising tide of car ownership is not an irresistible force of nature over which
governments have no control.. .there is nothing inevitable about the continued growth
of car ownership. (1990:141)
The DoT's methods of forecasting traffic growth have also been criticised by several
Government committees. The Report of the Committee on Trunk Roads Assessment
(commonly known as the Leitch Report), published in October 1977, was critical of the
Department's cost benefit methodology and of the obscurity of the forecast models which
it employed. It recommended that the degree of uncertainty intrinsic to traffic forecasts
should be made clear and that the Department should ensure that its methods were made
comprehensible to ordinary people. In 1984 the Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk
Road Assessment (SACTRA) was given the task of assessing the traffic, environmental,
economic and other effects of urban road improvements. Their report was published in
1986 and expressed concern about the way in which the DoT develops, assesses and
justifies major schemes and about the complexity and obscurity of the process. The DoT's
forecasts have recently come under renewed criticism with the publication in 1994 of
another SACTRA report, Trunk Roads and the Generation of TrafJIc. This report addressed
the question of whether new or improved trunk roads induce extra traffic and concluded
that they did. This conclusion caused some embarrassment to the DoT who had
consistently denied this assertion (I-lamer 1995).
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The Planning Process
Once the national need for new roads has been estimated the next stages are to identify
broad route corridors and then to prepare 'Stage 1 Scheme Identification Studies' which
identify possible routes for new roads and assess their feasibility. If it is decided that a
route is feasible it enters the road programme, consulting engineers are appointed and
alternative routes investigated in some detail (Stage 2 Assessment). There follows a stage
of public consultation. Exhibitions of the route proposals are staged and the Stage 1 and
Stage 2 assessment reports made available to the public. Questionnaires are distributed
inviting the public to submit their views on the options presented and suggest any
alternatives.
The results of the public consultation are then combined with the Stage 2 assessment and
a decision made on the DoT's preferred route. This preferred route is then announced and
detailed design work begins. Stage 3 assessment involves identifying clearly all the
advantages and disadvantages of the preferred route in compliance with the 1985 EC
directive on environmental assessment. When the scheme details are finalised the draft
orders are published providing details of the line of the road, alterations to side roads and
land and property to be compulsorily purchased. The proposal is advertised in the local
press and occupiers of houses close to or on the line are notified individually. The plans
are made available for public inspection and exhibitions mounted explaining them in detail.
Objections to the proposals are invited from the public and if any are received a public
inquiry is held.
Public Inquiries
The Report on the Review of Highway Inquiry Procedures produced by the Departments
of Transport and the Environment defines the role of the Public Inquiry as follows:
The purpose of the public inquiry is to inform the Secretaries of state for Transport
and the Environment of the weight and nature of objections to a road scheme. The
key tasks of the Inspector are to take account of objections from people affected by
the proposals; to report on those objections; and to make recommendations to the
Secretaries of State for Transport and the Environment on the proposals. The
ultimate decision is not the Inspector's; it is one which the two Secretaries of State
take jointly, in the light of representations and objections, the Inspector's report, and
all relevant aspects of the Government's policies. (1978:3)
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The Report stresses that the Public Inquiry is only part of a 'complex and lengthy process'
leading up to the building of a new road, but concedes that it is a 'very important part'.
Wynne explains that the public inquiry has this important status as it is the sole formal
setting for public conflict about technological developments (1982:52). For the public it
is the focal point of the planning process, the arena in which they can voice their objections
or support for the proposed scheme and receive a direct response from the planners. As
the extract above indicates the Inquiry is not a judicial proceeding. The inspector is not
judge of the cases for and against development, his (it usually is a man) is primarily a 'fact'
gathering exercise.
Research stretching back to the 1960s has branded the public inquiry system as a 'farce'
(Levin 1969), a 'charade' (Self 1970) and a 'fraud' (Cowan 1980). Criticism reached a
peak in the 1970s when objectors led by John Tyme successfully disrupted several inquiries
into road schemes. The objectors claimed that inquiries were unfair, cast doubt on the
Department's forecasting methods, argued that the public received insufficient information
about the proposals and claimed that inquiries should address the issue of whether the
project should take place at all. The growing controversy over methods of assessing the
need for a new road and the fairness of public inquiries was reflected in the publication of
two Government Reports. The recommendations of the Leitch Report (1977) that methods
of assessment should be made more straightforward and understandable to the public have
been outlined above. It was followed in April 1978 by the Report on the Review of
Highway Jnquiiy Procedures (RRHIP). The RRHIP introduced a number of changes to
the public inquiry process with the aim of restoring confidence in the fairness of the system.
More information was to be supplied to objectors before and during the inquiry, Inspectors
were to be nominated by the Lord Chancellor not the Secretaries of State as previously and
alternative routes of near equal merit were to be assessed alongside the Department's
preferred scheme. However as Cullingworth notes, 'these measures have not lived up to
expectations' (1985:3 18) and criticism of the system continues (see for instance Monbiot
1995).
The recurrent criticisms made of the inquiry system are first, that the Department's mind
is made up before the inquiry and thus the process is merely cosmetic. A number of
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writers have suggested that inquiries are concerned with maintaining the appearance of
consultation, rather than actually ensuring real public participation (Wynne 1982, Hutton
1986). Another criticism is that the process is fundamentally unfair as the proposers of a
development are the judge of their own proposals. Despite the transferral of responsibility
for appointing Inspectors from the Secretaries of State to the Lord Chancellor, concern
about fairness persists. This is largely because even if the Inspector finds in favour of the
objectors and recommends major alterations or the abandonment of the Department's
scheme, the Secretaries of State for Transport and the Environment retain the final decision
and are able to overrule the Inspector's recommendations. Inquiries are also widely
considered to be weighted against members of the public who wish to object to the
Department's plans. Objectors are said to lack the resources of time, money and expertise
necessary to provide an effective criticism of the Department's case. A further criticism
is that transport policy issues and concerns about its environmental and social consequences
are deemed irrelevant and inappropriate for discussion at public inquiries - only local issues
and the particular stretch of road being considered may be debated at each inquiry. Tyme
(1978) argues that this allows the DoT to build a road network 'by stealth' as a road is
never considered in its entirety, let alone the entire roads programme.
Following the inquiry the inspector submits his conclusions and recommendations to the
Secretary of State for Transport. The Secretaries of State for Transport and the
Environment make a decision on the basis of this report and if they decide to proceed with
the scheme the orders are made, contract documents drawn up and tenders to build the road
invited.
The whole process from inception to completion of construction takes an average of twelve
to fifteen years. The DoT note that while the construction stage has become shorter due
to technological and engineering advances, the planning stages have become lengthier with
the inclusion of public consultation and 'the greater political involvement which is in
evidence these days' (DoT notes for Training for Public Inquiries, Development and
Purpose of Public Inquiry System p3, 3.4).
Policy
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In the UK the Government is responsible for the planning and maintenance of trunk roads
and motorways while local authorities are responsible for local roads. Throughout the
1980s the Conservative Government's policy for roads prioritised the building of roads to
aid economic development, improve the environment (particularly by bypassing towns and
villages), making roads safer and preserving existing investment by repairing and
maintaining existing roads (Policy for Roads: England 1980, Policy for Roads in England
1983, Roads for Prosperity 1989). The 1989 White Paper (Roads for Prosperity) laid out
a greatly expanded motorway and trunk road programme to relieve the congestion which
the Government considered to be 'bad for the economy' (1989:1). Commitment to private
over public transport and to the use of cars in particular was apparent in the simultaneous
direction of public resources to improving and increasing the infrastructure of roads while
privatising the railways and deregulating bus services.
This policy has come under sustained and varied criticism from academics (Adams 1981,
1990, Adams & Hillrnan 1992), media sources and most vividly in direct action against
proposed new roads. Although direct action had been used to disrupt public inquiries into
road schemes in the 1970s, the nature and scale of protest in the 1990s is qualitatively
different. The movement began with protest against the planned extension of the M23
through Twyford Down in Hampshire, which involved local people and outsiders in
massive demonstrations and disruption of the road building process. Protestors emphasised
the importance of non-violent protest. Methods such as chaining themselves to construction
machinery and sit down protests were used to halt construction and draw attention to the
effects of the road on the countryside. Following Twyford Down other protests have
occurred throughout the UK, notably against the Batheaston bypass across Soisbury hill
near Bath, the Ml 1 in Wanstead and Leyton in East London, the M65 in Lancashire, the
M77 near Glasgow and the A34 Newbury bypass. All have received extensive media
coverage. These protests all drew attention to the effects of the particular road on the
locality - whether in terms of the destruction of countryside or of homes - but also raised
wider concerns. These are not only about the roads programme and transport policy more
generally, but also about the lack of opportunities for meaningful participation in planning
decisions and about the importance of conserving and protecting the countryside. A basic
criticism is that the assumption that building new roads will ease congestion is flawed, and
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that building new roads will simply encourage more people to make car journeys.
Environmental objections encompass concern about the effects on residential areas in terms
of aesthetics or health, about the loss of valued countryside, trees and wildlife and about
the wider environmental implications of a reliance on transport by motor vehicles which use
finite resources and emit pollutants. Further objections draw attention to the cost of
building new roads suggesting that the money could be better spent elsewhere, and point
to the consequences on those without cars, the increased danger for pedestrians and cyclists,
the loss of homes to make way for roads and the division of communities by them.
In 1994 the Department of Transport published a review of its roads policy (Trunk Roads
in England) which was widely taken to represent a U-turn in policy. This document
reasserted the Government's commitment to reducing congestion and announced the aim
of ensuring that the time taken to implement important developments should be shortened.
In order to do this a system was introduced which identified the schemes to be given
priority. Forty nine schemes were withdrawn from the programme on the grounds that
they could not achieve an acceptable environmental balance or they were unlikely
to be progressed for the foreseeable future. (1994:3)
Those withdrawn included both planned major new routes and 'improvements' to existing
routes. Although the DoT justified these changes in terms of attending to urgently needed
schemes more efficiently the media interpreted them as a significant change in policy and
declared that the Government were 'giv(ing) in to the demands of campaigners' (Wolmar
1994). Two other reports published in 1994 supported the need for further changes in
policy. In October the Royal Commission on environmental pollution produced a report
arguing that there is a need for:
a gradual shift away from lifestyles which depend on high mobility and intensive
use of cars (Royal Commission p233)
on the grounds that a continuing increase in road traffic is neither socially nor
environmentally acceptable. Also published in 1994 was SACTRA's report Trunk Roads
and the Generation of Traffic which, as outlined above, cast doubt on the DoT's claims that
building new roads eased congestion - the basic rationale of the roads programme. This
encouraged critics to believe that the tide was finally turning, and the environmental
transport group Transport 2000 hailed it as a 'watershed in the transport debate' (Smithers
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1994). The impression that a subtle shift in policy was taking place was confirmed by
further cuts to the roads programme in 1995, and the publication in 1996 of the Green
paper Transport: The Way Forward. In this the Government recognised growing public
concern about the environmental impacts of transport and acknowledged:
that a change of emphasis is needed, towards recognising the long term
consequences of high traffic growth (p12)
Conservative policy throughout the 1980s and early 1990s was thus characterised by a
commitment to road building. This policy now seems to be shifting, and many take this
change to be the result of persistent and effective campaigning against the roads
programme. 1-lowever critics question whether the changes are the result of a genuine
commitment to improving environmental conditions or simply a cost saving exercise.
Government commitment to public transport is viewed as little more than rhetoric as bus
and train services have almost all been privatised (Guardian 26/4/96), and the response to
direct action against proposed new roads indicates continuing commitment to road building
even in the face of mass public opposition.
The Case Studies
Tue Area
Both case studies were carried out in the South East of England, the Acer study within
West Sussex, and the ESRC study in an area around the West SussexHampshire border.
Both study areas can broadly be described as largely middle class. In both Worthing and
Chichester over 50% of economically active households are classified as belonging to the
first three of the Registrar General's social classes (1991 Census County Report for West
Sussex), although the roads in question pass through or close to both middle class and more
working class areas. Both areas are predominantly white; Worthing has only 1.5% of its
population classified as belonging to ethnic groups other than white, while Chichester has
0.9% and Emsworth just 0.6%. The majority of residents own their own homes - 76%
in Worthing, 74% in Lancing, 70% in the Chichester area and 80% in Emsworth. In
common with much of the south coast the area has a high concentration of elderly people.
For instance 30% of Worthing's population and 26% of both Chichester's and Emsworth's
are of pensionable age, compared with a national percentage of around 16% (Social Trends
1996).
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Maps of the case study areas and of the main proposed routes are provided as appendices.
In neither of the case studies was there any serious opposition during the planing process
to the proposal to build a new road. Debate centred on what route the roads should take.'
The A27 Wortlzing/Laizcing
The existing A27 between west of Worthing and east of Lancing is used as a local road as
well as providing part of an east-west route for longer distance traffic. It is mainly a single
carriage road and has many junctions along it. The road passes through some suburban
areas with houses adjacent to the road, and also crosses farmland between Worthing and
Sompting. At the Public Inquiry into the road scheme in 1993, Acer, the consultants for the
DoT, concluded that the road was deficient in terms of alignment, carriageway width and
number of junctions, with the result that traffic speeds were low causing vehicle delays,
increased pollution and a higher risk of accidents compared to a trunk road designed to
current standards.
The proposal to 'improve' the A27 was first seriously investigated in the early 1970s. In
1972 consultant engineers, L.G. Mouchel and Partners, were commissioned to design and
assess routes for the road. In 1977 the Secretary of State announced a preferred route on
the basis of their work, this route largely following the line of the existing road through
Worthing from the west up to the A24, and then passing to the north of the residential areas
of East Worthing and Lancing. This route is more or less the one that was finally brought
to public inquiry in 1993.
The process of approving the route was lengthy largely because the road was removed from
the trunk road programme in 1980 as its cost could not be justified at the time. In 1985
it was reinstated in the programme and Howard Humphreys and Partners (HHP) were
During the Worthing Inquiry a group called Worthing Against Motorways (WAM)
demonstrated and gave out leaflets entitled 'Mad Car Disease' which claimed that 'roads
are a senseless waste of finite resources' and promoting investment in public transport.
Their position was very marginal in the debate about the road, but reflects the emergence
of a national anti-road movement.
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commissioned to prepare a new study of possible routes. HHP employed a range of
methods of public consultation to gauge local route preferences. First they conducted a
'blank map' exercise, in which members of the public were supplied with maps of the area
and asked to indicate the route they would favour for an improvement of the road. The
results were used to identify the range of routes with most support, and a second exercise
carried out in which people were asked which of these routes they preferred. The results
of both these exercises indicated that within Worthing preference was split roughly half and
half between those who wanted an on-line route of the sort originally proposed by Mouchel,
and those who wanted to see Worthing bypassed to the north. In Lancing and Sompting the
majority of residents wanted to see that section of the road bypassing the residential area.
In 1989 the Secretary of State announced that what was known as the 'Green Route' - on-
line through Worthing and bypassing Lancing - was the DoT's preferred route. Acer
Consultants Ltd were appointed to carry out the final design and assessment. The Public
Inquiry into the route opened on 28 September 1993 and ran until 24 August 1994. The
inspector was Mr. Peter Leveridge. Throughout the planning and assessment of the road
local debate centred on the choice between an on-line route and a bypass. Opposition to an
on-line route was based on the fact that it would require the demolition of over 90 homes
and would have an unacceptable impact on the urban environment of Worthing, while
opposition to the bypass route focused on the effect that route would have on the
countryside of the South Downs. At the time of writing the Inspector's report has not been
published and no decisions have yet been made by the Secretaries of State. A recent article
in a local newspaper (The Worthing Herald 2 1/6/96) claimed that local people were still
unclear when the inspector's report would be published, and were becoming frustrated by
the long wait.
Tue A27 Havant/Cizichester
The proposal to construct a relief road between Havant and Chichester was first agreed by
the County Councils of Hampshire and West Sussex in 1937 and with minor amendments
this proposal featured in all the county development plans produced since then. In July
1972 a draft scheme was published based on the line proposed in 1937. At this stage the
intention was that the road would form a new section of the M27 south coast motorway.
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Many objections from local people were received in response to this proposal, the majority
expressing concern about its effects in the Fishbourne area. It was decided to review the
scheme and at the same time to take account of the wider powers of compensation provided
by the Land Compensation Act of 1973.
It was also around this time that the DoT introduced a new non-statutory procedure of
public consultation which enabled the public to comment at an earlier stage than previously
in the planning of road schemes. It was decided that this opportunity should be given in
respect of the 1-lavant-Chichester proposals and so the DoT withdrew the draft scheme and
in 1974 issued a consultation document inviting the public's comment on three possible
routes. The road was still proposed as a motorway. One of the options was a new route
to the north of Chichester and the other two were variations of the originally published
route connecting to the existing bypass south of Chichester. The consultation document
included a questionnaire in which people were invited to state their choice of route and give
reasons for their preference. Public exhibitions were held in Chichester and Emsworth
where people could examine detailed plans and discuss the scheme with DoT officials.
As a result of the consultation exercise 1,341 questionnaires were completed and comments
were received from local authorities and organisations. The old A27 (now the A259) was
a narrow single carriageway road which twisted through the hearts of a number of villages
and was heavily congested. Local people had expressed concern about the noise and
pollution the road caused in the villages, about danger to pedestrians, about effects on house
prices in what would otherwise be a very desirable area and about the length of time it took
to drive between Havant and Chichester. Consequently the plans to build a new road met
with almost universal approval although there was some disagreement about where exactly
it should be located. The majority of questionnaires returned favoured the northern route,
but strong arguments against the selection of this route were also advanced. West Sussex
County Council (WSCC) and Chichester District Council pointed out that the planning of
the Chichester area had been based on the assumption of a southern route. The northern
route was also opposed on the grounds that it would damage the landscape. agricultural and
recreational land, and the environment in general more than the alternative. The majority
of those who supported the northern route lived in the area that would be affected by a
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southern route. They expressed concern about noise, pollution, demolition of property and
the effects on shopping, schooling and community life.
In November 1977 the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Transport announced the
preferred route. The route selected was the southern option described as the black/red/green
route in the consultation document, except that at its eastern end it was modified slightly
with the intention of reducing the effect on Fishbourne. It was announced that the road was
to be constructed as an all purpose Trunk Road and not as a motorway. This decision was
made on the basis of new traffic forecasts. Detailed design of the route began, and draft
orders fixing the route between Havant and Chichester, de-trunking the existing A27 and
providing for alterations to existing roads, footpaths and private accesses were published
in February 1979. In March exhibitions of the draft orders and plans were held in
Chichester and Emsworth, and were followed by an objection period. This lasted until 25th
May and gave anyone affected by or concerned about the proposals an opportunity to send
in objections or to submit alternative proposals for the Secretary of State to consider.
During the period 233 objections were received. Over two thirds were concerned with side
road issues and the majority of the remainder were concerned with small changes to the
published route. Fifty two representations were made, mainly in support of the proposal.
Sixteen alternative routes were put forward for consideration. Of these five were withdrawn
either before or at the inquiry, eight were local modifications to the route and the other
three were major variations: route four going north of Emsworth, Westbourne, Ashling and
Chichester, route five going north of Emsworth and Westbourne, and route thirteen
bypassing Chichester to the North. On 11th October it was announced that a Public Inquiry
was to be held in Havant commencing on 4th December. Mr D.M. Sims was appointed as
the Inspector. The objectors' alternative routes were published in the local press and a
further 87 objections and 234 representations were received. Over half of the further
objections were in a standardised form from people in Ernsworth, and the rest were mainly
in support of one or more of the published routes.
The public inquiry ran for forty five days between 4th December 1979 and 1st May 1980.
Objections to the DoT's route drew on a variety of concerns. It was argued particularly that
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the road would divide communities, cause dangerous levels of pollution for children in local
schools and be visually intrusive. The inspector concluded that route four was preferable
to the Department's proposals, and thus he was 'unable to recommend that the draft orders
be made' (Inspectors' Report p229). However he presented his conclusions on the minor
route variation proposals, believing that:
action in accordance with my conclusions on these variations and amendments
would result in proposals that could be recommended were it not for the preferred
alternative route 4 (Ibid)
The Secretaries of State's decision made on the basis of the Inspectors report was not
published until February 1982. They decided to reject the Inspector's recommendation that
the orders should not be made, and to accept his recommendation that his conclusions on
the published proposals should form the basis for modifications and amendments to the
draft orders. It was noted that the promotion of route four would mean a delay of at least
three to four years and that there was almost unanimous agreement about the urgent need
to relieve the existing A27. They accepted that route four would have certain advantages,
but believed that these would be outweighed by its disadvantages compared to the preferred
route: the reduced effectiveness of relief to the existing A27, the further long delay in
producing relief and other benefits expected from the new road, the departure from the
long-established development plan line and the further substantial period of blight and
uncertainty over a wide area. Plans showing the modifications were made available for
interested parties, and representations on the proposed modifications invited.
Eighteen months later in August 1983 the Secretaries of State announced that the route was
fixed between Hambrook and Chichester and made line order and side road orders for this
section. However their decision had been deferred on proposals for the route west of
Hambrook Hill. One of the modifications published in 1982 had been a southern shift in
the road towards Southbourne away from properties in Westbourne and Woodmancote.
Residents of Southbourne had objected to this and the DoT decided to move the line of the
road back to the line originally proposed in 1979/80. This meant that the Inspector's
recommendation for this stretch of road had been overruled and thus any potential objectors
had to be given the opportunity to make representations or to call for another public
inquiry. A period of twenty one days was allowed for this.
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On December 6th the Secretaries of State announced that they had decided to withdraw the
remaining parts of the original draft line and side roads orders and to publish fresh draft
orders incorporating minor line changes at Warblington and Emsworth; and to publish draft
compulsory purchase orders for the whole scheme shortly afterwards. In a DoT Press
Release Mrs. Lynda Chalker, Minister of State for Transport, said:
Following the announcement of 24 August 1983 about the section of the road
between the River Ems and South Lane we have received a number of requests for
the inquiry to be reopened. In view of the unresolved conflict of interest between
the local residents, which was not argued out at the previous inquiry, we do not
consider that it would be right to make the order as previously published without
giving those concerned a further opportunity to have their case considered by an
independent inspector. (DoT Press Notice 6/12/83)
Objections to all outstanding draft orders would be dealt with at one public inquiry. On
December 9th the new line and side road orders for the Havant to Hambrook Hill section
were published, along with draft proposals for a split level interchange at the Warblington
Roundabout and supplementary side road proposals on the route already fixed between
Hambrook hill and Chichester. The draft orders were publicly exhibited in January and
open for objection and comment until 17th February 1984.
On May 1st 1984 it was announced that a public inquiry would be held in Havant. The
Inspector was to be Air Vice Marshall C.G. Maugham. On May 10th a pre-inquiry meeting
was held in Havant. The official notes of the meeting record that the Inspector made it
clear that it was his intention to rule that the line of the road from Hambrook to Chichester
would not be open to further discussion, and that all aspects of the Havant to Hambrook
section would be dealt with before proceeding with the Hambrook to Chichester issues.
The Inquiry opened on 19th June and ran until 17th July. By the time it finished 259
objections and 132 representations had been received about the Havant to Hambrook
proposal and 29 objections and seven representations received about the Hambrook to
Chichester proposals. Ten alternative routes were suggested by objectors, nine were local
variations of the published route and one was a major alternative taking the road north of
Emsworth.
In February 1985 the DoT announced that the contract for a bridge carrying the new road
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over the railway at Fishbourne had been awarded to Rush and Tompkins Ltd. Work began
soon after. Mrs Chalker commented:
(this) is a significant step in the progress of the improvement of the A27 between
Havant and Chichester and marks our firm commitment to this important scheme.
(DoT press notice 6/2/85)
A year after the inquiry was held, on 12th June 1985, the Secretaries of State published
their decision to accept the Inspector's recommendations. Overall he had found the
proposals contained in the draft orders to be satisfactory and urged early construction. He
concluded that the environmental advantage lay with the published route, that it would
provide traffic and economic benefits and that it was to be preferred to any of the
alternative routes proposed. The Secretary of State for Transport made the orders fixing
the route between Havant and Hambrook and the Warblington Interchange proposals, and
with minor modifications the associated side road orders. He also made the order for de-
trunking the existing A27 and with minor modification the supplementary side roads order
on the Hambrook-Chichester Section. Compulsory Purchase Orders were made soon after
for most of the land needed for the whole scheme. In August 1986 it was announced that
Alfred McAlpine Ltd. had signed a £19.9m contract to build the road. Construction was
to be supervised by Mott, Hay and Anderson. It was predicted that work would take two
and a half year. The road was completed six months ahead of schedule and was opened
on 19th August 1988 by Mr Peter Bottomley, the Minister for Roads and Traffic.
As soon as the road opened complaints began about the level and pitch of the noise
generated by the concrete surface which had been used. Existing residents' groups took up
the issue and other action groups quickly formed. Protest about the noise from the road's
surface was still ongoing at the end of the data collection period (July 1993).
Data Collection
Worth ing/Laiicing case study
As part of the social impact assessment of routes for the A27 various data were gathered.
Much of the research consisted of surveys of pedestrian movement and of use of areas of
countryside, in order to estimate the effect of building each route. The data collected
during these surveys will not be considered here. However semi-structured interviews were
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also carried out, and the data they generated was useful for the SIA and also for this thesis.
In addition press reports were collected after the completion of the SIA during the public
inquiry period.
Interviews
These interviews aimed to provide a better understanding of local life, and appreciation of
the anticipated impacts of the proposed routes for the A27. Choice of respondents was
constrained by Acer who were concerned that interviewing members of the public might
complicate the planning process (see p16 for a discussion of planners' fears about public
participation). As a consequence it was agreed that a sample of local community leaders
and representatives should be approached who could be expected to provide some insight
into the social life of the area and the range of views held about the proposals.
In order to obtain a sample, planning officers in Worthing Borough Council, Adur District
Council, Arun District Council and West Sussex County Council were approached.
Worthing Borough Council provided a list of borough councillors, representatives of leisure
facilities and of local residents associations, and action groups concerned with the A27.
Adur and Arun District Councils both provided lists of district councillors and West Sussex
County Council provided a list of schools within the area. In addition a list of churches
within the area was compiled by studying a map, and the names and addresses of the clergy
responsible obtained from the church notice boards.
Between October and December 1990 letters were written requesting interviews with a total
of 45 individuals. Of these 10 were representatives of action groups or residents'
associations, 9 were clergy, 8 were local councillors, 6 were head teachers, 6 were
representatives of groups for elderly people or for young people, and 6 were representatives
of leisure facilities. Twenty one of those approached agreed to be interviewed, a further 20
did not respond to the letter, 3 people provided a written response but declined to be
interviewed, and 1 person telephoned and said that they did not want to participate in the
research. Of the 21 who agreed to be interviewed 5 were representatives of residents' or
action groups, 4 were clergy, 4 were local councillors, 5 were head teachers, 2 were
representatives of leisure facilities and one was a representative of a group of elderly
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people. A total of 19 interviews were carried out as two respondents decided to attend
interviews arranged with other people rather than be interviewed separately.
The interviews were carried out between November 1990 and May 1991. Interviews were
tailored to respondents (so for instance head-teachers were asked different questions to local
councillors), however all were asked to provide details about local activities (whether that
was how children travelled to school, or details of social activity within the ward) and to
outline the concerns about the road held by those they represented. Respondents were
encouraged to discuss issues which they thought relevant rather than being kept to a strict
schedule. Interviews were of an informal nature and lasted between 30 minutes and two
hours, depending on how much information the respondents wanted to offer. The majority
of interviews took place in participants' homes with some including visits to areas which
they claimed would be adversely affected by one of the routes. Nine of the interviews were
with small groups of people, as respondents had invited others who shared their views to
be present.
Notes were taken during the interviews, and 16 of those interviewed agreed to the interview
being tape recorded. Of these 14 were subsequently transcribed in full as the recordings
were faulty in two cases. The transcripts were coded with the Prefix W (Worthing/Lancing)
and an identifying letter between A and N in order to ensure respondents' anonymity. When
more than one interviewee was present individuals were distinguished with the suffix i, ii
etc.
A common methodological recommendation is that attempts should be made to minimise
the effect of the interview situation on respondents' answers (see Fielding 1993). This
involves paying attention to interviewer effects as well as to features of the physical
environment in which the interview takes place. As it is recognised that there are limits to
the extent to which interview effects can be controlled, researchers are advised to provide
full details of the interview context, and to acknowledge any ways in which aspects of this
may have affected the accounts provided by interviewees (ibid: p145).
This recommendation is based on a conception of interviews as a tool to elicit the truth
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from interviewees about some events or about their feelings, attitudes or experiences. It is
assumed that a true version is available, but that this is liable to be distorted or
misrepresented. This approach to interviews is problematic from a social constructionist
perspective. Rather then trying to elicit the 'truth' from participants the social
constructionist researcher begins from the premise that the same events, emotions or ideas
can be described in a variety of ways with no version necessarily being 'truer' than the
others. Thus attempts to control the interview situation to obtain unbiased data become
irrelevant.
It is not that the effect of features of the interview context on the account produced are
dismissed but rather that the range of factors which might shape the account produced is
potentially vast. As Schegloff (1991) points out the analyst rarely has adequate grounds
to conclude that a particular feature of the context, or characteristic of a participant, has
influenced the data in a specific way. He notes the myriad ways in which any place or
person can be correctly described and concludes that it is only those features which can be
shown to be demonstrably relevant to participants themselves which should be used to
characterise the situation. Thus no attempt will be made here to provide an exhaustive
description of the interview context, or of individual interviewees' identity in terms of age,
occupation, gender or whatever.
Documentaiy Dcita
Press reports were collected during the Public Inquiry (September 1993 to August 1994).
Two local weekly newspapers, the Worthing Herald and the West Sussex Gazette, were
subscribed to, and all articles, letters and photographs on the subject of the road scheme and
the public inquiry were collected. Both newspapers carried some reports or letters about the
road proposals on most of the weeks for which data were collected. Both featured special
sections reporting on the progress of the inquiry. The Worthing Herald carried these
inquiry reports on 29 of the 49 weeks for which data were collected, and the West Sussex
Gazette on 17 weeks. These reports were marked with their own logo, and varied from one
article to three page spreads incorporating photographs. In addition to these reports 15
other articles about the road appeared in the Worthing Herald and 20 in the West Sussex
Gazette. During the period for which the newspapers were received 49 letters about the
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proposals appeared in the Worthing Herald and 16 in the West Sussex Gazette.
Havant/Cli ic/i ester Case Study
For the ESRC project three methods of data collection were employed: the collection of
documents relating to the scheme, interviews with people involved in the debate about the
road, and a survey of those living alongside it. The combination of these three distinct
approaches allowed a comprehensive picture to be built up of the history of the scheme and
its effects. It also allowed comparisons to be made between accounts of impact made in
different fora (for instance the official accounts provided by the DoT and the accounts
provided by local campaigners). In this thesis analysis will concentrate mainly on the
documentary and interview data.
Docurnentaiy Data
West Sussex County Council and Hampshire County Council provided access to data such
as files of press cuttings about the planning of the road, the reports of the two public
inquiries into the road scheme, various maps and plans, press releases, objectors'
submissions to the public inquiries 2
 and DoT memoranda about the scheme. These
documentary data were used primarily as background information in developing an
understanding of the issues before the interviewing phase. However the objectors'
submissions to the first public inquiry were also analyzed alongside the interview material.
All of the submissions which Surrey County Council had from representatives of groups
objecting to the scheme were collected - a total of 19. The submissions were numbered for
reference in the public inquiry and the original numbers are maintained in this thesis, except
where objectors made multiple submissions - in these cases the submissions have been
given the suffix a, b,c.
Documentary data about local responses to impacts as the road became operational were
obtained from local newspaper reports. A search was carried out in a micro-film archive
of copies of the Chichester Observer, the local weekly newspaper, for the period January
2 Those wishing to object to aspects of the proposals at the public inquiry must submit
their case in writing.
81
1988 (seven months before the road opened) to July 1993. The Chichester Observer has
sister papers, the daily News and the weekly West Sussex Gazette, that are published by the
same proprietor. However these carried fewer but similar articles on the road and were
therefore not also searched. Articles from the Chichester Observer that related to the road
and its impact were photocopied. During this period a total of 151 articles appeared about
the A27, most of them (60%) dealing with the development and organisation of the protest
about noise.
Interviews
Interviewees were selected by three methods. First, active participants during the public
inquiry phase were identified from the documentary data, secondly, key players in the
ongoing debate about the scheme were identified from press reports and finally those who
agreed to be interviewed were asked to recommend others whom it would be relevant to
interview. A total of 38 individuals were eventually approached for interview.
Twenty four of those approached agreed to be interviewed, 10 people did not respond to
the letter, one person provided a written response but declined to be interviewed and three
refused to be interviewed. Of the 24 interviewed 7 were local councillors, 6 were
representatives of groups who objected at the public inquiries, 4 were representatives of
action groups formed to campaign about the noise generated from the road, and the others
were people who had had their homes compulsorily purchased (2 people), representatives
of the DoT (2 people), the inquiry inspector, a local vicar, and somebody whose house was
particularly badly affected by noise. There was some overlap between these categories of
interviewee, for instance two of the local councillors interviewed turned out also to be
active members of one of the residents' groups. All interviews were with individuals,
except for one which was with two people. One indication that the sample of informants
was adequate is that no respondent suggested that anyone who was not in the sample was
an important source of information and opinion.
The interviews were conducted between August 1992 and January 1993. The format was
informal and semi-structured. As in the Worthing/Lancing study interviews were tailored
to respondents (for instance those who were involved in the inquiry phase were asked about
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this in detail), but all covered the respondents' attitudes towards the proposal to build the
road and concern at that stage, and then moved on to ask about their perception of the
impacts of the road since its construction. Respondents were encouraged to discuss issues
which they thought relevant rather than being kept to a strict schedule. Interviews lasted
between 30 minutes and two hours, depending on how much information the respondents
wanted to offer. The methodological considerations discussed in relation to the
Worthing/Lancing interviews (p79-80) apply equally to the Havant/Chichester data.
Notes were taken during the interviews, and all but one (the engineers responsible for the
road's construction) agreed to the interview being tape recorded. In two instances the
recording failed. Those successfully recorded were transcribed in full, giving a total of 21
transcripts. These were coded with the prefix H (Havant/Chichester) and an identifying
letter between A and U. When more than one interviwee was present individuals were
distinguished with the suffix i, ii etc.
Survey
A survey of a sample of the population who live near to the road was undertaken to assess
their perceptions of, and gauge their reactions to it. The population of interest was defined
as those living at the properties listed in the DoT consultants' schedule of properties
affected by the Noise Insulation Regulations 1988. This listed 406 properties situated
within 300rn of the centre line of the road. As the survey was not an attempt to represent
the views of the entire population of the area, but to obtain descriptive information about
those who lived particularly close to the road, it was decided to approach the residents of
all the listed properties.
The list of affected properties only identified addresses. However it was considered that
a better response rate would be obtained if questionnaires were sent to named individuals,
so the names of residents at the properties were obtained from the relevant electoral rolls.
Some of the properties did not appear on the electoral roll and others proved to be
residential care homes. Consequently the final list consisted of 378 properties. Where a
couple were resident at a property questionnaires were sent to both individuals. This was
to avoid obtaining a response dominated by men as seemed likely to occur if questionnaires
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were sent to 'heads of households'. 512 individuals were identified at the 378 properties.
A response was obtained from 322 individuals spread over 244 properties, giving a response
rate by property of 65%, and an individual rate of 63%.
For the ESRC project the data were analyzed using SPSS, but these results will not be
discussed here (for a discussion of the survey results see Burningham 1995). However the
questionnaire provided opportunities for respondents to provide written accounts of their
perception of and reactions to the road, and these comprise part of the data analyzed in this
thesis.
Conclusion
In the following chapters the data collected during the two case studies will be used to
explore the social construction of the social impacts of the roads. The data relied upon most
is that gathered in the interviews. In neither study was any attempt made to obtain a
representative sample of the local population for interview, rather the goal was to reach
representatives of the local community (in the Worthing/Lancing study) and key players in
the debate about the road (in the Havant/Chichester study). The relatively small number
of interviews obtained is sufficient given the detailed qualitative methods of analysis
employed.
With the Worthing/Lancing study the constraints placed on those who could be approached
raises some doubts about the representativeness of the views accessed. Although the
sample contained people from a variety of areas within Worthing/Lancing, and with a range
of opinions about the proposed scheme, it would have been desirable to speak to some of
those likely to be directly affected by the scheme rather than just to 'representatives' of
these people. Overall the sample from Worthing is rather small (19 interviews). It is likely
that the response rate was affected by the fact that the research was part of the official SIA
commissioned by the DoT, and some people may have been wary or sceptical of
participating in this process. In addition the interviews were carried out during a lull in the
process of planning for the road - the DoT had aimounced their recommended route a year
previously, and the Public Inquiry was not scheduled for another three years. If interviews
had been conducted closer to the time of the Public Inquiry it is likely that more people
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would have had something to say about the likely impacts of the road and would have
agreed to be interviewed.
Although the sample of interviews obtained for the 1-lavant/Chichester study is also
relatively small (24 interviews) the sampling method used in this study (identifying people
through documentary sources and personal recommendation) ensured that all those
considered locally to be (or to have been) active in the debate were approached. As with
the Worthing/Lancing study the sample suffers from the problem of including mostly those
who have been active in debate about the road, who may differ from those affected on a
day by day basis. 1-lowever the survey provided access to the latter and confirmed that their
appraisal of the impacts was broadly similar to that gained from the interviews. All agreed
that the major impact of the road was the noise generated by its surface
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Chapter 5
The Social Construction of the Impact of Noise
Introduction
This chapter and the following one focus on the social construction of noise as a significant
impact of the A27 1-lavant/Chichester. As soon as the road opened complaints began to be
made by local people about the noise generated by its concrete surface. Existing residents'
groups took up the issue and new action groups and alliances were formed to tackle the
problem. At the time of data collection protest about the noise and campaigning to get the
road resurfaced was ongoing. In this chapter analysis will focus on two questions: why did
any protest emerge, and why was it specifically about noise? The following chapter will
consider interviewees' claims about the impact of noise in some detail and address the
question of how noise was constructed as a real and significant impact.
Background - Noise as the most significant impact
During the planning phase of the road local people claimed that a range of impacts were
likely to result from its construction (see p74-75 for a discussion of the planning phase).
Objectors submissions to the public inquiries, and the Inspector's report reveal that the
impacts most frequently anticipated were that the road would divide communities, would
cause dangerous levels of pollution for children in local schools and would be visually
intrusive. However data from press reports, interviews and the survey suggests that once
the road was opened the only impact which was considered locally to be problematic was
the noise generated by the road's surface.
Press Reports
In the months after the opening of the A27 in 1988 (August-December) the Observer
carried a total of 37 items (articles, editorials, letters or photographs) about the A27. Fifty-
one per cent of these were about noise. The bulk of remaining coverage in the first year
was about issues around the opening of the new road and about the speed of traffic using
it and accidents occurring. In 1989 there was less coverage of the A27 (32 items) but
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almost all of this (81%) related to the problem of noise and local residents efforts to get the
problem officially recognised. In 1990 coverage decreased to just 14 items, 64% of which
were about the noise campaign. Coverage of the A27 remained fairly constant until July
1993; in 1991 19 items appeared, in 1992 17 and in 1993 (up to July) 13. The percentage
of items about the noise campaign has also remained fairly steady; in 1991 it accounted for
79% of the total, 82% in 1992 and 61% in the first half of 1993. In summary in the period
from the road's opening in August 1988 until July 1993 the aspect of it which received
most coverage in the Observer was the noise generated by its surface and local campaigns
to achieve a solution to it.
Survey
The postal survey (see p83-84 for details of the survey methodology) asked respondents
about the positive and negative effects that they thought the road had had. A total of 302
people provided information about negative impacts. The most commonly mentioned
negative impact was noise, cited by 93% of respondents. The next most frequently
recorded impacts were air pollution and various environmental impacts (this category
includes a variety of claims that specific views or areas of land had been affected, or that
plant or wildlife had suffered) which were mentioned by just 19% and 17% of respondents
respectively. Respondents were also asked whether noise from the road had any effect on
them personally and 90% replied that it did. Thus noise was by far the most frequently
identified negative impact of the A27, and the majority of respondents felt that they were
adversely affected by it.
Interviews
Of the 21 transcribed interviews, 16 were with people who lived in the locality or were
representatives (local or district councillors) of people who did (see 82-83 for more details
about the interviews). Of the remaining five interviews two were with representatives of
the DoT, one was with the Inspector of the first Public Inquiry and the other two with
people who had had their homes compulsorily purchased for the scheme. In the interviews
respondents were asked what they considered to be the major social impacts, or effects on
the local community, of the road. All of the respondents who lived in the area mentioned
noise, whether or not they considered themselves to be personally affected by it. A number
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of interviewees stated explicitly that noise was the only significant impact, for instance:
HBi	 I think on the whole, generally speaking, there is no objection to the present road
except for its surface and the noise generated there from.
J-IBii Well, you see, right from day one this A27 'roar' is talked about, and that really is
all there is to it.
HG So there is an enormous benefit that Emsworth has received from this road, and if
it wasn't for the noise everybody would be happy with it. But noise is the killer
really.
All these sources of data therefore suggest that noise was considered to be the main impact
of the A27.
Considering the Impact of Noise as Socially Constructed
Methodologies for SIA stress the importance of taking into account the perceptions and
expectations of local people about likely impacts, both in order to ensure that assessments
are correct and that they have local support (see p12-15 for a fuller discussion). However
in this case even if an SIA had been conducted prior to the construction of the road it
would have failed to anticipate the extent of the impact of noise correctly. The data
collected show that prior to the road's construction local people anticipated a range of
impacts (see p74-75) but that once it was built the only thing experienced as a significant
impact was noise.
One explanation of why this is the case might point to the inherent uncertainty of
predictions of impact, as Finsterbusch writes:
Given the complex nature of social phenomena, a complete and accurate social
impact assessment is nearly an impossible task except for highly standardized events
(1994: 1)
Even the best predictions can be upset by unexpected factors - in this case the choice of a
concrete surface for the road. An alternative explanation might be that the anticipated
impacts had not come about just because their possibility had been taken seriously, and
measures had been taken to mitigate them during the planning process. However if a post-
impact assessment were carried out it would almost certainly reveal that the design of the
road had resulted in some social severance (some people's journeys were longer etc.), that
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levels of pollution in the air were higher than before, and that the speed of cars using the
new road posed a safety threat. Thus it is possible that these things could have become the
subject of social impact claims making, so it is interesting that only noise was complained
about.
Both of these explanations for the difference between the anticipated and experienced
impacts adhere to a conception of social impacts as conditions, and consider complaints to
be linked causally to the inception of conditions - people complained about noise because
it was a problem, and not about other things because they did not turn out to be
problematic. A social constructionist approach to problems starts from the premise that the
relationship between conditions and claims is not so straightforward - that conditions may
exist without being identified and treated as problems, and conversely that claims may be
made about problems without this necessarily indicating anything about the existence or
severity of a condition. The focus is on why claims emerge at a particular time, how they
are organised and how they are maintained. This offers a promising approach for exploring
sociologically the question of why protest emerged about noise generated by the surface of
the A27.
As indicated in Chapter 2 the constructionist position adopted here is that outlined by
Spector and Kitsuse which focuses on claims making activities and treats the existence or
severity of conditions as irrelevant to the sociologist's analysis:
We are interested in constructing a theory of claims-making activities, not a theory
of conditions. Thus the significance of objective conditions for us is the assertions
made about them, not the validity of those assertions as judged from some
independent standpoint, as for example, that of a scientist. To guard against the
tendency to slip back into an analysis of the condition, we assert that even the
existence of the condition itself is irrelevant to and outside of our analysis.
(1987:76)
To follow this position is not to claim that the condition does not exist, nor even that there
may not be a relationship between claims and conditions, rather it is methodological
strategy which is useful in uncovering more about the situation. So the issue of whether the
noise generated by the road was 'really' excessive or disruptive will be put aside in favour
of a focus on the claims made about it. This is not to suggest that the condition did not
exist or was not severe, but simply that these issues are not relevant to the analysis.
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With this particular case study some challenges to the utility of the social constructionist
approach immediately present themselves. Treating noise as a putative condition and
maintaining a position of agnosticism about the existence of a 'real' problem may initially
seem unteiiable for two reasons. First as outlined above one of the base assumptions of the
constructionist approach is that protest does not inevitably attend conditions. However with
the case of the A27, the accounts provided by interviewees link the identification of a
problem explicitly to the inception of the condition. For instance:
HBii and it really was very, very interesting, we stood on that over-bridge there on the
opening day, and watched the traffic come, and you could hear it approaching, and
my wife turned to me and said 'that's the end of any peace we ever had'. And that
was the reaction throughout the villages.
1-IP The day it opened I couldn't believe it. We actually went up and watched the old
cars going along. The night it opened, at three o'clock in the morning I was out in
the garden in tears. It was amazing, the noise was like being on the edge of
Gatwick airport, it really was.
IIJ When the road opened and the first surge of traffic belted down, they had all been
queuing to get onto the road, and as soon as the tapes were cut they just came in an
absolute roar. I thought 'Good God, here we are, it's going to be like this 24 hours
a day for ever'.
In this case the condition had a clear start date (when the road opened) and was apparently
immediately identified as a problem. There are two points to be made about this. First,
although clearly the noise from cars driving on the concrete surface could not exist before
the road opened, identification of this noise as a problem was not inevitable. Other
conditions such as severance and loss of land which had been anticipated during the
planning stages commenced as soon as the construction of the road was under way, while
others, notably emission of car fumes, began once it was operational. However none of
these conditions were identified as problems or gave rise to organised protest and
campaigning. Thus although the volume and nature of complaints are likely to be linked
to the inception of a condition they are not simply an automatic response to it. The social
constructionist approach explores why one condition rather than others is identified as a
problem, drawing attention to the factors which facilitate its emergence and maintenance.
Secondly these claims themselves (that identification of a problem immediately attended the
inception of the condition) are data to be analyzed, rather than 'facts' to be uncritically
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accepted. The project of examining how claims are organised includes noting that
participants account for the inception of claims making in this way and considering what
role this plays in the social construction of the problem. The following chapter considers
the rhetorical construction of the impact in some detail.
A further objection could be that unlike some of the social problems to which the approach
has been applied (such as deviancy or child abuse) the incidence and dimensions of the
problem of noise can apparently be easily and objectively measured. It would seem
relatively straightforward to determine whether noise was really a problem by studying the
results of noise level assessments. However the appropriate method for assessing noise
levels was disputed and consequently official assessments were not always considered to
depict adequately the 'reality' of the problem. There are two strands to this. First the
DoT's noise assessment regulations consider only the level of noise and not its pitch.
1-lowever protest about the noise was about the distinctive pitch caused by car tyres passing
over the grooved concrete surface:
HJ	 I think it is because of the particular frequency band on which the sound is, that it
is very penetrative.
HL	 noise measurements never seem to me to be - decibel levels seem to be an
inadequate expression of the disruptive effect of noise.
HC	 You can reduce the decibels but it's the pitch of the noise which is important.
Thus the method of assessment did not take account of features of the condition which were
causing concern and consequently the method was deemed inadequate by complainants.
Secondly, the assessment was based on calculation and did not involve actual noise
measurements. The DoT justified this on the basis that measurements are subject to daily
fluctuations caused by traffic flow and weather conditions. Local protestors claimed that
such a 'desk top exercise' (Observer 2/2/89) failed to capture the characteristics of the noise
and repeatedly called for ministers to come down and listen to it:
Observer 27/6/9 1
Furious residents are planning a new-style campaign to fight for a new surface on
the notoriously noisy A27 from Havant to Chichester. . . Spokeswoman ( ) said... if
they need any proof at all they have just got to come and listen to the road because
it is getting worse.
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Observer 2/2/89
Chairman of the district council quoted as saying:
it was a great pity that the job was not to be done properly. 'They should come
down here and see it' she said.
Observer 7/3/9 1
Chairman of Residents Association quoted as saying:
The DoT is governed in what it can do by statistics, but we don't have statistics, we
just hear the noise from that road.
A distinction was made between the knowledge of the noise held by local people and that
held by the DoT. Local people portrayed their knowledge as being based on direct
experience while the DOT's knowledge was depicted as abstract and distanced from the
reality of the problem (see Chapter 6 for a detailed analysis of interviewees' accounts of
their direct experience of the noise). The DoT defended their 'complex science' of noise
assessment claiming that it 'has been the subject of considerable investigation' and that 'the
public gets a better deal from the calculation method than by measurement' (Peter
Bottomley - then Minister for Roads and Traffic - quoted in Chichesier Observer, 30/3/89).
1-lowever, their methods which control for variations in weather did not satisfy local people
who claimed specUlcally that the noise was worse under certain conditions:
HBii The sound of the road.. .is very much windborne.
HG	 The normal wind blowing here is from the south west, so it is blowing towards the
road from us here. But when the wind is in the north, you can hear the road here.
HH	 Certainly we find if the wind is from a certain direction particularly easterly, south -
easterly, it really is very bad indeed. And people from the other side when the wind
is south-westerly tend to get more noise from the road coming there.
I-IN If you have a certain humidity and a certain wind direction it affects such a wide
area. I can hear it quite clearly in the morning four miles - maybe five miles away.
Equally, on another occasion you won't hear a squeak.
HQ	 To a large extent.. .the prevailing weather conditions, the wind conditions and indeed
the wet conditions...all affect the noise output.
What for the DoT was a bias to be removed from the equation was for local people an
essential feature of the problem.
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In summary, protest about noise was not an inevitable response to the commencement of
the condition, and disagreement about appropriate noise assessment methodologies illustrate
the difficulty of providing a definitive measure of the problem. Insights can be gained by
considering noise as a putative condition and by considering the claims made about it
without reference to 'actual' levels.
If it is assumed that protest was not an inevitable response to 'excessive' noise two
interesting questions emerge. First, why did protest arise about any feature of the road? and
secondly, why did protest focus on noise when it could conceivably have been about a
range of other things?
Explanations for the Emergence of Protest
In this section three different explanations for the emergence of protest will be considered.
The first draws attention to the social characteristics of those involved in the campaign, the
second focuses on the relationship between local complaints about impacts and wider
conceptions about what is problematic, and the third explores participants' own explanations
of the background to the protest in terms of a feeling of having been let down by the DoT.
Social C/i aracteristics
Considering the individual and social characteristics of those who become involved in
protest about social problems forms a core part of traditional analyses of the emergence of
protest. Research on local participation in planning decisions illustrates that middle and
upper class adults are more likely to participate in local voluntary activities than those in
lower classes, and that middle class retired people are those most likely to mount effective
campaigns. Freudenberg and Olsen (1983), in a discussion of those members of the public
most likely to participate in planning debates, cite a summary of available research which
concludes that:
Most studies of participation.. .demonstrate that it is those with higher income, higher
education and higher status occupations who participate. (Verba and Nie 1972:12)
(see also Firisterbusch 1980, and Downs 1970). In this particular case the fact that residents
had access to resources of time, money and expertise because many of them were retired
professionals was likely to be an important factor in the emergence and maintenance of
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systematic protest.
Spector and Kitsuse acknowledge that examining the social characteristics of those involved
in campaigns seems sensible but argue that it is not central to an examination of claims
making activities. They consider that concentrating on why people participate in claims
making activities deflects attention from the organization of claims making activities
themselves:
Since we consider the activities themselves to be the subject matter of social
problems, we direct our inquiry to the forms of those activities. We would ask how
those activities become organised as they are, rather than why participants become
involved in them. We do not mean to say that the latter question is not related to
the former, but it is not central to that question. (1987:82)
However it is not clear that these central questions of 'why social problems activities are
organised the way they are (and) how variations in organisation be accounted for' (ibid:83)
can be sufficiently answered without a consideration of social characteristics. It is
inevitable that the social background and circumstances of participants will equip them with
varying skills for organising an effective protest, useful contacts and financial resources,
and will influence the strategies they use to make their claims and the way in which they
construct the problem.
Although Spector and Kitsuse argue that analysis should move away from looking at the
characteristics of those involved in protests several of the questions they recommend
sociologists should address in exploring claims making activity seem to direct attention
back towards the characteristics of claims makers. For instance they note that a claim is
a demand that one party makes upon another and suggest attention should be paid to 'How
do these two parties get together so that one is the claimant and the other the recipient of
the claim' (ibid:83). In this case study the claims were made by local people to the DoT.
A variety of strategies were used, but the main ones were attempting to get local MPs
interested in the problem and hoping that they would be able to effect some change through
political channels, and arranging meetings with DoT representatives and the Minister for
Transport to discuss the issue. The background and experience of participants is key in
understanding and explaining why these particular strategies were selected. As retired
professionals they had experience which was useful in communicating and establishing
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relations with officials. They also had a range of expertise which they could marshall in
mounting an effective campaign. Members of the action groups had the confidence and
expertise necessary to read and assess technical information about road surfaces and even
to conduct small scale research of their own. The leader of one action group described the
research the group had done:
HJ We've got a lot of well qualified scientific minds around here...and they all went to
it with a will.. .and we managed to get hold of all sorts of technical manuals, and one
of the first things we did.. .we measured the depth of the grooves.
While the leader of a resident's group talked of his own research:
HQ I personally went to some trouble to secure all the documents related to road noise
generation from the Department of Road Research at Crowthorne, and I read these
documents - I am an engineer basically...
With reference to the recipients of claims Spector and Kitsuse note that:
Agencies have their own idea of the work they are authorized to do and the clientele
who can legitimately demand their services. They may agree or refuse to recognise,
accept, or register the proffered claim. Any of a variety of factors may influence
them to weigh their authority and discretion, interpret their mandate, and finally, to
include or exclude a claim from their jurisdiction. (op cit:83)
Although the campaign to get the road resurfaced was based on the belief that the DoT had
made a wrong and unfair decision in selecting a cheap concrete surface, in general the
campaign was not overtly hostile towards the DoT. Those involved sought to establish
good relations with the DoT and to be taken seriously by them. Interviewees involved in
the campaign often stressed that they understood how the DoT worked and respected their
position although they disagreed with it:
HBii Now, ok, one accepts the financial imperatives that there are on these things, and
being entirely realistic about it I quite understand the attitude that the Department
might take which is 'we have a road, it's not falling apart, it's carrying traffic,
people have been awarded compensation for loss of value of their properties. Why
should we do anything about it now?'...So I can perfectly well understand that.
HJ We've all dealt with them in various ways, telephoned them or met them, and they
have all been extremely co-operative in every way... You see, I mean the Department
of Transport are you know, like everybody else. They have a book of rules and
they have a road manual which tells them what their parameters are, and they have
to do what they are told.
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Although the DoT disagreed with local people's assessments of the problem of noise they
did engage with their complaints to the extent that their representatives agreed to meet
protesters, corresponded with them, and visited the Site. The fact that those protesting were
middle class and carried out their protest in a form which the DoT considered reasonable
and respectable may well have been an important factor influencing them in their
engagement with claimants and their claims.
None of this is to suggest that the protest only took off because the action groups were
largely made up of middle class and retired people. Although research suggest that these
people are those most likely to participate in voluntary organisations recent direct action
against roads has mobilised people from all sectors of society. However the social
characteristics of participants are not inconsequential and are likely to affect the shape of
the protest. Social constructionism is an action perspective - it focuses on the activities of
those involved in social problems work rather then trying to identify external structural
factors which influence or determine the emergence and maintenance of claims. Clearly an
explanation for the emergence of protest in this case study which simply drew attention to
the social characteristics of residents would be inadequate and could not be described as a
constructionist analysis. However to the extent that the social position and background of
participants informed the ways in which they made their claims and the way in which these
were responded to, it seems that these are relevant factor in building a social constructionist
explanation of the campaign.
Tue Relationship betveen Local and National Problems
Conditions which come to constitute local social problems are linked to wider national and
international conceptions of what is problematic. There is a range of literature on public
opinions and attitudes on environmental issues and on media coverage of environmental
issues. This literature suggests that public awareness and concern and media coverage
developed during the 1960s, peaked around 1970, receded, and then began to increase again
in the rnid-1980s (see Young 1990 for a discussion of public opinions and attitudes, and
Hansen 1991 for references on media coverage).
The connection between international, national and local conceptions of problems is a
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complex one. Although problems which attract national or international attention are often
conceptualised as more important than those which are just the focus of local claims the
levels cannot be easily separated in this way. Consideration of environmental problems
particularly illustrates the degree to which the international, national and local are
interconnected rather than being arranged in a hierarchy. First, even those problems which
seem to be uncontroversially 'global' have effects which are experienced in specific
localities. For instance the depletion of the ozone layer is likely to have health effects first
of all for those living close to the poles. Of course this issue is global in that the causes,
effects, and concern about them are not confined to these localities, but they are
experienced first and most dramatically there. In addition attention is often drawn to the
need to 'think globally and act locally' in order to address environmental problems. For
all of the problems that are considered to be most serious, action is advocated at a local
level, whether that is conserving energy, reusing and recycling materials or reducing
emissions. It is not only that local action is advocated as part of the response to global
problems but also that what happens at a local level is considered to contribute to problems
which have much wider impacts. For instance emissions from individual power stations
in Britain lead to problems of acid rain in Scandinavia, individual car use contributes to
wider problems of pollution and so on. The point is that global and local environmental
problems are inextricable, the local cannot be considered in isolation.
This interconnection between global and local problems is usually discussed as above in
terms of the causes, effects and solutions for problems. However it applies equally to
concern and claims making about problems. Claims making at a local level is inevitably
informed by claims that are being made and being taken seriously in wider fora, and in turn
each incident of local claims making contributes to the construction of a national or even
wider 'problem'. In the dispute about the A27's surface the impact was sometimes framed
explicitly as an environmental problem, for instance:
HBii As a resident here and as somebody who is actually concerned about the
environment and all forms of pollution there are, I think something should be done
about this road.
I-IN	 It has made an environmental pollution in terms of noise.
HL	 The quality of the environment you are in is obviously less.. .and no matter how
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much money the Department of Transport costs as compensation I don't think it
counts for the loss of that environmental quality.
JIG	 What has been traffic wise an enormous success, has turned out environmentally to
be a diaster.
The construction of the noise as an environmental problem was not used extensively in the
campaign, however it seems likely that the pervasiveness and acceptability of environmental
concern played a part in facilitating protest. Recognition that the development of road
schemes may have detrimental environmental and social consequences fits into a context
of increased concern about the protection of the environment. There now exists a climate
in which complaints about the effects of specific road schemes resonate with wider
environmental concerns; claims about local impacts are thus more likely to be considered
legitimate and participants recognise that they have a chance of having their complaints
taken seriously. The extent to which framing a concern as environmental legitimises
complaint will be considered in more detail in Chapter 8.
The Relationship between claimants and the Agencies to whom Glaims are Directed
A third strand in an explanation of the emergence of claims might focus on the relationship
between those protesting and the object of their protests - the DoT. As mentioned above
Spector and Kitsuse define a claim as 'a demand that one party makes upon another'
(1987:83) and suggest that an exploration of the relationship between these parties is a
crucial part of the explication of claims making activities.
In exploring the relationship between the parties as a possible explanation for the emergence
of protest, it is important to avoid the analysis turning into a search for the real motives
which lie behind participants' explanations of their conduct. For instance it might be
suggested that local people were actually motivated to complain because they had
previously been let down by the DoT, and consequently did not trust them and felt hostile
towards them. Although his sort of explanation is appealing it is ultimately a speculation
which goes beyond the available data. As such it could be characterised as what C. Wright
Mills (1940) calls 'motive mongering' - an attempt to distinguish individuals' 'real' motives
from the reasons they themselves give for their conduct (for a fuller discussion of Mills'
argument see p163-165).
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Mills argues that motives are the answers people give to the question 'why did you do
that?', and that sociological analysis should concentrate on the vocabularies utilised to
justify a course of action. So a social constructionist analysis of the relationship between
the parties should concentrate on how participants themselves describe the relationship and
how they use this as a justification or explanation for their conduct, and not assume that
this relationship can be assessed independently of such accounts.
In their accounts of the campaign about noise a number of interview and survey
respondents described themselves as feeling that they had been misled and generally treated
badly by the DoT. interviewees talked about a 'climate of distrusf, of people feeling
'unhappy and embittered', and 'betrayed'. There were two main strands to this, the first
being that the Minister had overruled the finding of the inspector at the first inquiry that
a northern route would be preferable to the DoT's recommended route. Local people
complained that the public inquiry was a 'farce', with individual people having the odds
stacked against them from the start. Interviewees who had been objectors at the first inquiry
claimed that when they heard that the Inspector's recommendation had been overruled:
HH	 . . .this really took the wind out of all our sails actually, and it certainly opened our
eyes to the farce really of public inquiries.
HM It just made one rather cynical about the whole public inquiry process
HK	 I think in a sense people were more aggrieved by the fact that in a sense they had
won the argument but lost the battle sort of thing, won the battle lost the war
The second area in which respondents reported that they had been let down by the DoT was
over the surface for the road. At the second inquiry the inspector had recommended that
the DoT should ensure that the surface of the road be as quiet as possible. However this
recommendation was ignored and the cheapest option of a concrete surface chosen.
HH And the other point of course, the surface of the road, and again the Inspector at the
second inquiry actually . . .recornrnended that the surface of the road should be such
as to produce the minimum amount of noise. .and in the reply the Secretary of State
at the time or the Department of Transport did say yes, they would take that into
account.. and again we have been very badly let down on that.
HL I think the bitterness behind all of this of course stems from the reassurances we
were given, that the road would have a surface on it which would be a quiet road
surface, which obviously was totally overturned.
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Thus respondents constructed a picture of a climate of anger and frustration with the DoT
that existed before the road was opened.
The extent to which opposition is motivated by lack of trust and bad relationships between
local people and authorities has been stressed in much work on risk perception. A number
of writers conclude that public anxiety and protest about environmental risks is motivated
primarily by a lack of trust in the authorities responsible for implementing or regulating
technology. For instance Slovic et al writing about public perceptions of risk from nuclear
waste state that:
public fears of and opposition to nuclear waste disposal plans can be seen as
a 'crisis in confidence', a profound breakdown of public trust in the scientific
governmental and industrial managers of nuclear technologies. (1991:29).
They conclude that once public trust is destroyed it cannot easily be restored.
However for the social constructionist analysis pursued here rather than taking anger at and
lack of trust in the DoT as an adequate explanation of protest, attention is drawn to the way
in which participants themselves invoked these emotions as part of the background to the
campaign about noise. By describing their feelings in this way participants might be seen
as implicitly justifying or explaining their participation in the campaign. The theme of
feeling let down by the DoT was not restricted to participants' descriptions of the time
preceding the opening of the road, but persisted throughout accounts of the campaign. For
instance the story presented in the local press is one of a campaign with a history of peaks
and troughs; of a recurrent cycle of hopes being raised, only for them to be dashed again.
Being 'let down' is not only used as an implicit justification for the emergence of protest
it is also used to encourage and justify continued campaigning. The campaign is framed
as a simple struggle for fairness and justice, with the DoT being constructed as unreliable
and untrustworthy.
Thus if a reason for the emergence of protest is sought which puts aside the idea that
protest is an inevitable response to excessive noise, three partial answers can be suggested.
First the fact that the area had a large retired professional population both facilitated the
emergence and maintenance of protest and informed the claims making strategies used.
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Secondly the wider context in which increasing attention is paid to the environmental
impacts of developments means that at a local level claims about impacts are likely to be
considered legitimate and participants recognise that they have a chance of having their
claims taken seriously by officialdom. Finally I have drawn attention to the way in those
involved in protesting about the noise drew on aspects of the planning of the road scheme
to build a picture of themselves as having been continually let down. These accounts
might be seen as an implicit way of explaining the emergence and maintenance of their
campaign.
Explanations for the Identification and Maintenance of Noise as an Impact
Explaining why any protest emerged does not explain why protest focused on noise to the
exclusion of other impacts. In this section the question of why it was noise that became
identified as an impact rather than anything else is addressed. First it is suggested that local
complaints about noise should be seen within the context of the emergence of noise as a
national problem. The relationship of problems and solutions is then discussed and the
suggestion made that noise became an impact because there were clearly defined solutions
available. In explaining the maintenance of protest the way in which the impact of noise
was 'packaged' is an important factor. Attention is drawn here to the adoption of a
particular phrase to describe the impact and to the visual images which accompanied press
reports about it. Finally, and most substantially, competing definitions of the impact
between local people and the DoT are identified, and this disjunction suggested as a
particular explanation for ongoing dispute.
Noise as a Nev Social Problem
Noise is increasing coming to be seen as a serious environmental problem within the UK.
For instance Vidal (1993) claims:
Britain, already one of the noisiest countries in the world, is getting worse as
environmental background noise - from traffic to car alarms and lawnmowers to
music played in shops - increases annually. (1993:1)
He reports that the UK government now recognises noise as a pollutant and catalogues
research findings which indicate the negative effects - from stress to deafness - which noise
has on individuals. Griffiths (1996) agrees that 'noise levels are rising' and draws attention
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to a 'growing silence protection industry':
you can get cassettes of silence. Ear plugs sell well. 'Smart' buildings manufacture
optimum sound levels (1996:2)
Social Trends has a section on environmental concern which in 1996 included for the first
time a consideration of concern about noise. The report notes that 'noise has become a
major concern in recent years' (1996:191) and uses the example of complaints about noise
from domestic premises to illustrate this. Figures are provided which show that around
3,000 complaints per million population were received from environmental health officers
in England and Wales in 1992-1993. The rate of complaints has risen steadily since 1981,
with the level for 1992-1993 being over four times the rate for 1981.
Increasing concern and complaints about noise from a variety of sources are usually
explained by the suggestion that the world has actually become noisier. This is an
insufficient account as one of the main insight of social constructionism is that complaints
are not necessarily linked in such a straightforward way to conditions. Thus the whole
question of why noise from many different sources has become the focus for concern is a
research question which would merit investigation. That is beyond the scope of this thesis,
but what is relevant here is the observation that concern about noise is a widespread
phenomenon. It is within this context that complaints about the very specific noise
generated by car tyres on the A27's surface should be understood. As outlined in the
preceding section local identification and concern about impacts will be informed by wider
conceptions of what is problematic.
Problems and Solutions
Spector and Kitsuse (1987) argue that contrary to the commonsense notion that solutions
are developed once problems are apparent, the reverse is true: solutions produce problems
by providing the framework within which those problems can be stated. They argue that
the belief that something could be done about a condition is a prerequisite to it becoming
a social problem. This provides some explanation of why protest arose about noise rather
than about anything else. Once the road was built many of the problems aired at the public
inquiry were beyond solution; debate had centred on where the road should be sited and
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once that was decided and implemented there could be little possible gain from continuing
to claim that it should have been built elsewhere.
In addition some of the other impacts of road schemes such as social severance and
emotional reactions to changes in the locality are somewhat intangible and do not suggest
any obvious solutions. In contrast, noise is a tangible and concrete impact to which a range
of solutions are available. It may be that the more nebulous social concerns and fear are
reformulated into concern about a technical problem which is identifiable, nameable and
recognised by 'experts'.
Packaging the Impact
The noise was referred to locally as 'the A27 roar'. Schoenfeld et al note that in the early
stages of making claims about a putative social problem claims makers are:
aided significantly if they can find a distinctive term for their overall concern, if
only for the convenience of headline writers. (1979:39-40)
The first mention of the 'A27 roar' in the local press was on 1st September 1988 right at
the start of the campaign. The Chichester Observer headlined their front page report
'Residents' fury over 'A27 roar" and went on to say:
sound barriers and resurfacing work are being demanded for the new Chichester-
1-lavant A27 by hundreds of angry people living near the road - in a storm of protest
over noise dubbed the 'A27 roar' (1/9/88)
The report does not say who has 'dubbed' the noise the 'A27 roar', but it went on to
acquire common usage both in the press and by residents. A quarter of the articles in the
press reporting aspects of the campaign about noise used the term in their headline, for
instance:
'Opinions sought on A27 roar' (6/10/88)
'Profiting by the road roar' (25/5/89)
'Roads minister invited to hear A27 roar' (3 1/8/89)
'Residents suffer two years of A27 roar' (3 0/8/90)
References to the roar also recurred in interviews:
HJ	 When the road opened and the first surge of traffic belted down.. .they just came in
an absolute roar
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1-IP	 In the kitchen there is a big swing window, you open that, as you do immediately
you get a tremendous roar
HBii Right from day one this A27 roar is talked about
HL	 You get a dull background roar almost all the time
As Burgess and Harrison (1993) illustrate, claims about environmental change 'circulate',
with press accounts influencing public interpretations, but equally public and expert
discourses may be taken up by the media. Media references to the 'roar' both reflected and
sustained local usage of the term. Clearly the 'A27 roar' provided a more succinct and
manageable term for the impact than for instance 'the noise generated by the ribbed
concrete surface'. In addition the word 'roar' also provides some description of the type
and extent of noise that was being generated. While a noise may be quiet or pleasant, a
roar indicates a particularly loud and compelling sound
The visual images which accompany stories in the press can also play an important role in
conveying a memorable idea of the impact. Corner and Richardson (1993) in their research
on tv portrayals and audience understandings of nuclear power note that the visual image
is as important as the spoken in conveying a particular view of the issue, and with reference
to newspaper reports Mazur and Lee write:
Impressions of a news report may be formed from scanning its headline, an
accompanying picture and its caption or perhaps the first paragraph or two of text.
(1993:683)
Mazur and Lee also make the observation that all the global environmental issues which
have become the focus for mass concern have:
become associated with powerful visuals that eventually come to symbolise these
problems. (ibid:71 1)
The Oxford English Dictionary defines roar thus:
'of persons: to utter a very loud and deep or hoarse cry...'
'of animals: to utter a loud deep cry..'
'of cannon, thunder, wind, the sea or other inanimate agents: to make a loud noise
or din..'
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These range from NASA's computer pictures of the ozone hole to photographs of
charismatic animals to symbolise species loss.
these simple if slightly misleading images encapsulate these complex problems in
the mind of the media audience (ibid:71 1).
The problem of noise is a difficult one to convey visually, and this is reflected in the low
number of photographs which appeared in the press alongside reports of the 'A27 Roar'.
Of the 91 articles which were published in the Chichester Observer about noise only six
were illustrated with photographs (three of these used two photographs). The images used
were:
-	 24/8/89 two photographs of protestors on a demonstration to mark a year of the
problem;
-	 8/2/90 photograph of the Minister for Roads visiting the area and 'listening' to the
road;
-	 30/8/90 two photographs of residents who had 'suffer(ed) two years of 'A27 roar";
-	 25/6/92 photographs of both local MPs who had agreed to work together to secure
a meeting between the Minister for Roads and local people;
-	 8/7/92 photograph of Minister for Roads visiting the area and 'listening' to the road.
-	 1/10/92 photograph of local resident outside his home which is described as
'battered by noise'.
As so few photographs were used no attempt will be made to analyze them; it appears that
visual imagery did not play a large part in the construction of the impact. However it is
perhaps worth noting that two pictures were used of different ministers for roads 'listening'
to the road. As outlined earlier (p91) a key feature of the local campaign was the attempt
to get representatives of the DoT to listen to the noise, on the basis that direct experience
was necessary in order to appreciate the problem.
Competing Definitions of the Problem
The A27 roar was considered locally to be the result of a mistake by the DoT and a result
of their (misguided) concern to save money. The account usually provided was that the
Department selected a concrete surface for the road as this was a cheaper option than
tarmac ('black top'). The surface had grooves brushed into it by the contractors to prevent
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skidding. however at the time of construction the DoT supplied no specification about the
maximum depth of the grooves, only about the minimum. Consequently the grooves were
cut deep to increase resistance and as car tyres pass over these grooves the characteristic
'roar' results. The roar was conceived of as a problem which could have been avoided, or
a mistake, which had caused unnecessary suffering for local people. For instance
interviewees said:
FTP	 We all feel that it wasn't necessary to affect us this way.
HH	 Clearly they've made a mistake on this one, they won't admit it, they've made a
mistake, a very bad mistake in putting that surface down.
HG It was said to be an experimental surface and if it's an experimental surface they
ought to be prepared if it wasn't a success to come back and do something else, but
they didn't and they weren't..they won't come back and correct the mistake, that's
the problem.
In this account the DoT are considered to be the perpetrators of the problem and the only
party that can provide redress.
This formulation of the problem contrasts with the DoT's assessment of the situation. In
an information sheet they produced about the road they claim that:
Problems have arisen here primarily not as a consequence of the type of surface
used.. .but rather of people in proximity to a new and busy road where previously
there was none. (DoT 1989)
In this version the problem is that local people are unused to busy roads and thus no action
is necessary because as time passes they will get used to the road. The DoT's noise
assessments calculated that the road generated enough noise to justify the provision of
household insulation and the erection of noise barriers. However they attributed this level
of noise to higher than anticipated traffic levels rather than to the grooved concrete surface.
These contrasting constructions of the nature of the problem led to contrasting solutions
being considered acceptable. For local objectors the only acceptable solution was for the
road to be resurfaced; this would constitute a tacit admission by the DoT that they had
made a mistake in laying the original surface. However, from the DoT's position other
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more limited responses were appropriate. Once they had conceded that the road was indeed
too noisy they responded by providing measures to insulate people from the noise by means
of secondary glazing inside homes and noise barriers alongside the road. Nevertheless,
despite the use of the best available technology their attempts were met with local contempt
and dismissed as 'inadequate', 'useless' and 'interim measures'. It is worth considering
responses to each 'solution' in turn.
Secondary Glaing
The DoT have regulations whereby householders living within 30Dm from a new road and
experiencing a certain level of noise are eligible for a grant to enable rooms to be
soundproofed by double glazing. Both survey respondents and interviewees were asked
whether they had had the glazing installed and for their opinions of it. Thirty per cent of
survey respondents had had the glazing installed, and of these ninety per cent agreed that
it was successful in reducing noise levels in the home. However this does not imply that
they were happy with the glazing or that they considered it to be an effective solution to
the impact of the A27 roar. When asked if they had any comments about the glazing
common complaints were that the regulations were not suitable for many houses, did not
allow for enough windows to be glazed and that the glazing was only effective so long as
all windows were kept closed.
The interview respondents provided more detailed information about these shortcomings.
The regulations specify that a gap must be left between window and glazing, vents must
be installed on the outside of the building and venetian blinds placed between the existing
window and the new glazing. Interviewees complained that these specifications were
unsuitable for older houses and particularly for listed buildings, which some of their homes
were:
HL	 They offered us double glazing but how can you double glaze a house like this?
You can't.. .double glazing would have wrecked the place, absolutely wrecked it.
HBii if you have this secondary glazing installed you have to have a ventilation fan
installed which is something about two foot by one foot thick by six inches deep.
Now that requires sort of air bricks and so on on the outside which is not always
easy to get listed building permission for.. .and secondly there really isn't the wall
space in my cottage, which has got small rooms, to put the thing. So if I accept that
secondary glazing in the form of formal specifications I've got to have this dirty
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great box, using electricity which I have to pay for, to ventilate the room in a way
that actually I think is unnecessary because we have a live fire in there and you get
a dirty great draft.
The second failing of the insulation specifications mentioned is that they only cover the
glazing of certain rooms:
I-IBii I mean the current rules for secondary glazing will not pay it, only pay it for living
rooms. That does not include a kitchen. Now you tell a housewife that a kitchen
is not a living room. That's one stupidity as it were.
I-ID It's ridiculous really because wherever you are you can hear it. Because you happen
to have two rooms nearest to it they're the rooms they offer to have done. But the
remainder of the home is not done. But if you open the door of the ground floor
you can hear it, it's ludicrous...it's all silly thinking to me
The final complaint is not related to the specifications, but is that glazing fails to address
the problem. That is, it cannot reduce the noise experienced in the garden, as one
interviewee succinctly put it:
HBi You can double glaze a house but you can't double glaze a garden
and it prevents residents from opening their windows:
HQ	 double glazing isn't the answer to the consistent noise day and night, because you
have to open windows and people like to get out.
Chapter 6 provides more detail of respondents' accounts of how noise affects them and
reveals that the features which they consistently report are that their enjoyment of their
gardens is spoilt, and that they can no longer open their windows in the summer. Thus they
argued that the secondary glazing failed to address the problem as people could not be
insulated from the noise at all times, they were still subject to it if they wanted to use their
gardens or open their windows.
Noise Barriers
When the campaign about the A27 roar began there was some division between the groups
involved about whether noise barriers offered a potential solution to the problem. Some
noise barriers had been provided when the road was opened, and some people argued that
the problem of the roar would be solved if the DoT provided more and better barriers. One
of the large residents' associations began by pushing hard for the installation of barriers.
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One of their representatives was interviewed, and he described how the group had originally
felt that:
IIQ we'd be better served by addressing the question of containment, i.e. barriers,
cuttings, embankments, than we would in pursuing road surface change, which many
of the other protest groups in the area along the road were shooting for, they all
wanted the road resurfaced in tarmac.
1-Ic described how the group had had some success in 'terms of having additional barriers
built' but then went on to say:
HQ sadly they proved virtually ineffective.. .And so as of about two years ago, we...
changed our tack and joined if you will the resurfacing lobby, that is linked up with
other groups along the A27 that were shouting for resurfacing and nothing less.
1-us assessment that the barriers were 'virtually ineffective' was widely shared. In the survey
respondents were asked whether they had any comments to make about the barriers and
sixty-seven percent responded that they were ineffective or useless. Interviewees agreed:
HJ	 They (sound barriers) are of a German design, supplied by a German firm.
Completely unique in this country, and I have to say very useless.
HH But I'm afraid these ugly barriers they are putting up, which are a sort of a fob, they
say 'oh well we are doing our best' this sort of thing 'actually trying what we can
to reduce the impact of noise' but making things a lot worse. They are not reducing
the noise, not significantly anyway, and actually making bad visual impact on the
environment.
1-IN Now then, we come to the other feature, which is in terms of road building, do noise
screens and noise bunds apart from the psychological impact they have in that they
are doing something about it, do they really work? And the answer to that is no.
Some respondents were cynical about the DoT's motives in erecting the barriers. One who
was a central figure in the campaign about the roar joked that he thought that the DoT had
placed a barrier close to his house as an attempt to placate him as he was making such a
fuss about the noise:
1-U I think they ought to have put them further on in Emsworth where there are a lot
of people living and the road is on an embankment anyway, and they suffer terribly.
They didn't do that and they have got them here, mainly because I live here,
shouldn't say this but it's a joke really.
The idea that the barriers were intended to quell protest about the noise was also raised by
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other interviewees. For instance HH in the extract above suggests that the main rationale
for siting barriers was that it would make people think that the DoT were 'doing their
best..actually trying to reduce the impact of noise', he calls them 'a fob', suggesting they
are intended to work as some sort of placebo making people feel better without actually
changing the situation. HN also picks up this idea referring to the 'psychological' effect of
the barriers, they placate people by making them feel that at least the DoT are 'doing
soniething about it'.
For the DoT the problem of the road was not so much the noise generated by the surface
but the noise made about the noise by local residents. If the road was measurably noisy
but no-one complained presumably there would be no reason for the DoT to attempt to
ameliorate the noise. Residents suggested that the barriers were intended to reduce this
noise about noise, at least as much as they were intended to reduce actual noise. This idea
was also reflected in the local press' reporting of reactions to the barriers. A headline in
October 1991 read 'A27 noise barriers fail to silence residents (10/1/91).
The idea that the DoT were more concerned to reduce complaints than to reduce noise
levels fits with the conception of social problems as claims making activities. For the DoT
it is the local claims and complaints about noise which constitute the problem to be
addressed. Shielding residents from noise by installing glazing and erecting noise barriers
may have been expected to lessen complaints either because the efforts would actually
reduce the noise experienced, or because they would create the impression that the DoT
were concerned to improve conditions. However from the residents' viewpoint these
measures were ineffective as they failed to do anything about the problematic road surface.
From the DoT's point of view they must also be deemed largely ineffective as they failed
to reduce the volume of complaints, and indeed provided scope for further complaints.
Compensation
Under Part 1 of the Land Compensation Act 1973 home owners are entitled to claim
compensation for the deprecation of the value of their propert) due to noise or other effects
arising from the use of new or improved roads. Clearly compensation cannot solve the
problem of noise. However if as outlined above the 'real problem' for the DoT is the level
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of local protest about the noise, then providing compensation may be expected to placate
residents. Thus for the DoT it might be considered a possible solution to the problem.
However from the response of survey respondents and from interviewees' comments it
seems that compensation has suffered the same fate as insulation and barriers. It is not
considered to provide any sort of solution to the noise generated by the road surface, and
has provided a focus for new complaints.
The issue of compensation was raised by many interviewees as the money was being paid
out at about the time that interviewing took place. Local newspapers were carrying reports
and letters about the amounts received. Interviewees displayed their awareness that
compensation might be regarded as a possible solution to the noise but stressed that it could
do nothing to ameliorate the impact.
All the interviewees who discussed compensation agreed that regardless of the amount
received, money could not compensate for the effects of noise:
HL I mean, to put it into figures ours was £3,750 sort of stuff, which - you take it, buy
the odd holiday, buy the odd new car, but its not really compensation for a long
term loss of environmental quality. So I don't think we feel compensated. But I
don't think it would be possible to come up with a sum of money which is a
compensation.
HQ The fact is that even recipients of the fairly handsome compensation can still not sit
in their gardens during the summer months, those that live close to the road. And
this is a total change in their life style. They argued 'why should we have to put
up with this nonsense of not being able to use our homes?' The compensation is
only an award if you like against the reduced value of the home, which would only
come into force if ever they sold and moved on, but in the meantime they have to
put up with the misery of the road noise which is very serious.
HBi You can compensate a person for the actual physical, I say physical, I mean bank-
balance loss of value of his property, but doesn't it come to the fact that he's living
in discomfort, if he stays in that house, for the rest of his life.
This sort of argument was also made repeatedly by survey respondents. Seventy-one per
cent of households represented in the survey had received compensation, but few regarded
the amount they had received as generous (5%), with most assessing it as about right (40%)
or not enough (5 5%). The vast majority (82%) of these people answered that they did not
consider that the money compensated for the effect of the road. Unfortunately there was
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some confusion attached to this question. The question was intended to uncover whether
people felt that compensation was a solution to the road's impacts. However as a few
respondents commented, compensation is awarded for loss of property value, not directly
against the impacts of the road. They clearly felt that the question was irrelevant or badly
worded because the money was not intended to compensate for impacts.
The amount of money paid out in compensation was criticised by a number of interviewees.
They argued that compensation does not address the noise generated by the road surface,
and is thus a waste of money. The amount paid out was characterised as excessive,
although estimates of this amount varied greatly between accounts. One way in which
respondents illustrated that the level of expenditure has been excessive was by comparing
it to the original amount spent on constructing the road:
1-IJ they have, this was up till July, spent 12 million on compensating people, and that
was at a point where they had only processed half the applications. Now if the other
half, and this is conjectural, but if the other half amounted to another 12 million,
that means that the compensation paid will have exceeded the contract, tender price
of the road, vhich is 19 million. If it goes up to say 20 million it will exceed it
anyway. Well that is horrifying isn't it?
hG And they have spent millions of pounds now on trying to compensate the people for
the trouble. In fact I'm told that they have now spent more in compensation than
it cost to build the road. It's unbelievable.
HM I think originally when the scheme was mooted back in the 1970's the amount of
compensation which they thought they would have to pay out was well under a
million pounds. It's now approaching twenty which is very nearly the cost of the
road construction.
Thus although residents' groups had pressed for adequate compensation since construction
of the road began, and some individuals conceded that the amounts received were fair,
providing generous compensation did not lessen disquiet about the noise generated by the
road surface. Indeed it provided another topic for complaint. As the problem was
identified as lying in the road surface itself, any attempts to mitigate the impact of noise
which did not change the surface were deemed a waste of time and money. A number of
respondents estimated the amount of money which had been spent to date on these various
'solutions', and argued that the money would have been better spent in providing a new
road surface:
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I-IF It is certainly true that they have spent a lot of money in sound-proofing, they have
spent a lot of money in compensation, and some of that I think probably could have
been better applied to quietening the road as far as possible.
HD I mean you see what really annoys me is that all this compensation's being paid out,
it doesn't alter anything. They're just paying compensation out, and people are
receiving it. And they're probably very pleased to receive it, because that is their
right and due. But I mean at the end of the day, I mean personally I'd much rather
have a proper surface which doesn't make the noise than the money.
I IC they have probably spent more money in compensation and in sound barriers, noise
harriers, than they would have if they resurfaced the road in area which would be
beneficial to the heavily populated areas.
Thus overall the Dot's measures were singularly unsuccessful at achieving an end to the
protest as they failed to appreciate what that protest was about. Their solutions attempted
to insulate 'sensitive' residents from the noise, or compensate them for the experience.
These solutions failed to recognise the underlying moral character of residents complaints
that a concrete surface should not have been laid, that it was unfair that they should be
subject to noise and that the DoT should admit that they had made a mistake and address
it at source. Rather than reducing complaints the DoT's solutions provided scope for further
complaints - about the design and provision of secondary glazing, about the effectiveness
and appearance of noise barriers, and about the amount of money spent on compensation.
Conclusions
This chapter has used a social constructionist approach to account for the emergence and
maintenance of protest about the impact of noise from the A27 Havant/Chichester. In
explaining why any protest emerged the influence of the social characteristics of
participants was discussed and the relationship between local concern about impact and
wider conceptions of what is problematic was noted. Spector and Kitsuse suggest that
another important source of explanation lies in the relationship between participants and the
party to whom their claims are addressed. A case is made for concentrating on participants'
constructions of this relationship, and attention is drawn to the way in which participants
in the dispute used the feeling of being 'let down' by the DoT as a justification for both
the emergence and maintenance of protest.
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The chapter then moved on to consider why noise was singled out as a significant impact,
and to begin to explore how the impact of noise was constructed. Again attention was
drawn to the relationship between local and national conceptions of what is problematic,
and the suggestion made that noise is an emergent national social problem. In addition to
fitting in with wider concerns noise was also an impact to which clear solutions were
available, and thus was more likely to be identified as an impact than something which
could not so easily be resolved. The impact came to be known locally as the 'A27 roar'
and it is suggested that this played an important role by providing a clear and succinct term
and an identifiable image for the impact. The most substantial section of the chapter
outlined the competing definitions of the impact formed by local people and by the DoT.
It is suggested that this disjunction served to exacerbate protest as the parties were talking
past each other - the impact being addressed was different for each party. As a
consequence local people rejected the solutions offered by the DoT as they were not
solutions to the impact as they constructed it.
The application of the approach has implications for the practice of assessing the social and
environmental impacts of new developments. Text books recommend that social impact
assessments should consider both 'objective' and 'subjective' levels of impact; assessments
should not only consider whether there is 'actually' a problem, but also pay attention to
local perceptions of what is problematic. However in practice they rarely probe into how
the problem is framed and conceptualised, or consider any mismatch between official and
local constructions of the problem. The social constructionist approach provides a way of
making explicit these dimensions. Unless this is done there is the possibility that
recommended solutions will address the manifest features of a problem (e.g. noise) but in
failing to consider and address local construction of the problem will actually make protest
worse.
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Chapter 6
The Rhetorical Construction of the Impact of Noise.
In Chapter 5 a social constructionist approach was applied to the case study of the A27
Havant/Chichester to suggest answers to the questions of why any protest emerged after the
road was built, and why noise specifically came to be considered problematic while other
issues were ignored. In this chapter I will explore the issue of the social construction of
this social impact at a more detailed level and consider how participants' accounts (or
claims making activities) were constructed in order to achieve the sense that noise was a
serious and significant social impact.
Discourse Analysis
Discourse analysis is a term which is used to refer to a variety of different ways of working
in socio-linguistics, social psychology and social theory. Here I am referring only to the
approach exemplified by the work of Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), Potter and Wetherell
(1988) and Edwards and Potter (1992). This approach has its origins in the philosophical
work of Wittgenstein and Austin, and is influenced by the sociological recommendations
of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. In contrast to traditional approaches within
sociology, discourse analysis does not assume that language somehow corresponds to, or
can be taken as 'standing for' states of affairs as they 'really are'. Instead of regarding
language as a detached commentary on reality it is viewed as a dynamic medium through
which this reality is actually constituted.
Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) developed discourse analysis as a response to the
methodological difficulties encountered by sociologists studying scientists' actions and
beliefs. Previous research in this field had tended to use scientists' accounts unreflectively,
that is, as providing an unproblematic access to the events the scientists were describing.
However Gilbert and Mulkay noted that within the accounts they gathered from scientists
there was a huge amount of variability in the way that the same events were described.
This was apparent not only in accounts from different scientists, or from the same scientist
in different contexts (e.g. in journal papers, interviews and informal conversation) but also
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within the same interview. That is, individual scientists regularly characterised events and
their beliefs about them in quite contradictory ways during the course of an interview.
Gilbert and Mulkay recognised that variability was a pervasive feature of accounts of
actions and events, and it has since been documented in a variety of different sorts of
accounts (e.g. Potter and Wetherell's (1987) discussion of racist attitudes in accounts, and
Wetherell et al's (1987) discussion of discourses concerning gender and employment
opportunities). The extent of variability within accounts clearly poses a problem for
conventional forms of analysis which seek to provide a definitive account of action or
belief.
Following from their acknowledgment of the existence of variability within accounts Gilbert
and Mulkay argued that there is a fundamental flaw in the assumption made in traditional
methodologies that data obtained from interviews and questionnaires provide access to some
external social reality. Rather participants' descriptions of any state of affairs are partial
and selective representations. Even when speakers are describing the most routine and
commonplace events or states of affairs they have a wide range of alternative descriptions
from which to choose. For instance Schegloff (1972) has noted that for any object there
are a range of terms which could be used to describe its (geographical) location. He
illustrates this by detailing the range of terms he could use to formulate where his notes are,
ranging from 'right in front of me' to 'in the United States' with each of the terms being
in some sense correct. He argues that the sort of considerations that enter into the selection
of a particular formulation are of analytic interest. Referring to something or describing
something involves the practical tasks of selecting and assembling. Thus any description
is a construction, built from the range of words and phrases that could legitimately have
been used.
The implication is that when people respond in an interview or on a questionnaire they are
not merely providing a neutral commentary upon some feature of the world, but are doing
things in and with their spoken and written statements. For instance they might be making
complaints, justifying their position, blaming others, seeking sympathy or approval. All of
these are actions. Gilbert and Mulkay suggest that rather than attempting to use accounts
to interpret and describe some reality which is deemed to exist independently of them, it
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is more fruitful to analyze the accounts themselves, to explore how specific versions are
formulated and why. So, the account itself becomes the object of analysis, rather than the
individual giving it, or the subject which they are talking about. Discourse analysis deals
explicitly with the constructed and functional character of accounts, and addresses directly
the variability within them.
Disputes about Road Schemes as Discursive Acts
Discourse analysis has been used to explore the dimensions of a range of different sorts of
debates or disputes (e.g. Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), use it to analyze a controversy within
biochemistry, Potter and Reicher (1987) use it to explore contrasting press accounts of a
'riot', and Macnaghten (1993) uses it to explore arguments about what nature is). Edwards
and Potter (1992) suggest that peoples' talk about social conflicts is not simply a
commentary on some external state of affairs, but actively constructs and fashions the
conflict itself. They use discourse analysis to analyze public political discourse
concentrating on issues such as how events are described and explained, how factual reports
are constructed and how cognitive states are attributed. They argue that in public debates
and conflicts 'the events that take place are inextricable from their various constructions'
(1992: 1).
From the beginning debates about road schemes are played out in spoken and written
discourse in a variety of forms. The DoT and their consultants issue press notices and
publish and exhibit maps and plans. Individuals are invited to complete questionnaires
about the choice of route and to write to the Secretary of State with objections and
comments on the DoT's plans. Action and Residents' Groups hold public meetings, put up
posters and distribute pamphlets. At the Public Inquiry individuals and groups are invited
to present written or spoken submissions of objection or support. Finally the inspector
sums up the arguments made and issues raised in his report. Media, political and public
debate continues beyond the inquiry. In this case study local groups prepared petitions,
spoke to and wrote to the local press, wrote to their local MPs and representatives of the
DoT, held public meetings and distributed pamphlets - all of these activities are discursive
acts.
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The practices that individuals and groups deploy to warrant the authenticity of their own
account, or to suggest that another's version is untrustworthy, constitute the very site of the
dispute. The issue of whether an account appears to be factual, is robust, or insidiously
undermines alternative accounts is not simply an issue of academic interest but is something
of which participants are aware and take account. During the public inquiry it is obviously
important for participants that their accounts of how the road will affect them manage to
gain the Inspector's attention, and in later claims making about the impacts of the road
participants are obviously concerned that their accounts are persuasive both to other local
people and to the DoT. They recognise that the way in which they construct their accounts
of impact may have practical implications for the outcome of the dispute. Thus in order
to understand and describe such disputes it makes sense for sociologists to study the
organisation and construction of the language employed.
Social Constructionism and the Analysis of Language
A theme which recurs in recent reconsiderations of social constructionism within the social
problems area is that greater attention should be paid to the 'discursive production of social
problems' (Ibarra and Kitsuse 1993).
Ibarra and Kitsuse's mission is to clarify and update the agenda for the study of social
problems outlined initially by Spector and Kitsuse. They claim that Spector and Kitsuse's
original statement did not provide a sufficiently clear theoretical direction for studies of the
social construction of social problems with the result that many avowedly constructionist
studies have focused on what claims making is about (i.e. poverty, crime, child abuse)
rather than developing theories of the process of the production of social problems. In
order to direct research towards studying the process of claims making they advocate
rhetoric as the focus for contemporary constructionism.
For clarity Ibarra and Kitsuse suggest that the term 'putative problem' which Spector and
Kitsuse used to denote the attitude of indifference to the 'reality' of the problem, should
be replaced with the term 'condition-category'. They argue that the focus on 'putative
problems' has led to confusion and lack of direction within the field, because the term
'social problem' does:
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double service: it is now a member's then a sociologist's concept. (1993:28)
and also because Spector and Kitsuse's proposal has often been interpreted as
recommending that sociologists study what claims making is 'about' rather than focusing
on the features of the claims making process. They define condition categories as follows:
Condition-categories are typifications of socially circumscribed activities and
processes - the 'society's' classification of its own contents - used in practical
contexts to generate meaningful descriptions and evaluations of social reality.. .they
are the terms used by members to propose what the social problem is 'about'.
(ibid:30)
Thus they envisage that this new term will draw attention to debates between members over
what the problem is 'really about', the practices and stategies they use to shape and produce
social problems. This involves the study of the language of claims making.
The research programme they outline consists of drawing up and refining ideal types of the
rhetorical dimensions of social problems discourse. They suggest that such a focus on the
'vernacular resources' which participants draw upon in claims making activities offers more
potential for developing a coherent theory of social problems activity than does the
continued provision of studies of 'the social construction of X, Y & Z' (ibid:32-33). They
suggest that there may be common ways of speaking and reasoning used when people make
social problems claims regardless of the condition-category used, and distinguish four
dimensions of claims making which sociologists might consider:
-	 rhetorical idioms - these situate the condition-category into a moral dimension, for
instance in terms of loss, unreason or unfairness;
-	 counter rhetoric - used to oppose or counter claims;
-	 motifs - figures of speech which act as shorthand descriptions or evaluations of the
condition-category, for instance plague, diaster or tragedy;
-	 claims making styles - for instance whether claims are made in a legalistic, comic
or scientific style.
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Within each of these four dimensions Ibarra and Kitsuse identify a range of rhetorical
resources which they suggest are common in claims making about social problems. They
acknowledge that:
The inventory of specific idioms, styles and so forth that we offer is composed of
ideal types and thus stands to be refined, reformulated and elaborated upon through
empirical observation and further theoretical reflection. (ibid:34)
Their recommendation is that researchers take their ideal type model of rhetorical resources
and use it to interpret the data they collect on claims making about a particular problem or
problems.
While applauding the recognition that social constructionisrn shouki focas arr the ]arigt1age
of claims making, others have taken a different tack. For example Marlaire and Maynard
(1993) and Holstein and Miller (1993) urge a more ethriomethodological approach, insisting
that research should explicate the details of everyday interactional matters. Such studies
would concentrate on how people handle problems of immediate interest to them rather than
focusing (as Ibarra and Kitsuse do) on issues already labelled as social problems by, for
instance, policy makers or citizens' groups. They also suggest that analysis should always
start from empirical observation of naturally occurring interaction rather than seeing to what
extent the data fit pre-ordained rhetorical patterns.
By providing a discourse analysis of interview data I am steering a path somewhere
between these two. Discourse analysis of this sort is informed by the ethnornethodological
concern (also central to Marlaire's and Maynard's, and Holstein's and Miller's work) to
explicate actual instances of talk rather than developing typologies of discursive styles.
Providing detailed analyses of actual claims would seem a necessary precursor to any
attempt to outline the constituent features of claims making as Ibarra and Kitsuse
recommend. 1-lowever the data I will be analyzing is not ordinary conversation (as in
Marlaire's and Maynard's and Holstein's and Miller's work) but are accounts gathered in
interviews. Both Holstein and Miller, and Marlaire and Maynard stress the importance of
studying the 'interactional production of concrete instances of social problems' (Holstein
and Miller p1.52) and, following a traditional conversation analytic path, take the recording
of ordinary conversation to provide the best data. In this chapter I will be examining
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claims produced in an interview setting, which differs in important ways from naturally
occurring conversation. However as the emphasis here is on how claims about a specific
'problem' (noise) are organised rather than more generally on how people use language to
handle problems of immediate interest to them, interviews provide the best opportunity of
collecting appropriate data. The analysis will concentrate on participants' monologue
accounts about noise and will not consider in detail the part that interaction between
interviewer and interviewee plays in producing the 'problem' of noise. Wooffitt (1992)
acknowledges that the data provided in interviews designed specifically to elicit accounts
about a particular event or experience cannot be treated as naturally occurring in the same
way as talk that occurs spontaneously in everyday interaction, but he argues that this does
not invalidate the use of conversation and discourse analytic methods for these data. He
suggests that talk in specific settings is distinct from, but based upon, procedures which are
recurrent features of everyday talk. Thus the analysis of interview data contributes to the
ethnomethodological programme advocated by Marlaire and Maynard, and Holstein and
Miller.
The analysis that follows may be seen as part of the empirical work which Ibarra and
Kitsuse encourage in order to test and refine their ideal type model of social problems
discourse.
Noise as a 'Fact'.
An interest in the way in which the factual status of events is achieved in participants' talk
is firmly established in both conversation analytic and discourse analytic studies. For
example Smith (1978) considers how the fact that a young woman is mentally ill is
achieved in her friend's account, and Wooffitt (1992) explores how people depict their
experiences of paranormal events as factual. This work has direct relevance for sociologists
interested in exploring the details of the social construction of environmental or social
impacts.
Achieving factual status for the social impact of noise is a 'live issue' (Edwards and Potter
1992) for participants. As discussed in Chapter 5 local people's claims that the road
surface generates unacceptable noise have been repeatedly rejected by the DoT who assert
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that the problem is not that the road is too noisy but that residents are over sensitive (see
p106) In order to make an effective case against this version local people have to establish
that their complaints are based on the fact that the road surface generates too much noise,
rather than merely being based on the perceptions of sensitive or self interested individuals.
In the following analysis I will concentrate on some of the detailed features of participants'
accounts which contribute to the construction of the factual status of the impact of noise.
The extracts considered here are from parts of interviewees' accounts in which they discuss
the impact of noise. I will consider first how the reality and intrusiveness of the noise is
provided for through descriptions of the way in which everyday activities have been
affected, and will then briefly consider two ways in which the noise is constructed as
extraordinary and hence necessitating corrective action.
Noise and Everyday Activities
Both interviewees and survey respondents were asked what effect the noise had on them
(if they had claimed that noise was an impact). Although some respondents talked of
dramatic effects (nervous breakdowns, loss of business, health effects) they were in a tiny
minority; the majority listed a range of everyday activities which they could no longer
enjoy. Common complaints were that they could no longer sit in their gardens, talk to
neighbours over the garden fence, sit inside with windows open, or hear the radio in the car
when travelling over the concrete surface. For instance:
HH	 You just can't have the windows open at the back, it really is so noisy, and of
course if you go into the garden...it's very difficult to talk to people you know.
I-IL	 The worst thing is summer nights, you can't open the windows at the back of the
house at all, just cannot.
l-IQ	 (those affected) can still not sit in their gardens during the summer months, those
that live close to the road, and this is a total change in their lifestyle.
Complaints were overwhelmingly about such changes to mundane activities rather than
what might be thought of as more serious consequences. Claimants provided details of the
measures they had been 'forced' to take in order to engage in their ordinary activities as
a result of the noise. I will consider two examples of this:
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1.	 HBii
I	 I think something should be done about this road
2	 Cos there's no two ways about it
3	 I drive a lot
4	 I drive about twenty two thousand miles a year
5	 which is not sort of company rep kind of mileage
6	 but it's more than your average granny who does five thousand miles a year
7	 and this is the noisiest road surface that I know to drive on
8	 I mean for example
9	 I mean when I drive to work in the morning
10	 and when I drive home at night
11	 I am usually listening to radio four with the news programmes
12	 morning and evening
13	 and as I come onto that road I have to turn the volume of my
14	 radio up
15	 cos otherwise what I can hear on a tarmac surface I cannot hear
16	 when I'm running over the concrete surface
In this extract the speaker asserts that 'something should be done about this road'. He
establishes the fact that he 'drives a lot' and then presents his claim that 'this is the noisiest
road surface I know to drive on', before going on to provide an example of his direct
experience of the noise. Although there are many interesting points that can be made about
lines 1-7 the analysis here will concentrate on lines 8-16 in which he provides a description
of the way in which a routine activity is disrupted by the noise.
In this example of the noise he experiences on his trips to and from work he draws
attention to the breadth of his experience. In lines 9-10 he emphasises that he drives both
morning and evening and this is stressed again in line 12. Thus the example is presented
as one that happens routinely rather than being a rare occurrence. The use of the phrase
'when I drive' in lines 9 and in line 10 further implies that what he is describing is
something that always happens; he is not drawing attention to one extreme occurrence but
something that happens routinely as part of his everyday activity.
He describes how when he drives onto the concrete road he has to turn the volume of his
radio up in order to hear it as the volume adequate on a tarmac road is inadequate once he's
driving over concrete. In this part of his account he provides very precise details of the
mundane activity he is engaged in, in which the noise becomes a salient issue. We learn
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what the programme is that he's listening to (the news programme) what radio station it is
on (radio four) and when this happens (morning and evening). Having provided this
detailed depiction of an ordinary activity he then describes how the noise intrudes and
necessitates the taking of some direct action - he has to turn the volume up if he is to hear
the radio.
This structure, a detailed depiction of everyday activities followed by an example of the
way noise intrudes and necessitates change, was a common component of a number of other
interviews. For instance an ex head-teacher describes the effect of noise oii children in the
school playground:
2.	 HI
usually the way of getting children when the play time was over was to blow a whistle then
2	 they would all stand still
3	 and then we would say 'make your way to the classrooms'
4	 and that was it
5	 She 'ci current teacher at the school, said they don't hear a whistle now
6	 and they have to have a loud hailer
7	 so I mean that was really amazing
8	 that that should have to happen
9	 So it shows there is a lot of noise.
In this excerpt she provides details of the usual procedure for calling children in from play
and describes how this has been changed by the advent of noise. Since the road has been
operational the ordinary whistle has had (line 6) to be replaced with the rather extreme
loud-hailer. As in Watson's account she asserts that some change had to be made, it was
not an option but a necessity. This example like the details of having to turn your radio
up is another subtle example of what Sacks (1970) termed a members' measurement
system: it provides an everyday example besides which the level of the noise can be judged.
By the DoT's scientific yardstick the noise may not be judged excessive, yet by everyday
comparisons it clearly is - it is too loud for people to continue to do what they used to do,
whether that is listening to the radio at the same volume or calling children in with a
whistle. That these examples are used to provide some 'proof' that the road is noisy is
nicely illustrated in line 9 of this excerpt where the speaker states explicitly: 'so it shows
that there is a lot of noise'.
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Both of the examples considered here are taken from data collected in interviews.
However the practice of presenting details of the way in which changes to everyday
activities have been 'forced' by the noise are widespread in claims •presented in other
contexts. For example in a press report a local resident is reported as claiming that the
noise has meant that she has 'had to wear ear plugs when pruning the roses' (Chichesler
Observer 30/8/90), and on questionnaires respondents claimed for instance that 'we have
to shout to attract our children's attention in the garden', '(we are) forced to keep windows
closed in hot weather' and 'you have to raise your voice to speak to neighbours over the
garden fence' (emphasis added).
These examples of the way very ordinary activities are interrupted and affected by noise
do three things: first they provide a way of emphasising the extraordinary nature of the
noise, secondly they work to bolster the identity of complainants as essentially ordinary
people and consequently their complaints as reasonable, and thirdly they contribute to the
achievement of facticity for claims that the noise is excessive. I will deal with each point
in turn.
i) In 'Telling Tales of the Unexpected' Wooffitt (1992) provides details of a rhetorical
device he calls the X/Y device. He describes how, in providing accounts of paranormal
experiences, speakers routinely embed the detail of the experience (Y) in recollections of
the mundane activity they were engaged in at the time (X). For instance:
as I was going through the doorway (X)
I was just jammed into it (Y) (ibid:118)
Wooffitt argues that by providing details of mundane activities the phenomena described
(paranormal experience) are rendered truly extra-ordinary or strange:
That is the strangeness of the phenomenon is made inferentially available through
its juxtaposition to the everyday and routine (ibid:143).
Although providing an account about a road being noisy is clearly very different from
providing an account of some sort of paranormal experience, there are parallel aims. In
both cases the speaker is at pains to stress that the phenomenon (noise, paranormal
experience) is real and extraordinary, while at the same time they themselves are ordinary
people (inferred by details of ordinary activities). Details of mundane activities provide a
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context in which the phenomenon (noise) appears intrusive and extreme. Tluis the structure
works to warrant the central claim that some action should be taken about the road's
surface. The way in which the noise is actively constructed as something extraordinary will
be pursued further in the following section.
ii) As participants in a dispute, respondents face a dilemma: how to make their
complaint appear factual and serious, yet at the same time avoid the inference that they are
making too much of the issue, that they are over sensitive or overly motivated to complain,
or are simply complaining in order to further their own ends (see Chapter 8 for a detailed
discussion of the way in which participants attempt to characterise their motives for
complaint as laudable). Edwards and Potter suggest that this is often a crucial dilemma for
participants in disputes:
the dilemma of presenting factual reports while being treated as having a stake in
some specific version of events or some practical outcome. (1992:3)
In these examples participants' construction of themselves as people engaged in ordinary
activities appears to be part of a strategy designed to counter such an unsympathetic
hearing. Depicting in detail the activities disrupted by noise is an implicit way of 'doing
being ordinary' (Sacks 1984) and hence a way of underlining the legitimacy of their
complaint - it is what anyone would complain about. The use of 'ordinary claims' recurs
throughout the process of the construction of social impacts and will be discussed further
in Chapter 7.
iii) Potter and Edwards (1992) note that by providing detailed descriptive accounts of
events speakers warrant the authority of their accounts. They use the example of a
controversial briefing between the then British Chancellor, Nigel Lawson. and a group of
journalists. Press reports after the meeting announced that a major alteration was to be
made in benefits payable to old age pensioners. The following day Nigel Lawson claimed
that he had not said any such thing. A debate followed in the press over what had actually
gone on at the briefing and who was telling the truth. Potter and Edwards suggest that one
of the resources used by journalists to justify their account of the briefing was the provision
of detailed descriptions of the physical lay-out of the room in which the meeting was held.
They propose that this level of description works to suggest direct perception or fresh visual
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memory on the part of the reporter and is 'an accomplishment in the rhetoric of truth
telling' (1992:206). In the data presented above, the provision of details of the mundane
activities which are interrupted by noise work to create a strong sense of the respondents'
direct perception or first hand knowledge of the problem. The respondent is located as a
direct observer of the problem and hence her/his observations may be granted greater
validity than the distanced assumptions of the DoT.
Noise as Extraordinary
In the previous section it was argued that by describing the effect of noise on everyday
activities its factual status and disruptive character is provided for. In this section I will
explore two other ways in which noise is constructed as extraordinary and thus requiring
attention. First I will examine excerpts in which speakers mark the noise apart from other
expected impacts, and will then discuss excerpts in which they assert that they could not
have anticipated the kind of noise generated by the surface.
Noise as Distinct from Other Impacts
In depicting the noise as different from 'ordinary impacts' it is rendered more serious and
thus in need of corrective action. In addition by stressing the extremity of noise this
strategy provides grounds for the existence and maintenance of protest; the effort involved
in protest appears appropriate given the extent of the problem.
3.	 ilBil
I'm not a sort of shrinking sensitive plant as it were when it comes to sort of being
2	 sensitive about noise
3	 Like Mike I've lived an awful lot of my life in warships
4	 where you've got ventilation fans going the whole time
5	 and in many ways it's it's similar to that as a sort of permanent background noise
6	 and I got used to that
7	 but I still find the noise of this road an intrusion
The excerpt begins with an implicit identity claim in which the speaker distinguishes
himself froi-n people who are 'sensitive about noise' (lines 1-2). This sets up his account
as that of a reasonable person and succinctly counters the DoT's insinuation that complaints
are a result of resident's sensitivity to noise, rather than of the extremity of the noise. This
characterisation of himself is warranted by the provision of evidence of his wide experience
of putting up with noise (lines 3-5). He then contrasts this noise he 'got used to' with the
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noise of the A27 which he 'still find(s)...an intrusion'.
In lines 3 & 4 he provides some evidence to back up his claim that he is not overly
sensitive to noise, referring to his experience of living on board warships which had
'ventilation fans going the whole time'. Attention is drawn to the extent of his experience;
we are told that he lived 'an awful lot' of his life on warships and that the fans were 'going
the whole time'. Thus his position is presented as being grounded on extensive evidence.
He then goes on to claim that the noise of the A27 is similar to the noise of the ventilation
fans in that it too is 'a permanent background noise'. Drawing parallels between the noise
of the A27 and other extreme noises was a common practice both in interviews and on the
survey questionnaires. For instance the noise was often likened to living close to an airport
or race track. In this instance having suggested that the two noises are at least in one
respect similar the speaker goes on to draw a distinction between them; he was able to get
used to the former while he still finds the latter 'an intrusion'. Through this contrast the
A27 noise is constructed as extraordinary; it is quite different to other sorts of extreme
noise.
Lines 3-7 comprise a classic contrast structure (Smith 1978) in which the first part provides
a rule whereby the second part is constructed as odd. In the first part of this contrast we
receive information about the normal response to permanent background noise - to get used
to it. This is contrasted with the odd response elicited by the A27, it has not been 'got used
to' but is still considered an intrusion. However the speaker has taken care to show that
it is not he who is extraordinary for not being able to get used to the noise (he has
explicitly told us that he is not overly sensitive to noise and given an example to validate
this claim), rather it is the noise itself that is extraordinary and can not be 'got used to'.
This implicit suggestion that the normal response to impacts is to 'get used to them' but
that this was not possible in the case of the A27 noise was also made in other accounts.
128
4.	 HH
1	 but as far as the school
2	 to my knowledge haven't kicked up an enormous fuss about the road
3	 so I presume like the rest of us they have learnt to live with it
4	 and I think that's what you do
5	 big change in the environment and you just got to put up with it
6	 you can't just grouse at it for evermore
7	 got to learn to live with it
8	 and I think that's probably what the schools are doing
9	 but of course the noise is another matter
In this extract the speaker is responding to a question about whether he considers that the
road has had any significant impacts on the local primary school. He had been a prominent
objector to the DoT's route at the public inquiries and a central feature of his case had been
the way in which children at the local school would be affected by exhaust fumes. In this
excerpt he states that as far as he knows the school has not complained about this effect.
Their response, not 'kicking up an enormous fuss' is presented as the appropriate response
to environmental impacts. He assumes that they 'have learnt to live with it' and asserts
that this is a reasonable response: 'I think that's what you do' (line 4).
In stressing that this is the appropriate response he implicitly counters the possible
assumption that lack of complaint equates with lack of impact. Indeed he suggests in line
7 that the school has been faced with a 'big change in the environment'. Thus his earlier
claims that the school would face significant impacts are not invalidated, he claims that they
have faced 'big environmental impacts' but that they have responded appropriately and
'learnt to live with it'. Having built up this depiction of appropriate response to impact he
then introduces the case of noise which he claims 'is another matter' (line 9). Noise is
assigned to a different category of impacts, it is constructed as entirely different and thus
the rule of how one should respond to ordinary impacts does not apply to it.
The following excerpt reinforces the notion that there is an implicit convention for dealing
with 'ordinary' impacts but that this does not apply in the case of the noise:
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5.	 HJ
1	 I must admit that my and our sort of interest in the road is fairly one-track just the
2	 noisy aspect
3	 I think I am quite sure that if they made it as quiet as some roads are that sort of
4	 class of road
5	 that we would live with it
6	 I am sure we could
This speaker is the leader of an action group and here he claims that the group is only
concerned about the noise and are not interested in other effects of the road. He suggests
that if the noise had been an ordinary impact ('as quiet as some roads are') then they would
have adopted the normal response ('we would live with it'). He emphasises this point
saying that if the road noise were in that category ('that sort of class of road') then he is
sure they could live with it (line 6). There is an implicit suggestion here that as the road
is not 'that sort of class of road' they cannot adopt this response.
Noise as Something Which Could Not be Anticipated
In this section I will present some extracts in which interviewees assert that they had not
anticipated the extent of the noise before the road was built and, moreover, they could not
have done so. Depicting noise in this way attends to two concerns: First it provides a
reason or justification for individuals not having been actively concerned about this impact
before the road was constructed, as they argue that they could not have anticipated it, and
secondly it contributes to the construction of the noise as extraordinary (it was beyond
anticipation) thus legitirnising protest and necessitating remedial action.
6.	 HG
1	 We cos I lived before fairly near it
2	 and we had the railway embankment between ourselves and the road
3	 and we thought we shall be alright
4	 Actually we moved before the road was finished so I don't know what it would be
5	 like living there
6	 but I know now that the other people who live in the same road they have all had
7	 compensation and double-glazing done so we would have been miles too near
In this extract the speaker provides a contrast between what he expected the noise of the
road to be like which might be summarised as 'alright'(line 3) and the reality of the noise
which has proved to be not alright as evidenced by the need for compensation and double
glazing. His assumption that those who lived in the area would be 'alright' is presented not
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as a naive assumption but as based on his own experience of living close to both a road and
a railway and thus on considerable exposure to noise. As in the last section the noise from
the A27 is distinguished from ordinary or expected noise and rendered extraordinary. The
fact that the road has proved to be noisy is depicted as wholly unexpected on the basis of
past experience, as something which there was no reason to expect. A contrast is presented
between what was reasonably expected ('we shall be alright') and the reality of the situation
('we would have been miles too near').
The next speaker provides a parallel account of her failure to anticipate the problem of
noise:
7.	 HP (Iinterviewer).
1	 I: And you knew at the time you moved here that a road was proposed ?
2	 HP: Oh yes it has been on the books for years and years and years.
3	 I: But that didn't affect your choice did it?
4	 1-IP: No because we had lived on the old A27 and very close in fact on the corner
5	 of (village)
6	 and we were used to the noise of cars going by
7	 and we also had three children at one stage
8	 so we are not squeamish about things like that.
She too asserts that she had experience of noisy environments having lived 'very close' to
the old A27 and also being accustomed to the noise produced by three children. Like HG
(extract 6) she portrays herself as someone not overly concerned about noise declaring
herself 'not squeamish about things like that' and as someone who would have been
prepared to tolerate a degree of noise. Later in the interview she notes that her initial
assumptions that noise would not be a problem were unfounded and provides an account
for this:
8.	 HP
TIP:	 But it was strange the fact that we thought it wouldn't be as bad as it is
2	 I:	 Because you thought you knew what traffic noise was like?
3	 HP:	 Yes I mean it's not the same as normal traffic noise pootling along a country
4	 lane
5	 actually the A27 wasn't a country lane went through (village) and (village)
6	 it was a busy road but it had a normal surface
Here she justifies her assumption that the noise would not be excessive by distinguishing
the new A27 from the old A27 which she describes as a busy road but one with a 'normal
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surface'. Thus both her complaint and that of HG are presented not as a complaint about
living close to a busy road but a complaint about the extraordinary condition of this
particular road. Had the road been 'normal' there would have been no reason to anticipate
any notable problem.
These invocations of past experience of living next to busy roads serve to counter the
DoT's position. As outlined above the DoT argue that the problem lies not with the
surface but with local people's unfamiliarity with proximity to busy roads. This version
of events is explicitly refuted in the above extracts. Speakers draw attention to their
experience of 'ordinary' road noise and thus undermine the assumption that they were
simply unprepared for noise and will eventually get used to it.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have used a discourse analytic approach to explore how social impact
claims about the A27 roar were constructed. This analysis has implications for three
distinct areas: it contributes an action perspective to research on the 'powerlessness' of
members of the public in planning disputes, it provides an alternative assessment of the
impact of noise, and contributes to the refinement, reformulation and elaboration of Ibarra
and Kitsuse's framework for analyzing the discursive production of social problems. These
points are elaborated below.
Existing analyses of the place of ordinary people in planning disputes have drawn attention
to their relative powerlessness in the face of the experts and the planners (Wynne 1982,
Hutton 1986, and see page 67). The system is characterised as inherently unfair and
ordinary people depicted as having decisions imposed upon them against their wishes. The
analysis presented in this chapter does not address this issue of the existence of structural
inequalities between planners and the public, but draws attention to the way in which
participants themselves can describe their position in just this way. Participants were shown
to describe themselves as having to change aspects of their everyday lives in response to
the impact of noise. They use the idea of powerlessness and enforced change in their
construction of the impact as real and serious. This analysis should be seen as
complimenting rather than challenging more structural analyses of planning disputes.
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However the recognition that ordinary people are active participants in such disputes and
utilise a range of strategies in their fight is an important one and will be developed further
in the following chapters.
Existing summaries of research on the impact of noise draw attention to effects such as
hearing loss, sleep interference and psychological effects (Finsterbusch 1980, Vidal 1993).
1-lowever little attention seems to have been paid to consideration of how those who claim
to be affected by noise describe its effects on them. In the interviews reported here this
question was asked and the answers received focused on changes to details of everyday life
- not being able to hold a conversation in the garden, having to close windows or having
to turn the radio up. Rather than attempting to construct the impact as serious by reference
to dramatic effects such as hearing loss or psychological damage, participants used these
changes to mundane activities as evidence of the reality and severity of the impact. There
are two points to be made about this; first that for those affected social impacts are those
things which disrupt everyday life, and secondly that those who claim to be affected by
noise describe its impact in different ways from those who research its impact. Both of
these points are tentative and require further exploration.
The discussion in the previous chapter revealed that local people's claims had a distinct
moral element to them; they claimed that it was unfair that they should have to suffer noise
as it was the result of a mistake by the DoT, and a consequence of their misguided attempt
to save money. The DoT attempted to counter this rhetoric of unfairness and bad treatment
by providing an alternative formulation of what the problem was 'about'; they claimed that
there was no problem with the road surface but that there was a problem of people being
overly sensitive and unprepared for noise. Ibarra and Kitsuse's model of rhetorical idioms
and counter rhetorics seems to describe these strategies well. However it does not do
justice to the dynamism of the process of the construction of social problems and the
flexibility of accounting practices. Discourse analysis draws attention to the degree of
variability within and between accounts and to the way participants' accounts shift to
address different interactional aims. In the accounts analyzed above we see some of the
accounting practices which participants utilise to counter the DoT's counter-rhetoric to their
initial claims. They are not simply claiming that there is a problem but are at pains to
1-
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establish their claims that the road surface is too noisy as factual, and thus to undermine
the accusation that they are simply overly sensitive. Thus the construction of a social
problem or impact is an ongoing interactive process with the rhetoric and accounting
practices used being shaped and developed in response to those used by 'the other side'.
Ibarra and Kitsuse's notion of claims making styles is also relevant here. Their aim is to
identify styles which are evident across the range of social problems discourse and they
provide a list of different styles which they hope will be developed through empirical
observation (1993:34). The styles they list are as follows: scientific style, civic style, comic
style, theatrical style, legalistic style, and subcultural style, and they provide a brief
discussion of what each might involve. The way in which local people in the dispute about
the A27 roar make their claims could be categorised as an example of the civic style of
claims making. Ibarra and Kitsuse write that:
The civic style of claims-making entails making claims that have what we might call
the look of being unpolished'. That is the civic styles distinctive character is based
in being 'honest', 'sincere', 'upright', 'unstylised'...it involves trading off an ideal
of the 'common decent folk'. (ibid:52)
In the analysis above I have show how participants incorporate details of mundane activities
into their accounts of noise and argue that this: places the noise in contrast to the everyday
activities and consequently renders it extraordinary and warranting attention; works to
provide positive identities for claimants as ordinary people; and conveys a sense that
respondents are direct observers of the problems and hence better equipped to assess its
nature and extent than the distanced DoT. These invocations of ordinary identity and
references to mundane activities may be an important resource in making social impact
claims. This idea can be considered as part of the elaboration of their ideal type which
Ibarra and Kitsuse recommend and will be further developed in the following chapters.
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Chapter 7
The Use of Identity Claims in the Construction of Social Impacts: Being
Ordinary.
In the previous chapter I used discourse analysis to explicate the construction of claims
made by interviewees in the Havant-Chichester case study about the A27 'roar'. In the
following two chapters I continue with this approach and use it to analyze further aspects
of the discursive production of the social impacts of the two roads studied. The focus
throughout will be on how, in the process of making claims about impact, participants use
certain representations of their own identity and to what ends they do so. I will concentrate
particularly on various forms of invocation of ordinary identity and of attempts to
distinguish self from others, and own position from others'. In this chapter the focus is on
how participants identify themselves as 'ordinary people' and use this to distinguish
themselves and their own position clearly from that of the DoT and their consultants. The
data analyzed in this chapter are claims made by objectors in their written submissions to
the first Havant-Chichester Inquiry, and claims made by interviewees in the Worthing-
Lancing study. The following chapter also deals with issues of identity, but concentrates
on how participants seek to distinguish themselves and their stance from other 'ordinary
people' involved in the planning dispute.
Identity Claims and the Achievement of Divisions
As outlined in Chapter 4 the majority of research on conflicts about planning focuses on
features of the inquiry process. One of the recurrent themes in this literature is that the
process is unfair as the relationship between 'experts' and 'ordinary people' is unequal. For
instance in road scheme inquiries objectors seldom have the money to employ their own
technical experts, and even when this is possible they are unlikely to be able to undertake
extensive traffic surveys and projections to compete with the DoT's forecasts. In addition
they are often unable to decipher and counter the technical evidence produced by the DoT,
and lack the knowledge and resources to present their case in a similar expert, empirical
fashion. The objectors' status as lay or ordinary people is assumed to somehow determine
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and constrain their performance within the public inquiry placing them at a disadvantage
to the 'experts'.
More sophisticated sociological analyses of planning disputes have been provided by
Wynne (1982) and Hutton (1986). Both concentrate on the public inquiry; Wynne provides
a case study of the Windscale Inquiry of 1977 into British Nuclear Fuel's (BNFL)
application to build a Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) at Sellafield, and Hutton
analyses an inquiry also held in 1977 into Shell-Expro's plans to construct a Natural Gas
Liquids processing plant at Moss Moran near Peterhead in Scotland. Both authors draw
attention to the way in which the issue is constructed differently by the different parties at
the inquiry, and both pay attention to differences in the content and style of their
participation. Both emphasise that for objectors the issues are framed in moral and political
terms, while for the project proponents and the inspector they are presented as simply
technical. These case studies draw attention to the way in which the 'facts' of the public
inquiry are socially constructed. However they concentrate on how the dominance of the
'experts', in terms of external power and relations within the inquiry, enable them to
determine what counts as fact and thus ultimately to determine the outcome of the inquiry.
In neither of these case studies are the categorisations of 'ordinary people' (or lay objectors)
and 'experts' subject to any scrutiny - they are implicitly assumed to be objective
descriptions of the participants which determine and constrain their actions and expectations
in certain ways.
This notion that membership of a category group (expert/ordinary) structures interaction in
a relatively straightforward and unproblematic way is widespread. Maynard notes the way
in which externally based patterns of inequality or difference are assumed somehow to:
automatically reproduce themselves as embedded, pervasive and omnirelevant
features of people's direct interrelations. (1988:317)
The relationship between interaction and social structure is a complex one which comprises
the central problem for much social theory. I will draw attention briefly here to two
approaches which challenge the idea that external structures of inequality simply exert an
influence on interaction in a straightforward way, and make a case instead for concentrating
on how those involved in interaction employ particular characterisations of themselves and
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of each other, and to what ends.
Ethnomethodologists' focus on members' methods has often led to the criticism that they
assume that actors proceed unconstrained by social structure. Schegloff (1991) however
deals specifically with the relationship between what goes on in interaction and social
structure. He acknowledges that even the most casual observation of interaction provides
a strong sense that there are occasions when who the parties are relative to each other
seems to matter, and importantly, to matter to them. These senses of 'who they are'
connect to what is ordinarily meant by social structure, focusing for instance on the
participants' relative status or power, their membership of gender, ethnic or age groups.
However, he argues that the question is not whether such things matter, or even whether
they affect interaction, rather it is how to produce a defensible empirical analysis which
demonstrates their significance. This position is based on the simple observation that there
are many possible categorisations for any individual. For example the same person may
be variously described as a woman, a white person, a sociologist etc., with all of the
descriptions being correct. Thus he argues that:
Some principle of relevance must underlie the use of a reference form and has to be
adduced in order to provide for one rather than another of those ways of
characterising or categorising some member. (1991:50)
His solution is that the characterisation of participants must be that which can be shown to
be demonstrably relevant to the participants themselves in their production and
interpretation of the interaction in which they are involved.
The other approach to the relationship between structure and action which is useful here is
Giddens' concept of the duality of structure. Rather than viewing social structure as
something external which exercises constraint upon interaction, he conceptualises it as both
'medium and outcome' (1984:25) of social interaction. Thus the detailed analysis of
interaction is an important part of understanding how social structure is reproduced or
challenged. While Hutton explicitly uses Giddens' structuration theory as a framework for
his analysis of the Moss-Moran inquiry, he does not consider the role of the invocation and
contestation of identity.
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Recognising the importance of how participants in planning disputes present and represent
themselves and others does not constitute a rejection of the idea that there are structural
inequalities which shape such disputes. What it does is draw attention to the fact that
identity is an important issue for participants in disputes, not just to analysts, and also
provides new insights into the dynamics and organisation of such disputes. In the analysis
which follows the identities of for instance 'ordinary person', 'local person' or 'expert' are
not taken to be unproblematic descriptions of participants, rather attention is drawn to the
identities which participants themselves invoke and utilise.
The analysis concentrates on how participants identify themselves as 'ordinary people', and
suggests that this is an important resource for them. Contrary to the assumption in previous
studies that being an 'ordinary person' is a disadvantage, I will show it to be an identity
which participants actively claim and use strategically. Three dimensions of the invocation
of ordinary identity are considered. First participants' refutation of expertise, secondly their
reliance on 'common knowledge' and finally their characterisation of themselves as a
distinct group with a different outlook and values to those of the experts'.
Being an Ordinary Person
An interest in the way in which speakers describe their activities and themselves as
'normal' or 'ordinary' in order to achieve specific interactionai goais stems from the work
of Sacks. He argues that rather than applying the notion of an 'ordinary person' to this or
that person it should be considered as the way somebody constitutes themselves.
It is not that somebody is ordinary; it is perhaps that it is what one's business is, and
it takes work, as any other business does (1984 (1970):4l4)
Sack's work focused on how people do 'being ordinary', and explored particularly how
people may claim membership of the category 'ordinary people' without making explicit
reference to it. For instance they may present their experiences or actions so as to make
them appear mundane or usual rather than in any way extraordinary or unusual. Sack's
preliminary observations have been developed in subsequent research. For instance
Jefferson's (1984) study of the way in which people who have had extraordinary
experiences work to produce unexceptional versions of the events, and Wooffitt's (1991)
analysis of how people who claim to have had paranormal experiences warrant their
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normality. Wooffitt and Widdicombe (1990) explored the use of the category 'ordinary'
in written discourse, focusing on its use in newspaper articles, and also noted that
ordinariness is routinely claimed for individuals whose normality may be disputable in some
way.
The following analysis builds on this work, exploring how objectors present themselves as
'ordinary' in contrast to the alternative category of experts, and how they characterise their
viewpoint as ordinary common sense. I will suggest that these invocations of ordinary
identity attend to a range of important interactional goals.
In their written submissions to the first Havant/Chichester inquiry (see p81) a number of
objectors explicitly drew attention to their lack of expertise and used the identity of an
'ordinary person' to make strong claims about the potential impacts of the proposed road.
For instance:
1. 195
You will be hearing from expert pollution witnesses later on in this inquiry. They
will be more able than I to provide you with research evidence on the effects of
vehicle pollution on schoolchildren. However, I feel it is necessary to draw your
attention to the concern of parents and teachers over the risk of pollution. We all
know that motor vehicles emit a lot of poisonous and noxious chemicals from their
exhausts.
2. 195
I don't know much more than the ordinary parent about the risks of pollution, but
what I know makes me very concerned about the proximity of the first school in
particular. Much of this school, as I've already indicated, is less than 100 metres
from the proposed road. And this seems to be just the area which is vulnerable to
the effects of pollution, particularly lead pollution.
3. 232a
I am not qualified to discuss in detail pollution from lead and other chemicals. I do
know, however, that there is controversy over both the effects of lead on growing
children and the concentrations which cause those effects
4. 223a
I have not got the expertise to criticise the principles of the procedure used to
evaluate the new road. But I would point out that as far as I know the construction
of the new (road) would create a stretch of road from (place name) to (place name) -
all motorway or dual carriageway - on which there is no service area.
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All of these extracts consist of an explicit refutation of any claim to expertise on the subject
under discussion: 'expert pollution witnesses.. .will be more able than I to provide you with
research evidence on the effects of vehicle pollution on schoolchildren', 'I don't know
much more than the ordinary parent about the risks of pollution', 'I'm not qualified to
discuss in detail pollution from lead and other chemicals' and 'I have not got the expertise
to criticise the principles of the procedure used to evaluate the new road'. The denial of
expert knowledge in each case is followed by a 'but' or 'however' after which the speaker's
claiii or concern is voiced.
I-Iewitt and Stokes identify this construction as a disclaimer, which they define as:
a verbal device employed to ward off and defeat in advance doubts and negative
typifications which may result from intended conduct. (1975:3)
According to Hewitt and Stokes, disclaimers reveal speakers' recognition that what they are
about to say could be used by recipients to make negative inferences about their identity
or conduct, and explicitly asks that that inference is not made. So for instance 'I'm not
racist but...' displays the speakers' recognition that what they are about to say might lead
hearers to infer that they are racist, and seeks to avoid that typification. They note that
such disclaimers have two components. The first is an identity claim; the negative
typification as a racist is disclaimed, and so the opposite valued identity is claimed.
Secondly there is a substantive claim, in their example an expressed belief about the
unreasonable demands made by black people. They argue that people use disclaimers in
order to secure the success of substantive claims, but without the possible negative
implications for their identity claims.
However Hewitt and Stokes go on to suggest that the 'I'm not an expert, but..' disclaimer
has a distinct use, which they call 'hedging':
'I'm no expert' is a phrase that conveys to others the idea that no expert identity is
being claimed; if no expertise is, in fact, shown, no claim needs to be defended.
The phrase signals to hearers that they should treat factually faulty statements or
deeds that have the wrong effects as the normal prerogative of people who are not
and do not claim to be experts in what they are doing. (ibid:4)
They argue that 'hedging' signals minimal commitment to what follows and indicates its
tentative nature, suggesting that speakers who employ 'I'm not an expert, but..'are willing
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to receive discrepant information, change opinions, be persuaded otherwise or be better
informed' (p4). However they do not provide any data to warrant this interpretation, and
in planning disputes of the sort examined here 'I'm not an expert , but...' seems to have
a different interactional use. In the data above the disclaimers of expert status rather than
being expressions of tentativeness on the objectors' parts, appear to work like 'I'm not a
racist' to claim a valued identity and secure the success of following claims.
The disclaimer creates a distinct identity for objectors as different from 'experts' and
ensures that their concerns and claims are heard as those of 'ordinary people'. Presenting
a concern or complaint as that of an ordinary person may give it a special strength. By
presenting their complaints as explicitly not those of experts, objectors recluest that their
submissions should not be criticised in the way that expert statements would be. Expert or
pseudo-expert assessments of the danger of pollution lend themselves to easy refutation by
the Department of Transport. However the concerns of 'ordinary people' cannot be
criticised on the basis of facticity or dismissed lightly.
Within the quasi-legal context of the public inquiry objectors' identity comes under close
scrutiny. In cross examination the barrister for the DoT will attempt to throw doubt on
objectors' credibility, and thus on the strength of their case, by questioning their experience
and background, and their technical competence (University of Surrey Workshop on being
an expert witness 1994). Who objectors 'are' is extremely important to the success of their
objection. By explicitly identifying themselves as ordinary people objectors make relevant
their stock of common sense and common concerns while resisting attacks on their technical
competence to speak.
Previous analyses (see p67 & p136) argue that objectors are at a disadvantage because they
are unable to challenge the Department's experts, but equally the Department cannot
effectively challenge the authority of 'ordinary people' to talk about their concerns for their
community. By establishing themselves as 'ordinary people' objectors claim a relevant
authority for their statements.
In addition, by presenting their concerns as those of ordinary people and not those of
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experts, concern over lead pollution, for example, is presented as being of widespread
concern and not simply of academic interest. In the first extract the speaker aligns with the
concern of ordinary parents and teachers about the effects of lead pollution on
schoolchildren. The implicit suggestion is that if even ordinary people are worried about
the threat of lead pollution then that concern should be taken seriously - the concern is
constructed as both grave and widespread.
Thus 'I'm not an expert, but...' may be viewed as a device which protects objectors' claims
from technical criticism, anticipates and averts the criticism that their case is unreliable as
it is not expert, and sets up the following speech as that of an 'ordinary person'
consequently providing a source of legitimate authority for speakers and working to secure
the success of their complaints.
Common Knowledge
Another way of invoking ordinary identity is by claiming that ones account is based on
common knowledge. In these data two forms of this are apparent; presenting accounts as
what 'anyone' would say, and as what 'we all know'.
One of the disadvantages that objectors are said to face at public inquiries is their lack of
access to the resources and 'evidence' that the 'other side' have. However they can lay
claim to an alternative valuable resource - common knowledge. By virtue of their
occasioned identity as 'ordinary people' objectors are qualified to speak of what is common
knowledge, what ordinary people know from experience.
Presenting an account in terms of what 'anyone would say' or what we all know' broadens
the basis for the particular version of events, and helps to warrant its facticity. Individuals
giving such accounts claim for themselves membership of a larger group of ordinary people,
and thus avert the possible inference that their account is simply that of a cranky or overly
motivated individual. Edwards and Potter (1992) write that when there is a controversial
issue at stake participants are caught up in a dilemma of interest - how to provide accounts
which attend to their interests without being undermined as interested (see p126). One way
of doing this is by claiming that the account provided is 'anyone's' account. The events
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being described are presented as what 'anyone' would make of them rather than the
interpretation of one individual, and thus are attributed some sort of objective status.
Objections made on the basis of what is common knowledge may be particularly difficult
to undermine. Objectors present their complaints in an environment where they can more
or less guarantee that the Department will be hostile to what they have to say, and where
persuading the Inspector of the validity of their case is of paramount importance.
Complaints about the likely impacts of the scheme which appeal to common knowledge are
likely to achieve at least tacit affiliation from recipients. The complaint is presented as
something which does not need to be precisely formulated because it is so commonplace -
it is true by definition. Edwards and Potter point out that such claims to common
knowledge are neat in that they invoke a wide range of consensual knowers without giving
any particulars about who they are that could potentially be contested (1992:146). Drew and
Holt (1988) make a similar observation in their research on the use of idioms, that such
expressions have a special robustness. Idioms are resistant to being challenged with concrete
empirical facts and this quality makes them useful when presenting complaints in
inauspicious environments. In objectors' submissions to the public inquiry vague
formulations which draw on what 'anyone' would say or what 'we all know' may be
particularly difficult to challenge as their implications are less open to rebuttal than explicit
statements are.
What 'Anyone' Would Say
5.	 210
Mr. 1-lolland has stated in his paper on behalf of the Department that the preferred
route has been selected after 'full consideration of all the factors involved'. This is
reassuring, is it not? Any member of the public would take this to mean that every
question has been investigated and evaluated by experts in every relevant field. I
must say to you, sir, that in respect of Emsworth, I have seen no evidence in the
published statements that the Department has spent even five minutes on considering
either the most appropriate line for the road, or the most vital factor, the effect on
Emsworth as a comnmnity.
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6.	 223a
What they do not indicate, for example, is the considerable extent to which the
present A27 - not only the dual carriageway around Havant but also the single
carriageway through Emsworth - operates well below its full capacity for something
like 95% of the week for most weeks of the year. This is, I think, quite apparent
to anyone, like myself, whose job requires them to travel either before or after both
the morning and evening rush hours.
7. 223a
If all car owners were actually motor-cycle owners one would guess that hardly any
new road construction would have been needed over the past 10-15 years. But even
a trend towards smaller cars must have a major impact on the capacity of existing
roads and the need for new ones - as any driver of a mini will tell you.
8. 459
I appreciate that the station is itself noisy when a train is passing through, but this
oniy occurs about 6 times an hour, and to anyone waiting for a train this is a
welcome sound rather than unwanted noise.
In extract 5 the speaker is beginning to challenge the DoT's claim that there has been full
consideration of all the factors involved. He argues that the DoT's statement would lead
'any member of the public' to believe that the evaluation had been thorough, the effect of
the road on Emsworth as a community has received insufficient attention. His criticism of
the DoT therefore rests on the assertion that their statement was false; they said one thing,
but did another. His claim that 'any member of the public' would interpret the statement
as meaning that 'every question has been investigated and evaluated by experts in every
relevant field' ensures that it is understood that it was not that he simply misinterpreted the
meaning of the statement; 'anyone' would have taken it to mean the same thing.
In extract 6 the claim that the road operates well below its full capacity for the majority of
the time is presented as 'apparent to anyone' who travels outside of rush hours. In extract
7 the claim that a trend toward smaller cars would have an impact on the capacity of
existing roads and the need for new ones is presented as what 'any driver of a mini would
tell you'. In extract 8 the speaker is making a case against the road being sited close to the
station. The DoT argued that the station is already noisy and thus traffic noise would make
little difference. The speaker is seeking to distinguish between the 'welcome sound' of an
arriving train and the unwelcome intrusion of traffic noise. She argues that the noise of
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trains is a welcome sound to 'anyone waiting for a train' - it is not simply her own
interpretation.
From this limited number of examples it seems that 'what anyone would make of a
situation' is used when the speaker is making a potentially difficult and contentious claim.
For instance that the DoT have made a false statement, that the existing road operates below
its capacity, that a trend toward smaller cars would avoid the need for new roads, or that
there is a distinction between the noise of trains and the noise of traffic. These are all
direct refutations of the Department's case and are guaranteed to meet with opposition.
Presenting their position as that of 'anyone' works to generate accounts which appear to be
undisputable and are consequently less vulnerable to attack.
What 'We All Know'
9. 195
So, we shall have 2,000 to 3,000 lorries and juggernauts passing by every day, less
than 100 metres from the children working in the first school and 200 metres from
children working in the middle school. And, we all know quite well how dirty and
noisy these vehicles are. This is the threat which hangs over the peaceful
environment of these two schools. Not only will the children be surrounded by
polluted air from this new road, but they will also be subjected to continuous loud
and unpleasant traffic noise. Is this the right environment for young children from
5 to 12 years to play in? I don't think one needs any research to prove that this
sort of environment cannot be beneficial to our children.
10. 195
We all know that such underpasses attract vandalism, threatening behaviour and
sometimes violence. Who does not feel a twinge of anxiety about walking through
a subway at night? Where there is an alternative way, without using the subway,
we will use it. But, here, in Emsworth there will be no alternative way across the
new road, you will either use the underpass or stay where you are.
11. 205
It came as a great shock to me to realise that the road, as planned, would rise far
above the railway embankment - which might have provided some protection from
a lower sited road - and from this lofty position fumes, filthy fumes, filled with lead
deposits would permeate and pollute the good clean air of the playground. We know
that lead is particularly detrimental to the health of young children, and there is no
doubt that these fumes would deposit lead into the atmosphere.
As the excerpts above demonstrate common knowledge was also invoked by objectors by
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reference to what 'we all know'. This formulation was used like 'what anyone would say'
to contrast the common knowledge of objectors with the expertise of the planners and to
suggest that the former is more valid. If the DoT are promoting a scheme in which a road
runs close to a school when 'we all know' that vehicles are noisy and their fumes are
dangerous, and a scheme that necessitates the use of underpasses when 'we all know that
underpasses are dangerous' then that scheme appears to be lacking in common-sense.
All of the references here to 'what we all know' were preceded by a description of the
DoT's plans. Extract nine was preceded by a long calculation of how many vehicles and
of what sort were likely to be passing the primary school; extract 10 came after the objector
had presented what he called 'a few relevant facts about the subways and underpasses'
which drew attention to details such as their proposed length and width; and extract 11
begins with details about the planned elevation of the road. Thus attention is drawn first
to familiarity with aspects of the proposed scheme. Objectors display their ability to
understand and interpret the DoT's plans before demonstrating that they run counter to
common sense. To simply say that the plans made no sense or were wrong without
demonstrating familiarity with them would be counterproductive, while providing details
of (a version of) them and then contrasting this with 'what we all know' provides a neat
dismissal of them.
Where a complaint is made on the basis of 'what we all know' an attempt to refute it has
two possible consequences, one of which implicates the individual challenging the claim,
the other implicating the individual making the claim. First, it may have the result of
excluding the person who refutes the claim from what is assumed to be common knowledge
available to all ordinary people, thus placing them in a somewhat deviant and peripheral
position. The DoT can counter claims about 'what we all know' by suggesting that there
is no evidence to back up the claims, or that they are not reasonable. For example in their
reply to submission no. 195 they address the objector's statement (presented here as extract
10) about 'what everyone knows' about subways by arguing that:
with regard to the underpass the Department sees no reason to suppose that the
criminal activities described by (name) would be any more likely within the
underpass than anywhere else along New Brighton Road.
146
However this sort of response may not effectively undermine common knowledge. Simply
because the DoT 'see no reason' or 'can find no evidence' the claims of 'what we all
know' are not dismissed. Indeed the attempt to query 'what we all know' reinforces the
division between the DoT and the objectors. By taking issue with what is assumed to be
common knowledge they isolate themselves from ordinary people. An implicit distinction
is created between 'what we all know' and 'what the experts say'. What we all know' is
closely aligned to what is 'common sense'. Thus anyone who fails to affiliate with 'what
we all know' is taking up a position that is counter to common-sense. Consequently the
'sense' and credibility of their position is rendered questionable. In this way invocations
of common knowledge may provide objectors with a means of subtly undermining the
DoT's case. This technique may well offer objectors a more effective way of attacking the
DoT than an attempt to challenge them on their own expert empirical terms.
The alternative response to claims about common knowledge is to make implicit accusations
about the moral status of the objector. If the DoT were to challenge an objector's statement
about what is 'common knowledge', on the grounds that the knowledge is not in fact
common, it amounts to suggesting that the objector is not a common or ordinary person,
but rather is some sort of outsider or crank. Access to internal DoT memoranda suggests
that this is a tactic which the DoT use privately to discredit objectors, but it is unlikely that
it is one they would use in public. The DoT strive to preserve the sense of a fair process,
part of which involves taking objectors seriously and presenting their own position as based
on objective and dispassionate consideration of 'the facts' rather than on issues of opinion
or personality. Thus within a public arena such as the Inquiry they may have little defence
against claims based on 'common knowledge'.
In these examples common knowledge, what ordinary people know, is explicitly posited as
an alternative to expert analyses. Ordinary knowledge is elevated over expert analyses, it
is suggested that it is a more relevant and reliable source of information. The impression
created is that ordinary people are well aware of the likely impacts of the road and do not
need the expertise of the DoT to assess their likelihood and extent - they already know. For
instance in extract 9 having outlined what 'we all know' about the pollution emitted by
heavy goods vehicles, the speaker states quite explicitly 'I don't think that anyone needs
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any research to prove that this sort of environment cannot be beneficial to our children'.
In this sense they are portrayed as 'ahead' of the experts, and expert research is deemed to
be an unnecessary waste of time. Objectors can concede that experts know more than they
do about the technicalities of road schemes without undermining their case. They can lay
claim to expertise in another sphere; their common knowledge which they possess by virtue
of being 'ordinary people' enables them to provide alternative assessments of how the road
will affect the locality.
In this section I have demonstrated a range of ways in which objectors at the public inquiry
sought to establish their identity as ordinary people with access to common knowledge. In
contrast to previous studies which imply that the status 'ordinary person' is an objective
feature of objectors which constrains and limits their performance within the public inquiry,
I have demonstrated that it is an identity which objectors actively and deliberately select
and utilise strategically. Far from being a negative characterisation it is a positive and
valuable identity.
Them and Us
So far in this chapter I have shown how objectors use various claims to ordinariness to
establish an alternative sphere of competence and expertise from that of the 'experts'. This
section considers an additional way in which participants seek to distinguish themselves
from the 'experts' and to imply that their position is in some way superior. All of these
extracts are taken from interiew, con ctecl thxring the. W-L c( €.
each the interviewee depicts the actions or anticipated actions of 'thern - who I take to be
the DoT, their consultants and contractors - wreaking harm and havoc upon 'us'. The
analysis furthers the argument that divisions within planning disputes are actively worked
up rather than simply pre-existing and determining interaction.
12.	 WE
They bought the houses ten years ago. They sold them back to the owners, well
they sold them anyway. Now they've done the same again, and we don't know
what is happening.
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13. WB
If that does come here, they will infihl here. They'll infihl the other side from here
to (place name), there's another big field, two fields, two big fields. They'll infill
that in no time at all. Well why?
14. WG
You see with a week to go to the road coming through somebody in power could
change their mind. And with a week to go, a month to go, whatever, they could say
'right, we've changed our mind, we're going to go the blue route, the pink route,
whatever'. So we are hand tied until it actually happens.
15. WE
and it seemed extraordinary to me that they just come, and they just bulldoze 100
beautiful houses, maybe 200 beautiful houses.
16. WG
You're talking about I forget how many houses, is it 60 houses that are going to be
affected? I mean that's a drop in the ocean to the Ministry of Transport.
17. WG
There's no question about it this is a popular golf course. But from the point of
view of the Ministry of Transport, from the college over there, all the way through
this golf course, through the four holes on the other course, they've got
uninterrupted road building. No hold ups, no problems. They just move in and take
their time leisurely.
In extract 12 the speaker is describing the effect that the years of uncertainty about the
route have had on residents. The DoT had purchased a number of properties along their
preferred route and had then sold them again some years later when the original plans were
shelved. The plans were later resurrected and the houses repurchased. The respondent
presents these events as an inexplicable cycle of buying and selling. The behaviour of the
DoT is presented as irrational, leaving 'us' confused and uninformed; 'we don't know what
is happening'.
In extract 13 the respondent is expressing her fear that if the DoT's preferred route is
constructed there will be subsequent pressure to develop the countryside surrounding the
road. In this case 'they' are not the DoT, but planners, industrialists and businessmen,
however their incursion into the countryside follows hard on the heels of 'their' (DoT's)
decision to site the road across this stretch of land; 'if that does come here, they will infill'.
Again 'their' actions are depicted as incomprehensible, their destructive action is built up
by the repetition 'they will infill' and by the escalating description of the amount of land
149
that they will infihl; 'another big field, two fields, two big fields'. The extent of their
damaging action is then contrasted sharply with 'our' bewilderment - 'well, why?'.
In both these extracts the construction of 'their' actions takes the form of a three part list:
	
1.	 1.	 they bought the houses
2. they sold them back to the owners - well they sold them anyway
3. now they've done the same again
	
2.	 1.	 they will infill here
2.	 they'll infill the other side from here to (place name), there's another big
field, two fields, two big fields.
3.	 they'll infill that in no time at all
In the second example there is a further three part list embedded within the extract. 'When
the speaker clarifies the amount of land that will be infilled she does this in the form of a
three part list:
1. another big field
2. two fields
3. two big fields
The construction of lists in three parts has been found to be a recurrent practice in ordinary
conversational materials (Jefferson 1991). The phenomenon is common in a variety of
forms of discourse and suggests that three partedness may be a culturally available resource
for list construction. Atkinson (1984) noted that three part lists were a recurrent feature of
political speeches and were typically used to package praise for the speaker's own position
or criticism for that of others. He argues that three part lists provide a very suitable method
for packaging praise or criticism because listing similar items can work to strengthen almost
any kind of message. In this data the three part lists clearly amplify the criticism of 'their'
actions, building up a picture of arbitrary destructiveness.
In extract 14 the respondent is talking about the effect that alternative routes would have
on the local golf courses, and explaining that no redevelopment of the courses can be
planned until it is clear which route is to be built and what the details of the route will be.
Two three part constructions are employed in this extract and work to characterise 'their'
behaviour as capricious:
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1. with a week to go.
2. a month to go,
3. whatever,
they could say right, we've changed our mind,
1. we're going to go the blue route,
2. the pink route,
3. whatever'.
Both of these lists are constructed with a 'generalised list completer'; 'whatever', (Jefferson
1991) occupying the third slot. Jefferson argues that the use of generalised list completers
such as 'whatever', 'or something', 'something like that', demonstrates that people orient
to the convention of constructing lists in three parts, as they produce three part lists even
when a clear third part is not immediately available. The use of generalised list completers
in these data work to accentuate the impression that the DoT can do 'whatever' they want.
The list is constructed in three parts but the range of options for the DoT is left open, their
options on both the timescale and choice of route are characterised as unconstrained and
potentially limitless. This sense that they are accountable to no-one is reinforced by the
speaker's claim that they can simply say 'we've changed our mind', they do not have to
provide any reasons for their decision. The particular formulation of 'our' reaction to
'their' actions in this extract, 'we are hand tied', provides a neat depiction of the power
relationship between 'us' and 'them', 'we' are portrayed as physically bound, captive to
their designs.
The final three extracts depict 'them' as having totally different values, and as being guided
by a completely different frame of reference from 'us'. In extract 15 we see again the
construction of 'their' absolute power; 'they just come, and they just bulldoze', no
explanation is given for their actions, 'they just' do what to 'us' is extraordinary,
destructive behaviour. They are characterised as wantonly destroying something of great
value to 'us'; 'one hundred beautiful houses, maybe two hundred beautiful houses'. The
speaker in extract 16 picks up this theme of the number of houses that will be taken by the
DoT's scheme, and argues that the number is 'a drop in the ocean to the Ministry of
Transport' providing an implicit contrast between 'their' evaluative framework and 'ours';
in 'their' assessment sixty houses have little worth.
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The final extract provides a comparison of 'our' assessment of a piece of land and 'theirs'
and characterises their assessment as based on entirely different factors to ours. What is
to us a popular golf course is to them the site for 'uninterrupted road building'. Again we
have the depiction of their casual power, 'they just move in, and take their time leisurely'.
Thus in these extracts respondents provide accounts which clearly distinguish 'them' from
'us'. 'They' are characterised as all powerful, ruthless, and capricious and 'their' behaviour
is constructed as motivated by values distinct from those that 'we' hold. In contrast 'we'
are portrayed as confused ('well why?', 'we don't know what is happening', 'it seemed
extraordinary to me'), constrained ('we are hand tied'), and holding entirely different
frameworks of value. It might be that local objectors employ contrasts of 'them ' and 'us'
to the same ends as Atkinson suggests politicians do in their speeches; to gain sympathy
and approval for their position. All the accounts were produced in the context of an
interview with a researcher carrying out an assessment of the social impacts of the road
schemes. Clearly it is in respondents' interests to gain the researcher's sympathy for their
case, to convince her that they are 'hard done by' and that the DoT are proceeding
unreasonably. The implicit contrast between 'them' and 'us' works to maximise their
complaint that their feelings and assessments of the situation are being ignored.
The images in the data of 'their' destructiveness of the environment are contrasted
implicitly with other references in the interviews to 'our' concern for the value of homes,
the countryside and recreation sites. The uimamed individuals and groups who comprise
'them' are depicted as invading and desecrating what 'we' hold dear.
This rhetorical strategy is not confined to interview situations, it occurs in other contexts
and in relation to other road schemes. It is used in situations where individuals seek to gain
sympathy or recognition for their position and to disparage the actions and beliefs of the
planners. For example a local newspaper article published before the A27 Havant-
Chichester was built reports one resident as saying:
we get the impression that the road is going to be pushed through whatever we
do. .(village) is going to be decimated, it will no longer be the little village we have
known and loved. To ruin the peace and tranquillity of this place is criminal.(The
News 27/2/79)
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and an article which appeared in You magazine (November 1 991 ) about a proposed road
scheme in Derbyshire had one resident claiming:
(p/ace na/nc') is a jewel, I see it as a haven Irom the modern world where we can
come and breathe the fresh air and enjoy an unspoiled English landscape...this road
is an abomination of desolation, cars and lorries vi1l roar through the valley and no-
one will give a second thought to what has been lost to the nation.
In both oF these extracts the worth of the area is built up. in the flrst it is reFerred to as a
'little village' and a place of 'peace and tranquillity', in the second it is a 'jewel' a 'haven'
and 'unspoiled'. 1 he Department of Transport are portrayed as 'criminals. and planners
ol an abomination . their actions will 'ruin' a village and result in something of' great value
being lost to the nation. The following cartoon which appeared in The Independent
(2/3/92) uses the same imagery, depicting the DoT's choice of route for the M3 over
Twyt'ord Down as the rape of the garden of Eden:
"I (1Cm 't COiC if'th is is the GcirI a oIL den, ue're cominq tIiiovd
TIIL' JIzdeJ,Je,zdelzt 1991.
The cartoon characterises the DoT as invading and destroying something of' great beauty,
with no concern for its worth or the feelings of the people who live there. The residents
of the area, Adam and Eve in this picture, are depicted as powerless to stop the bulldozers
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wreaking havoc on their home.
Baurnann has drawn attention to these distinctions which people draw between 'us' and
'them'. He writes:
The image of the enemy is painted in colours as lurid and frightening as the colours
of one's own group are soothing and pleasurable.. .were they allowed to have it their
way, they would invade, conquer, enslave, exploit: openly if they are strong enough,
or surreptitiously if forced to hide their true intentions'(1990:46)
This strategy of portraying planners as invading and destroying something which 'we'
treasure has also been noted in other sociological studies. Wynne (1983, 1985) reviews
the work of Winner (1978), McDermott (1974) and Daly (1970) who describe the fantasies
or spectres which ordinary people create in the attempt to make meaningful their lack of
control of the forces directing technology. Wynne suggests that such constructions are
condensed images which become surrogates for explanations of more complex experiences.
He argues that they should be seen as metaphors for the real social relationships which
exist; they represent the alien social elites controlling technological innovation. Thus for
Wynne, in the data above the 'monster' which will 'just bulldoze' beautiful houses, 'will
infill' fields and build roads at its leisure through popular golf courses, should be viewed
as a metaphor for the social relationship between planners and the public. Wynne's
approach treats this portrayal of planners as alien creatures as revealing something about
the 'real situation'. For instance the sentiments expressed in the data above might indicate
that there is little communication between the DoT and ordinary people, or if there is that
it is not understood, and that people feel powerless, confused, threatened and invaded in the
face of the DoT's plans. Wynne 's position here is essentiaLly a rea1ist one - particiçants'
accounts are assumed to provide access to information about external states of affairs. In
contrast a discourse analytic approach concentrates on the active social construction of
reality through participants' accounts. The point is not to argue that objectors do not
'really' feel themselves to be powerless and exploited, but to emphasise that this sense is
actively worked up by them, and that this self characterisation serves particular interactional
functions.
Conclusion
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This chapter has considered strategies which participants in planning disputes over road
schemes employ in order to distinguish their position from that of the planners and
developers. The rhetorical devices used in all of these strategies have been documented in
other sorts of data and are common methods for bolstering ones' own argument and
undermining that of others.
The analysis differs from previous investigations of planning disputes which have tended
to focus on the importance of factors such as differential access to resources and political
influence between experts and the public, and between different groups of the public.
These analyses have undermined the Government's claims that inquiries are objective 'fact
finding' exercises (DoT 1978) and have concluded that they are an attempt to make the
planning system appear to be objective and fair. They argue that the inquiry system is
biased, and that consequently the developer's preferred scheme is likely to be built whatever
the 'factual' case against it (see Adams 1981, Tyme 1978, Cowans 1980).
These existing studies employ an implicit assumption that divisions between the various
parties in planning disputes emerge from features of the background or experience of those
involved, or are caused by the institutional setting of the public inquiry. In contrast the
analysis presented here focuses on the way in which divisions are worked at by participants.
The distinctions between 'ordinary people' and 'experts' and between 'us' and 'them' are
viewed as discursively constructed and maintained, rather than simply exerting some
external constraint on interaction. One of the benefits of a close analysis of textual and
interactional data such as that presented here is that it can draw attention to unexpected
features of the organisation of planning disputes. The observation that objectors seek to
distinguish themselves and their position from the project proponents is perhaps
unsurprising, however what would not be anticipated is the way in which they use their
'ordinariness' as a strategy in the dispute. The powerlessness of objectors and their status
as ordinary people are positively employed by participants rather then simply being
disinterested descriptions of them.
Giddens defines power as 'the means of getting things done' (1984:28 1) and the ability to
'make a difference (ibid:14). The extent to which these invocations of ordinary identity
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actually make a difference within planning disputes is beyond the scope of this study.
What is clear however is that participants use what has often been seen as their
powerlessness - their ordinary identity - as a strategy to get things done, to try to make
robust claims about social impact.
What is presented here is an alternative level of analysis, and does not contest the basic
assertion that the inquiry process is fundamentally biased in favour of the proposers of new
developments. What it shows however are some of the intricate interactiorial strategies
which objectors to the proposals use to fight within the consultation and inquiry system.
The planning system clearly favours developers at the expense of residents in a range of
ways, however residents are not merely submissive or frustrated victims, they are active
participants in the dispute. Like the experts they are concerned to distinguish 'IactuaY from
'fictional' accounts, and to ensure that their position appears more robust and credible than
that of others. In addition this activity is not confined to the pubhc inq'uiry but extends
before and after it.
As noted above (p136) both Wynne's and Hutton's case studies of planning disputes draw
attention to the way in which the issue is constructed differently by lay participants and
planners, and particularly how the former construct the issue in moral terms while for the
planners it is seen as simply technical. The analysis presented in Chapter 5 of the social
construction of the A27 roar illustrates the existence of a similar process in the Havant-
Chichester case study; local people constructed the noise as a moral problem - something
which should not have been imposed upon them and which the DoT should remedy - while
the DoT characterised it as a technical problem and responded to it as such (by providing
barriers, insulation and compensation). These different conceptions of the problem were also
evident in terms of what sort of assessment of the problem was considered necessary. The
DoT relied on their technical methods of calculation while local people drew attention to
their direct experience of the noise and insisted that representatives of the DoT should
come down and listen to it (p91) This moral framing of the issue and appeals to direct
experience as the basis for impact claims are also evident in the analysis presented in this
chapter. I have shown how participants sought to depict their position as informed by
different and superior values to those of the DoT, and also illustrated the extent to which
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they draw upon ordinary experience of life lived locally as the basis for their claims and
arguments.
The following chapter stays with the issue of how specific identities are invoked and used
in the construction of social impacts. Rather than focusing on the identity of an ordinary
person with common sense knowledge, it considers how local identity is claimed and
utilised. In common with this chapter it explores the role that constructions of identity play
in the achievement of divisions between participants, but concentrates on divisions between
groups of local people rather than between experts and ordinary people.
157
Chapter 8
The Attribution Of Motives In Social Impact Claims
Introduction
In the previous chapter I explored how those involved in making claims about social impact
prior to the construction of a road use particular representations of their own identity to
bolster their own accounts and undermine those of the developers. This chapter continues
with the theme of the identities participants invoke, but concentrates on how those within
a locality seek to present their account as more valid than others within the same locality
who take an opposing stance towards the new development. I will concentrate on how they
present the motives which underlie their position and how they characterise the motives of
those with different views. The data analyzed in this chapter are taken from newspapers
collected and interviews conducted during the Worthing-Lancing study, and objectors'
submissions to the Havant-Chichester inquiry.
There is a tendency in some of the early work on SIA to talk of 'the public' or 'the
community' as though they are an undifferentiated mass, and to assume that those living
within a locality share broadly similar interests, values and views (e.g. Olsen and Merwin
1977, Watkins 1977). More recent work talks of 'publics' (Guidelines for SIA 1994) and
recognises that conflicts of interest between those living close to a proposed development
may be as significant as those between local people and the planners. This is particularly
true with proposed road schemes which often have direct benefits for some, (for instance
in terms of taking traffic away from roads near their homes) while having negative impacts
for others (for instance having a road built close to their homes). In order to understand
the process and nature of claims making about social impact it is necessary to pay attention
to the claims made by groups holding one position about those holding a different position.
Participants in such disputes engage in a variety of strategies to present their position as
more credible, robust arid convincing than that of others. In the previous chapter I outlined
some of the ways in which those who object to proposed schemes seek to present their
position as premised on entirely different knowledge and values from that of the DoT, and
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to suggest that their position is superior. Similar concerns are also apparent with regard to
the position of other individuals and groups within the locality. Participants recognise that
the way in which they construe the costs and benefits of alternative schemes may have
practical implications for the outcome of the dispute. These claims are very much part of
the struggle over what counts as a social impact, often being concerned to establish that
there are good reasons to support particular claims about impact and not others.
There are various ways in which participants seek to undermine the position of others.
They may simply argue that the others' position is wrong - that there is no evidence to back
up their claims of impact. For instance in the Worthing study there was much debate about
whether the route through the town would really cut the town in two as opponents argued,
and similarly whether the bypass would really ruin the Downs as opponents of that route
claimed. An alternative strategy is to attempt to discredit the person or group who is
providing the opposing position, by suggesting that they are not qualified to make their
argument or that their motives for doing so are suspect. This is a strategy that is widely
used within the public inquiry where the process follows the adversarial model of courts
of law in which undermining witnesses plays a major part (see p141). In this chapter I will
concentrate on this sort of strategy and focus specifically on the ways in which participants
attribute motives and values in order to present their own position as credible and that of
their opponents as invalid.
The chapter begins with a brief overview of literature on local opposition to siting
proposals. A social constructionist critique of those studies which seek to uncover the
motives of participants is developed, drawing on the work of C. Wright Mills' (1940) and
Spector and Kitsuse (1987). However analyses which focus on the social and political
factors which inform the development of protest are now becoming more common, and it
is argued that these are potentially useful in developing a social constructionist analysis of
siting disputes, as they direct attention away from the motives or values of participants and
towards contextual features of the claims making process. I then demonstrate that on closer
inspection some of this literature retains an interest in determining the motives of
participants and as such falls short of a complete constructionist analysis. Data from the
two case studies is then presented to demonstrate the potential for a constructionist approach
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which avoids ascribing motives to participants and concentrates instead on how they ascribe
motives to themselves and others. This analysis demonstrates that participants are aware
of the negative connotations of being attributed NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) motives
and that they work to avoid such characterisations for themselves, while simultaneously
trying to achieve this characterisation for those holding opposing views. The analysis also
illustrates the dilemma participants face of asserting their local identity and hence ownership
of important knowledge, while rejecting the possible implication that they are only
protesting because they are local (i.e their protest is a NIMBY one). The conclusion of this
analysis is that participants in siting disputes are engaged in an activity very similar to that
of some analysts of such disputes - namely achieving the characterisation of NIMBY for
some participants and avoiding it for others. The chapter contributes to a social
constructionist analysis of the process of social impact by illustrating how attributions of
motive and value are utilised to build up or undermine claims about social impact.
Interests and Motives for Local Environmental Protest
Almost all of the literature which deals explicitly with the NIMBY syndrome originates
from the US, and has been published since the late 1980s. NIMBY is used to describe
opponents of new developments who recognise that a facility is needed but are opposed to
its siting within their locality:
In plain language.. .the motivation of residents who want to protect their turf More
formally, NIMBY refers to the protectionist attitudes of and oppositional tactics
adopted by community groups facing an unwelcome development in their
neighbourhood.. .residents usually concede that these 'noxious' facilities are
necessary, but not near their homes, hence the term 'not in my back yard'. (Dear
1992:288)
Most of the studies concentrate either on the siting of social facilities (e.g. prisons, homes
for the mentally ill) or waste incinerators. Although the issues surrounding these sorts of
facilities differ much of the analysis is similar. Concern is evident in much of this
literature about the ability of local protestors to hold up the siting of Locally Unwanted
Land Uses (LULU's), for instance Popper writes:
No new free standing hazardous waste facility has been sited during the last five
years. No new nuclear plant has been undertaken since 1978...No large metropolitan
airport has been sited since...the early 1960s. The lack of locations for new prisons
has caused such overcrowding in many existing jails that some cities.. .have had to
release convicted criminals. (1987:9)
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In order to overcome this blockage of development numerous studies have emerged which
attempt to understand and overcome the NIMBY syndrome.
Freudenberg and Pastor (1992) provide a useful review of the NIMBY literature and
suggest that it can be characterised as falling into three distinct perspectives. The first
perspective they describe is of NIMBY as an ignorant or irrational response. In this position
a clear distinction is drawn between the real risks or impacts associated with new
developments, and the public's assessment of these risks. In this view the public are
considered to be 'wrong' and thus the response of planners should either be to educate
them, or simply to overrule them. Freudenberg and Pastor use the work of DuPont to
exemplify this approach. Writing about public opposition to nuclear power he talks of 'the
irrational fears of the public' (198 1:14) and argues that public opposition should not sway
developers because:
the fear they feel is out of proportion to the actual risks.. .This is phobic thinking
(1981b)
This perspective utilises a deficit model of public understanding, in which the public are
problematised as having too little, or incorrect knowledge. This position has been roundly
criticised by sociological studies (e.g. Wynne 1989, 1991, Irwin 1995) which have
demonstrated that far from being passive vessels which simply need to be filled with more
or better information, members of the public are active in weighing up the usefulness and
relevance of scientific information. These studies show that members of the public are able
to assimilate even very complex scientific information if they can see the practical gains
from doing so, and conversely may choose to ignore information if they do not trust those
who are giving it or see no advantage in understanding it.
The second perspective on NIMBY which Freudenberg and Pastor identify is that it is a
selfish response. Some of those who equate NIMBY with selfishness assume that this
means that such protest is less important than that based on wider social and environmental
concerns (e.g. Keeney and von Winterfeldt 1986); however others note that actions taken
in an individual's self interest are considered to be rational within free market systems and
so can hardly be condemned. For instance Brion addresses protest based on fear of
property devaluation and writes:
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At stake is the value that the neighbours (of the new facility) enjoy from what most
likely is not only the focus of their existence but also their principal economic
asset, their residence. (1991:179)
In addition studies of siting disputes have illustrated that opponents are not alone in seeking
to defend their own interest, the project proponents are likely to have interests of their own,
which as Freudenberg and Pastor put it 'may mesh only imperfectly with the good of
society as a whole' (op cit:43). If NIMBY response are understood as motivated by
selfishness, the responses considered appropriate rely on trade-offs or compensation. For
instance Inhaber (1992) proposes a method of using 'reverse auctions' where the auctioneer
sets a price which communities will be paid for accepting a LULU, and then communities
bid for the siting. If no bids are received the price rises until a community comes forward
who are willing to accept the development. Portney (1991) outlines an alternative trade off
strategy, that of risk substitution. This is based on the idea that:
people may well be willing to trade uncertainty about new risks if these new risks
are substituted for risks they know or believe to be very high. (1991:138)
lie provides the example of siting a hazardous waste incinerator in an area that already has
a hazardous waste disposal facility, with the expressed purpose of cleaning up the site - 'the
newly proposed risk would actually help to diminish existing risks' (op cit:139). Others
suggest that the provision of generous compensation to individuals in the affected area
offers the best solution (e.g. O'Hare & Sanderson 1987).
It is the conceptualisation of NIMBY responses as irrational or selfish which has captured
popular imagination. NIMBY is now a phrase in popular usage in the UK as well as the
USA. This is well illustrated by the use of the term in newspaper articles without any
explanation of what the acronym stands for. For instance:
-	 Is Bel Mooney, roads protestor, really a NIMBY in disguise? (Independent 8/8/94)
-	 NIMBY Dimbleby puts the boot into bypass (Express 23/5/94)
-	 Dorset is the county of NIMBYism writ large (Guardian 12/6/93)
When opposition to new developments is labelled NIMBY it is effectively dismissed as
selfish, narrow and protectionist. NIMBYism is seen as illegitimate grounds for protest and
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compared unfavourably to opposition based on broader social or environmental concerns.
The final perspective which Freudenberg and Pastor identify as influential is that of
NIMBY response as prudent. In this view local opposition is seen as based on well
grounded concern about the impacts of new developments. Freudenberg and Pastor describe
the literature which puts forward this case as 'smaller newer and less consolidated'(op
cit:44) than the irrationality and selfishness perspectives. They draw attention to work
which suggests that the public are often acting reasonably in distrusting scientists, have
good grounds for concern, and are able to see the siting problem in wider terms than the
planning experts. Although Freudenberg and Pastor do not refer to it, there is a clear link
here with studies of lay epidemiologies or citizen knowledges (see p191-193 for a
discussion of this literature). These provide evidence of how local people's concerns about
environmental risks often prove correct despite continued reassurances to the contrary from
experts. This body of work can be seen to challenge directly the deficit model of public
knowledge and understanding - here the public are seen as active in drawing together
relevant information and evidence, which often contradicts that of the experts. Freudenberg
and Pastor characterise studies which emphasise the prudence of local protestors as one
perspective on NIMBYism. However given that the term NIMBYism has come to be
synonymous with limited, selfish or irrational responses, it would be clearer to see this
work as suggesting that in fact protestors are not NIMBYs at all, but rather have good and
often wide ranging grounds for their complaints.
1-lay ing reviewed these diverse perspectives Freudenberg and Pastor suggest that in fact they
all share an important characteristic; they all try to explain what lies behind local protest.
While there are important differences between the perspectives (especially between those
that problematise the public and those which see them as well informed and prudent) they
all focus on the local participants and attempt to uncover the basis for their protest.
Freudenberg and Pastor suggest that research on local development protest should move
beyond this sort of explanation and instead 'focus on understanding the broader system that
creates such conflicts in the first place' (op cit:39).
Motives: A Social Constructionist Approach
1 c-I 0.)
This interest in moving away from research concerned with the motives or bases for
individuals' protest in favour of understanding the social and political factors which inform
the emergence of protest can be seen to fit well with the social constructionist concern to
explain the emergence and maintenance of problems. Moreover it echoes a longstanding
concern within social constructionism about approaches which concentrate on individual
motives, values or attitudes. This traces its roots to C. Wright Mills seminal paper 'Situated
actions and vocabularies of motive'(1940). In this Mills took issue with the conventional
concept of motives as explanations of social conduct, and with attempts by experts
(sociologist, psychologists, psychoanalysts) to distinguish individuals 'real' motives from
the reasons that they themselves provide to explain their actions. Mills argues that this
mode of analysis (which he calls motive-mongering) cannot provide satisfactory
explanations for social conduct and proposes instead a radically different conception of
motives. He claims that motives are not causes of actions but rather are the answers which
people provide to questions such as 'why did you do that?'. Motives are attempts to justify
or explain a line of conduct which has been questioned, they are resources available for
use when certain kinds of questions arise. He suggests that in specific situations a range
or vocabulary of appropriate motives are available. Different vocabularies are appropriate
in different contexts, for different actors and at different times. Thus for him motives are
considered to be a product of social situations rather than a reflection of some prior element
'within' individuals.
Spector and Kitsuse (1987) extended Mills' treatment of motives as linguistic resources to
the study of values. In their study of the construction of social problems they argue that
values are an important element in what they call social problems activity - the way in
which a condition comes to be identified as a social problem at a particular time, how the
This approach has recently been criticised by Campbell (1996) who argues that Mills'
claim that motives should not be considered as elements 'in' actors is 'contrary to existing
usage' (pilO) and incorrect. However whether or not there are actually internal states
which compel people to take particular courses of action is not the issue here - these may
well exist but we have no access to them. What we have are accounts in which people draw
on a range of motives to explain their action. The variability of these accounts suggest that
to search for the true internal motive is likely to be futile. See the later analysis (p169-171)
of the variability of motives and attitudes for an illustration of this point.
164
problem is defined and what solutions are considered desirable. Following Mills they reject
the notion that values somehow 'cause' people to define conditions as problems, arguing
instead that values are better considered as the explanations which people give in support
of their claims, complaints or demands. They are used to justify claims, to explain not
simply what is wrong, but why it is wrong. Spector and Kitsuse argue that the imputation
of values to participants is not a valid task for the sociologist, however they note that it is
a fundamental component of participant's explanations and accounts. Thus the imputation
of values by participants making social problems claims is a crucial part of the data to be
explained rather than an adequate explanation for behaviour.
Discourse analysis also problematizes the attribution of motives, values and attitudes to
participants. The two issues that have particular relevance are the realisation that there may
be immense variability within and between accounts, and the recognition that accounts are
constructed by speakers to attend to specific interactional functions.
Mills advocates the construction of typal vocabularies of motive that are used within
specific types of situation or action, while discourse analysis recommends a close analysis
of the use of motives and values within specific accounts. A social constructionist analysis
of local disputes about new developments could be developed which combines these two
approaches First it would draw attention to the broad social and political context in which
such protests arise, and secondly it would concentrate on what motives or values are used
by participants, how, and to what ends. Such an approach would put aside the question of
what motivates individual protestors, and would instead draw attention to the social factors
which inform the adoption and use of specific vocabularies, and would also look in detail
at particular instances of use.
There is not so far any work that explicitly applies such a social constructionist perspective
to case studies of local protests about planned new developments. However there are a
number of studies which draw attention to the wider context within which protest occurs,
and specifically to factors which result in protest which can be characterised as NIMBY
(e.g. Brion 1991, Irwin et al 1994). One such study actually uses Mills' notion of
vocabularies of motive to explain local responses - Kemp's (1990) study of local responses
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to UK Nirex Ltd's proposals for the disposal of low and intermediate level radioactive
waste. In the following section I will provide a brief review of this paper, and illustrate
how its analysis is directly applicable to the case of road planning. I will then go on to
suggest that the paper fails to take Mills' warnings about motive-mongering seriously
enough and in doing so fails to provide the 'radical interpretation' (see title) of public
opposition that it promises. In the remainder of the chapter I will draw on data collected
during the A27 case studies to sketch out what an approach that takes seriously the
recommendation to focus on participants' use of motives might look like.
An Outline and Critique of Kemp's Approach
Kemp (1990) applies Mills' notion of vocabularies of motive to explain the values or
motives invoked by those opposing the local siting of radioactive dumps. Between
November 1987 and May 1988, UK Nirex Ltd distributed some 50,000 copies of a
discussion document setting out their basic proposals for disposal of radioactive waste and
invited comment. Copies were sent to interested parties such as local authorities,
environmental pressure groups and political parties but were also sent free to members of
the public on request. Almost 2,000 responses were received from members of the public
and these provide the data for Kemp's analysis.
Kemp demonstrates that those who objected to Nirex's proposals drew on a range of values
and concerns as the bases for their complaints. Some of these may be characterised as
NIMBY. Other analysts (e.g. Lee et al 1984) had interpreted this as evidence that public
opposition to the disposal of radioactive waste is motivated primarily by the NIMBY
syndrome, rather than by broader environmental concerns. Kemp takes issue with this
approach, and uses Mills' notion of vocabularies of motive to argue that certain situations
either provide or require standard forms of response, in this case responses which might be
characterised as NIMBY. He argues that 'structural, institutional and contextual factors
contribute to the employment of particular forms of reasoning'(p1247), and suggests that
two factors may have been particularly important in generating responses which could be
characterised as NIMBY. First NIREXs' perceived past record of secretiveness, unfairness
and incomprehensibility had led to a lack of legitimation for the participation process.
Consequently people might have chosen not to participate, or if they did participate their
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primary concern may have been to express their distrust. Without a consideration of this
background, responses may be seen as irrational, confrontational and protectionist.
Secondly Kemp argues that the form of the discussion document itself was likely to lead
to site-specific protests. It showed a map of the areas geologically suitable for the location
of repositories for radioactive waste, and so, not surprisingly, responses came mainly from
the areas identified as potentially suitable. Thus what set out to be a generic exercise
turned out to be site specific - a framework was created for the discussion which greatly
influenced the nature of the response. Thus he argues that the production of NIMBY
concerns is largely a result of various features of the context in which local people
participate in such disputes.
Although Kemp is alone in explicitly using Mills' work, the suggestion that the form of the
decision making process may encourage responses which can be easily characterised as
NIMBY, has also been made by others working in the field. For instance Brion (1991)
argues that the US decision making process has the protection of the private property of
individuals as one of its prime responsibilities, and consequently favours 'selfish' claims
over any wider public interest. Irwin et al (1994) also draw attention to the effect the
decision making process has on forms and expressions of opposition. They argue that in
public campaigns about environmental issues citizen groups are typically obliged to adopt
a reactive or obstructive stance as there is not room for public involvement prior to
implementation. Freuedenberg and Pastor (op cit:51) suggest that this focus on how the
broader system 'creates' NIMBY responses offers the most promising way forward for
research.
Looking at how aspects of the planning system lead to NIMBY responses has direct
relevance for understanding public responses to proposed road schemes. As many authors
have noted policy issues are deemed irrelevant and inappropriate for discussion at public
inquiries (see Adams 1981, Tyme 1978, Wynne 1982). This allows the Department of
Transport to continue their programme of building a road network 'by stealth' (Tyme op
cit) as only local issues and the particular stretch of road being considered may be debated
at each inquiry. The impacts which the Department of Transport recognises and
compensates for are those which can be shown to damage personal property or quality of
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life, such as increased noise or loss of land. Wider concerns for instance about the effect
of a road on community life or of the road building programme on the countryside or
perhaps even on the global environment are not considered relevant in the process of
assessment. It is only by drawing attention to specific local and often personal impacts that
objectors stand to win any victories at all.
It is clear that this level of social constructionism - exploring how aspects of the decision
making process affect the sort of claims made - provides useful insights for studies of local
responses to environmental change. However I suggest that this is only one part of a social
constructionist response, and that studies which stop at this level do not provide the
corrective to studies focusing on attitudes and motives which they promise. This is well
illustrated by Kemp's study.
Alongside his assertion that the decision making process influences the sort of claims
people make about the impacts of new development, Kemp also develops a rather different
argument. In his analysis of letters to NIREX he notes that people often use what could
be characterised as NIMBY objections to the plans alongside objections which draw on
wider social and environmental concerns. He takes this to indicate that:
the NIMBY concept may be applied too readily, a convenient attribution of motive
which disguises a more fundamental range of technical, environmental and socio-
economic concerns. The NIMBY concept shouid therefore be rejected as disorcirig
and unhelpful. (ibid:1239)
In this his argument mirrors exactly the position of authors who argue that NIMBY
concerns are often veiled by more socially acceptable reasons for protest (e.g. Keeney and
Von Winterfeldt 1986). Kemp simply turns the argument on its head and claims that what
looks initially to be a NIMBY response, on closer inspection turns out to be one based on
more acceptable concerns. In this he slides back into the motive mongering which Mills
warns against. He is attempting to 'plumb behind verbalisatiori' (Mills op cit:910) and
pronounce on the 'real' motives of complainants. A true social constructionist approach
must leave this concern behind and concentrate on how participants use and attribute
motives and values in the course of the dispute.
Kemp takes a case study of a protest which has been characterised as NIMBY and attempts
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to demonstrate that it is not in fact NIMBY at all. This concern to distinguish between
NIMBY responses and more legitimate protest is also apparent in a number of other studies.
Welsh (1993:15) also uses the example of opposition to nuclear developments in Britain
and suggests that the labelling of such protests as NIMBY 'gained widespread credibility
in the 1980s'. He explores how nuclear protest has come to be characterised as NIMBY and
then uses case studies to demonstrate that protests could be characterised quite differently,
and in more positive terms. Although both Welsh and Kemp argue for a more considered
use of the term NIMBY both their studies implicitly engage in a process of attempting to
distinguish NIMBY responses from non-NIMBY responses. Bullard (1993) does this even
more explicitly. In his discussion of the environmental justice movement in the USA (a
largely black grassroots movement which has emerged to fight 'environmental racism'
particularly in relation to the siting of Locally Unwanted Land Uses - LULUs) he blames
the NIMBY actions of some white communities for the environmental problems suffered
by black communities. He argues that these white communities oppose developments in
their locality and as a consequence siting shifts to poorer less powerful black communities.
What is interesting though is that he labels the opposition of white communities as NIMBY
(i.e. illegitimate and selfish) while he sees the opposition of black communities to the same
proposals as an exciting and positive development. While there may well be differences
in the ways in which the problems are conceptualised and responded to between the two
sorts of communities, to label one NIMBY and the other as not NIMBY is essentially a
value judgernent. It serves to legitimate one protest and undermine another.
In their influential book on environmental groups Lowe and Goyder (1983) do a similar
thing. They outline the various ways in which middle class residents seek to protect their
own interests under the guise of environmental concern, for instance by attempting to have
desirable residential areas classified as preservation areas, and so protected from
developments such as the provision of low cost housing. Although they do not use the term
this characterisation suggest that those involved are basically NIMBYs - they protest about
proposed developments because they do not want them in their backyard. They characterise
such campaigns as furthering the interests of one sector of the local community often at the
direct expense of other sectors, and suggest that such group activity is motivated by self
interest rather than true environmental concern. To a varying extent all of these authors
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make moral judgments about the validity of protests.
Of course individual authors are entitled to their own judgements on the validity of specific
protests. However the point is that such concerns should play no part in a social
constructionist analysis of such protests. As Spector and Kitsuse point out, deciding
whether complaints about a 'problem' are justified is to leave behind the analytical project
of social constructionism and to become engaged in the practical project of participants in
the dispute.
Moreover discourse analytic studies have demonstrated the difficulty of deciding
conclusively what the 'real' motives or attitudes of people are. This can be illustrated by
extracts from an interview conducted with a couple who lived, and ran a school, close to
one of the proposed routes for the A27 Worthing-Lancing. At times during the course of
the interview the respondents said things which might be taken to indicate NIMBYism,
while at other points they raised a variety of social and environmental arguments against
the route they opposed. For example the following extract suggest that they are classic
NIMBYs, concerned primarily with defending their own interests:
1. WB	 (I - Interviewer)
I	 O.K. Anything else that you can think of?
WBi Well if it affects our living in the end we don't think much of it.
WBii Well no, I suppose that's really what it boils down to actually.
\VBi the bottoii line
WBii actually yes, you've sort of got to look after your own interests to some
extent.
However, at other points in the interview both pointed to a range of other soda) az
environmental concerns which informed their opposition to the plans. For instance they
expressed concern about the Department of Transport's road building programme, arguing
that the building of new roads and the subsequent development which roads attract will
erode valued countryside. For example the man argued:
2. WBii
Just because we happen to live in this area we shouldn't say 'oh no, well nobody
else could come here, you know, and sort of enjoy it'. But the point I think is, that
what we feel is that it has been open country always, and once it's changed it's
changed for ever. Gone. More town. And very soon there won't be any sort of
open space along the South Coast at all, you know, it'll all be bricked over.
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His wife similarly builds a case for opposing the route close to their home which seems to
be based on a range of environmental and social concerns, rather than narrow self interest:
3. WB1
If they put the road here, so close, they will infill in no time at all these few fields
between (superstore) and the church. And the church has stood there, it's Saxon,
it's a beautiful church, it really is lovely. They'll infihl that in no time at all, you'd
see it just.. .you know. And you need space, just the quality of life. We have a lot
of people, cos our land has a public footpath going through the far woods, and ever
so many people I know use it to go up onto the Downs, they walk their dogs. Now
that will end if that ghastly bypass goes over there. You need greenery, you need
to be able to look up.
4. WB1
I take the dog for long walks over the Downs regularly, and I do see a lot of people
you know. I've got children your age sort of thing, and our children mock me cos
I always say, when they were younger, 'you should always say 'good day". So we
always say 'good day' to people we meet, and we chat...but you would, that would
go. That is part of how life should be, that you should be able to walk the downs
and, well just to breathe the air and hear the birds and just to hear the breeze
In these extracts the respondent points to valued features of the locality which she argues
would be disrupted or destroyed if the proposed route want ahead. She appeals to a variety
of environmental and social justifications for her claims, drawing attention to the
importance of aesthetic considerations ('it's a beautiful church, it really is lovely'), heritage
value ('the church has stood there, it's Saxon'), rights to common land and the country
('you should be able to walk the downs') the need far sçce ad çecceçtuai stfnultk/ll
('you need space', 'you need greenevy', 'you need to be ab'e t loak <p'), th
of the area for social contact ('we always say good day to people we meet, and we chat')
and for recreation ('ever so many people I know use it').
It is difficult to know on what grounds we can decide what the respondents' 'real' motives
for opposing the route are - are they really motivated by this wide range of social and
environmental concerns and simply mention self interest as they realise that this is the only
justification likely to be taken seriously in the decision making process, or are they really
only concerned about their own interest but mention these wider justifications in order to
build a more sympathetic case? Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) and Potter and Wetherell
(1987), recognise that it will always be possible for the researcher to extract a version of
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what the respondent 'really means'. This could be done in a variety of ways: by
eliminating certain statements as hyperbole, irony, rhetoric or whatever; by interpreting the
data in accordance with tacit understandings gleaned in the course of interaction with
participants; or by introducing a range of modifying variables (the idea that the expression
of a attitude will always be modified by other variables, such as judgernent of what other
people will think etc. (Potter and Wetherell op cit:54)). However they stress that:
this process of reinterpretation to distil a comprehensive ultimate version can
produce firm conclusions only by disregarding copious interpretive uncertainties
(Gilbert and Mulkay op cit:11)
The fact that in practice people say so many contrasting, apparently inconsistent things
suggests that the search for an underlying consistent motive may be misplaced. The
response advocated by discourse analysts is to put the question of what really motivates
participants aside, and concentrate instead how participants use NIMBY and environmental
motives in their accounts and for what purposes. In the following section I will provide an
analysis of how NIMBY motives were used by participants in the disputes about the A27
Havant/Chichester and Worthing/Lancing, which indicates clearly how the concerns of
analysts of NIMBYism often converge with the interests of those actually involved.
Participants' Use of NIMBY Motives
Self A wareizess
The first thing to note is that participants in disputes about new developments are well
aware of the negative connotations of the attribution of NIMBYism. Their accounts display
an element of reflexivity about motives; at times they iJisp)ay their knowJedge about bow
their position could be construed. This is apparent in extract 2 in which the speaker
acknowledges that protecting the area in which one lives may be considered selfish and
states that complaints based on this motivation 'shouldn't' be made. Similarly a report
in the Mciii on Sunday's You magazine (November 1990) about a proposed road through
a village called Bagnor on the edge of the Berkshire Downs, cites one local objector thus:
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5.
We all hate the thought of the road, and, of course, I suppose I could be called a
NIMBY because I certainly don't want that bloody thing in my back yard. But it
is much more than my personal misfortune; the real issue is the damage it will do
to the.. .comrnunity. . .the ministry says that it has completed something called an
environmental impact assessment but what do they mean by that? Do they take into
account the loss of Bagnor to the entire community?
here we see that the speaker acknowledges that 'I suppose I could be called a NIMBY'.
In both these examples the display of self awareness about how their complaint could be
framed is followed directly by an attempt to establish that this would be an incorrect
depiction of their position. In extract two the speaker goes on to outline the broad base for
his complaint; his concern that the countryside is being eroded by the construction of new
roads and consequent development around them. He constructs his concern as being about
the whole South Coast rather then simply about the area in which he lives, or the particular
road being proposed. In extract 5 the speaker asserts that her complaint is motivated by
'more than my personal misfortune' being based on her concern to protect the whole
community.
Participants in disputes about road schemes work with the same assumptions as academic
and media analysts of those disputes. They assume that NIMBY responses are inadequate
bases for complaint, while social and environmental concerns are legitimate and laudable.
They engage in the same activity that I have argued writers on NIMBYism are caught up
in, that is ascribing NIMBY motivations to some while attempting to establish that it is an
inappropriate characterisation of the complaints of others. The following analysis of their
accounts illustrates that participants in such disputes attempt to characterise the positions
of those with opposing views as informed by NIMBYism, while at the same time
characterising their own position as explicitly not NIMBY, and informed by wider social
and environmental concerns.
Attributing Self-Interest to Others and nzore Laudable Motives to Self
Analysis of a variety of different sorts of accounts has illustrated the attention which
speakers pay to presenting their version as objective, unbiased and considered in contrast
to the ill-informed, biased or misguided views of others (see Gilbert and Mulkay 1984,
Edwards and Potter 1992). For example in their interviews with scientists Gilbert and
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Mulkay identified a phenomenon which they called accounting for error. They called any
account in which the speaker identifies the views of one or more scientists as mistaken, and
provides some kind of account which enables us to understand why these scientists adopted
an incorrect theory, an example of 'accounting for error'. In these accounts speakers linked
their own position firmly to empirical facts such as experimental results, while the position
of those they identified as being in error were explained in highly contingent terms; for
example as the result of stubbornness, stupidity, bias or prejudice. Gilbert and Mulkay
write that these accounts have an asymmetrical structure: speakers employ an empiricist
repertoire to account for their own position, and a contingent one to account for the
positions of others. In the empiricist repertoire scientists characterise their actions and
beliefs as following unproblematically from the empirical facts, while in the contingent
repertoire actions and beliefs are accounted for in terms of factors such as personal
characteristics, social ties or group membership.
In the Worthing case study data a similar pattern was apparent. Speakers attributed the
'wrong' positions of others to the result of 'putting their head in the sand', 'not listening
to facts', 'not understanding' and personal interest, while their own position was
characterised as 'facing up to facts', objective, based on common sense and 'rational
appraisals' of expert advice and information. This is well illustrated by an interview
conducted with three men who were founder members of an action group formed in
opposition to Downland routes. All of the interviewees lived in a village which would be
very close to the proposed route across the Downs and could expect to be adversely
affected by it. WCi describes the rationale of the action group thus:
6. WC1
As far as (action group) is concerned as WCiii says it's a number of people who are
concerned, who've got together, and thought we must put the other side of the case,
we must make sure it's presented, and not from the point of view of (village) but
from the point of view of just ordinary common sense logic and economics
He argues that their opposition to the Downland route is not based on personal and local
interests but rather is informed by common sense and a wider consideration of the issues.
On the other hand he claims that the downiand route he opposes:
7. WCI
just does not make sense, it doesn't make economic sense, it doesn't make
environmental sense, it doesn't make engineering sense, it is a completely spurious
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argument
His argument that his group's position is motivated by common sense and information in
contrast to the 'spurious arguments' of their opponents, is also taken up by WCii. He
describes his attendance at a public exhibition of the DoT's consultants' plans thus:
8.	 WCI1
I went in there, and I went round and I looked at all the things and as I said I tried
to be a rational person and just assimilate information, come up with an answer.
And you'd have to've been totally biased before you went in. and bunkered, not to
come up with what Howard Humphreys came up with in the end.
In this extract he builds a clear picture of himself and the route he supports as entirely
logical and reasonable. We are told that he 'looked at all the things' and 'tried to be a
rational person, just assimilate information, come up with an answer' His decision to
support the recommended route is presented as an entirely open minded consideration of
the 'facts'. He goes on to claim that anyone who saw the exhibition and did not reach the
same conclusion would have to have been 'totally biased' and 'blinkered'. Clearly ordinary
people rely on empiricist repertoires to bolster their case, and contingent repertoires to
undermine the position of others, just as much as scientists do.
In addition speakers not only attempt to render their position credible and 'right' by
asserting its objective and unbiased nature, but also by stressing that it is informed by
environmental values. Participants claimed not only that the route they opposed would have
adverse effects on the environment, but also where they were actively supporting the
construction of another route, they often claimed that this would actually have beneficial
effects on the environment. For examples in pamphlets produced by groups opposing the
on-line route in favour of a bypass, it was claimed that the route they opposed would 'have
an unacceptable impact on the environment', whereas a Downland bypass would 'enable
others to share with us the splendour of the views which the Downs provide'. Those who
held the opposite view (opposing a downiand bypass in favour of the on-line alternative)
used exactly the same strategy. One interviewee claimed that a bypass would 'ruin the
Downiand environment' while the on-line route would improve the environment in the
residential area by lessening the pollution caused by present traffic congestion.
Participants also question their opponents' motivation for protest, characterising their
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proposals as both damaging to the environment and motivated by self-centred NIMBY
concerns. The first example of this is also taken from the interview with the resident's
association discussed above. The association favoured the on-line route proposed by the
DoT, but failing that preferred the prospect of a bypass south of the Area of Outstanding
Natural Beauty (AONB) rather than one further north. In this extract the speaker suggests
that the local MP is only opposed to the building of a southern bypass because that route
would affect land belonging to the golf club of which he is president. His position is
effectively undermined by the suggestion that it is based on selfish concerns.
9.	 WCiii
He (local MP) said and I quote... 'a bypass route. .1 think that would have serious
disadvantages'. Now you know why don't you? It goes through (his) golf club.
He's president of the golf club, so it mustn't go through there.
This contrasts with the position of the association outlined in extract 6 where WCiii asserts
that their position is 'not from the view of (village)' but based on more objective and
reasonable grounds. Thus a clear contrast is presented in the interview between the selfish
basis of the complaints of others, and the impartial basis of the group's own complaints.
Research in a variety of different settings (e.g Smith (1978) in an account of a young
woman's psychiatric problems, Atkinson (1984) in political speeches) has illustrated the
way in which contrasts are often employed in this way in accounts to bolster a particular
version of events or behaviour and undermine others.
The second example is taken from an interview conducted during the Havant/Chichester
study in which the leader of a residents' association was reflecting about the public inquiry
held before the road was built. In this the speaker also constructed a clear contrast between
his own objective views and the narrow self interested complaints of others.
10.	 HQ
Well, there was a deal of controversy about it (the Public Inquiry) because the
various factions representing the route alternatives were all quite articulate, and I
think made their cases very well. The Inspector had a tough job really arbitrating
between the various objections, because they were six of one and half a dozen of
the other, and I think it would be fair to say that the underlying objective of the
people that spoke was to keep the thing away from their personal patch.
Understandably, but it's the old story. We had the advantage in that most of the
people who represented the Association... were not directly affected by the road, and
therefore could remain reasonably objective about the route alternatives
176
He credits other objectors at the public inquiry with having given the inspector a 'tough
job' as they were all 'quite articulate', however their arguments are undermined by the
suggestion that these people were motivated simply to 'keep the thing away from their
personal patch'. The speaker sets up the majority of other objectors at the inquiry as being
motivated by self interest and then contrasts them with the position of the association he
belongs to which could be 'reasonably objective' because its members were not directly
affected by the road.
In both interviews the speakers appear to recognise that their own position may be as
susceptible to charges that it is based on narrow self interest as those which they criticise.
They acknowledge this possibility and work to avert this categorisation. In the first
interview the speaker states clearly that their position is not 'from the point of view of
(village)' and in the second the speaker claims that their position could not be denigrated
as self interested as none of the members of the association expected to be directly affected
by the road.
Attempts to undermine the position of other by suggesting that they are motivated by self
interest was also apparent in letters published in the local press. During the course of the
public inquiry into the construction of the A27 Worthing/Lancing road the local newspapers
(Worthing Herald and West Sussex Gazette) regularly carried letters from local people
making arguments for and against the routes being discussed. Many of these letters aimed
to demonstrate the fallibility of arguments put forward in support of routes to which the
writer was opposed. One of the strategies used to achieve this was the suggestion that
proponents of the route were motivated by self interest. This is particularly well illustrated
by the following exchange of letters:
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11. (1-lerald 29/10/93)
Although to anyone with a scrap of intelligence it is clear that the Downiands route
is the most damaging and shortsighted of the options on offer (none of them
attractive), the dominant voices of our council have consistently supported it and
have spent many thousands of pounds of our money in arguing the case. It beggars
credibility that any of these people could actually believe that it is better to betray
an ancient trust and destroy downland than to sacrifice a few houses and the corner
of a golf course. So why do they do it? Surely, they could not be motivated by self
interest? Could their judgement be swayed by the fact that they live in fine houses
close to the DoT route, and would stoop to any level, nimby-fashion, to deflect the
inconvenience of the road works to someone else's doorstep? Perish the thought.
Perhaps you could set our minds at rest on this point by reprinting the list of
councillors and their views alongside their addresses. The local residents will be
able to draw their own conclusions from whatever correlation emerges.
12. (Herald 19/11/93)
Your correspondent suggests that councillors opposed to the DoT route could be
motivated by self-interest, and would like to see their views accompanied by their
addresses. Could we perhaps start with the councillor who has been leading the
opposition to the council's view that the Cissbury Ring route will serve Worthing
residents best. The leading exponent of the DoT preferred route is (name) whose
home is just a few luindred yards from where the Findon Gap route would cross the
A24
This example illustrates how people holding different positions use exactl y the same mode
of argument in an attempt to undermine each other. In the first instance the writer suggests
that those who oppose the DoT's preferred route through the town only do so because the
route would be near their homes, while in the second the writer claims that the position of
one of the main opponents to the bypass route is informed by the close proximity of her
home to that route.
Thus it seems clear that one of the strategies used by participants in disputes about social
impact is to attempt to tarnish those who hold opposing views with the suggestion that they
are NIMBYS, while at the same time working to avoid the characterisation of themselves
as NIMBY.
Local Knowledge and Self Interest: A Dilemma
However ascribing NIMBYism to those within the locality who hold opposing positions is
not without its problems. By tying the ascription of NIMBYism to place of residence as is
done in extracts 11 and 12, participants could be seen to undermine one of their own most
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important resources - the claim to local knowledge and experience. In Chapter 7 I outlined
how knowledge gained from living locally is invoked as a powerful resource against the
opinions and assessments of experts, and how living close to the proposed development is
taken to provide a warrant for complaint and access to specialist knowledge about likely
impacts (see also discussion of the importance of direct experience p91-92). This sort of
claim would seem to sit uncomfortably alongside claims that others' local residence
provides evidence of the selfish and limited nature of their complaints. However the
arguments do coexist, for instance later in the letter that extract 11 is taken from, the writer
goes on to argue:
13.
At least we can't accuse our revered MP of pursuing self- interest, as he doesn't
even live in his constituency
So the letter begins by undermining the position of some people because they live close to
the route they oppose ('could their judgement be swayed by the fact that they live in fine
houses close to the DoT route?'), and ends by undermining the position of someone else
because he does not live close to any of the proposed routes ('he doesn't even live in his
constituency'). Here not living locally is taken to indicate that the MP does not have the
right, or the relevant knowledge to participate in the debate. Thus it seems that not being
local at all disqualifies people from making valid contributions to the debate just as much
as being 'too' local does.
There are numerous other examples in the press of the way in which not living locally is
considered to disqualify people from making pronouncements on the plans. For example:
14. (Herald 3/12/93)
We folk in Durrington. . .are a small band of people who love living here, who feel
at home here, who feel lucky to live in an area, which although not totally quiet
feels like a village.. .1-low dare anyone not living in our heart threaten to destroy us?
15. (Herald 27/5/94)
Mr X of West Buildings said he resented the fact that a Worthing MP who lived 60
miles away and a few councillors most of them having moved into Worthing in
recent years 'should have the power to destroy our heritage for their own advantage
and their golf courses'.
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16. (Herald 16/6/94)
Complaints that the future of Worthing were being settled by people who did not
live near it were made by Mrs X of Cradock Place, Durrington. She said she was
deeply disturbed that people planning and organising Worthing were not going to
live there. They did not even know the town.
17. (Herald 10/6/94)
A mania for road building was alleged against the DoT... a change of political will
was needed and it must be directed to the DoT mandarins who did not live here and
had no bond with the area.
The dilemma of how to achieve credible local knowledge for oneself while discrediting
others as motivated by NIMBYism seems to rest on subtle cues. Those arguing that people
who do not live in the area have no right to comment, build their argument in terms of the
sense of community (we folk in Durrington. .feel at home here), shared heritage ('our
heritage'), local knowledge ('knowing the town') and having a 'bond' with the area.
Although all of these motivations draw attention to the local identity of residents, no
mention is made of self interest. Living locally is characterised as providing participants
with insights into what the social and environmental impacts of the development are likely
to be. This is clearly illustrated in objectors' submissions to the first Havant-Chichester
Inquiry in which they often drew attention to details of everyday life in the locality which
would be disrupted by the proposed road. For instance one objector claimed that the
proposed route for the road would have a divisive effect upon the local community:
18. 215
The map that was being used by the Department.. .to show the route through (town)
grossly misrepresented the real and substantial links between the two halves of the
community. Large areas shown as blank on the map because they contained few
buildings and no roads are rich with associations upon which the health of the
community depends - the recreation grounds where children swing, play with balls,
where dogs are taken for walks, where the town's cricket and football teams play,
where the tennis courts are located, where senior citizens sit and scold the
youngsters who cycle along the footpaths, where the community ' s annual flower
show takes place. I could point to the farm where many of us go for manure in the
spring, to the paddock next to the roman Catholic Church where the children going
to and from school feed the horses.
The speaker goes on to detail more 'associations' which he argues that the proposed route
will destroy. His argument rests on the importance of direct personal experience within a
locality. He builds up a detailed picture of social activity within the area, suggesting that
the meaning of the place cannot be understood by reference to maps and plans of the area,
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but requires experience. An objector representing another community along the route of
the prosed road argued similarly:
19. 136a
The friendly, lively spirit of the village depends on the ease with which people can
move about the village, to the shops, Post Office, school, church; the daily journeys
with their informal, meetings and greetings, visits to friends and relations. Meetings
and social events centre largely on the church hail, which is also the polling station.
Daily walkers, perhaps with a dog, make use of the quieter lanes such as Clay Lane,
or the footpaths which lead towards the harbour. Younger children love to feed the
ducks at the mill pond.
Here a vivid and idyllic picture of village life is built up on the basis of the objector's
ordinary knowledge gained as a resident in the locality. In both these examples attention
is drawn to details which would not be apparent if you did not have extended personal
experience of living within the area. This strategy ties in with the other ways outlined in
the previous chapter by which people claim special and sometimes superior insight into the
likely effects of the development by virtue of their identity as ordinary, local people. In
drawing attention to local experience and knowledge no mention is made of the
participants' personal situations; it is wider effects on the community and natural
environment that are emphasised.
Concerns about the effect of a new development on private property are those most easily
labelled NIMBY. In the Worthing case study those opposing the on-line route which would
require the demolition of approximately 100 homes are those most susceptible to being
labelled NIMBY. This strategy was often used by those who argued that an on-line route
would be preferable to a downiand route. There are numerous instances in the data where
although NIMBYism is not directly mentioned a contrast is made between the value of
houses and the value of the Downs with the Downs being constructed as much more
valuable. For instance:
20. Herald 22/10/93 (letters)
The quality of life is more important than a number of houses that can be rebuilt
elsewhere. The Downs cannot be rebuilt once they are destroyed they are lost
forever.
21. Herald 19/11/93 (letters)
You can build more houses - you cannot create more downland.
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Asserting that Downs are more valuable than houses is to assert implicitly that those who
seek to protect the Downs have more valid and laudable motives than those who seek to
protect houses.
however an examination of the claims made by the other side (those opposed to the on-line
route) reveals that their complaints were framed to suggest that their concerns had a social
or environmental basis rather than being simply to do with houses and individual interests
as their opponents suggested. When they did talk about the planned demolition of houses
they were more likely to talk about them as homes than simply as houses - drawing
attention to the social meaning rather than the bricks and mortar. For instance one objector
at the inquiry was quoted in the press as saying:
22.	 Herald 20/5/94
The most important agent of human conservation (is) the home. It is here that the
future of each individual is moulded, and it is the homes of many Worthing people
that are to be destroyed or seriously affected by the published scheme.
These participants also raised social and environmental concerns, for instance about social
severance ('Don't split our community' letter Herald 3/12/93), the effects of pollution on
health (objector at the inquiry talked of his fears of 'dramatic increases in respiratory
illnesses' Herald 17/12/93), the environmental problems of noise and vibration (WSG
23/6/94) and the effects of the on-line route on the countryside bordering the town (objector
claimed 'that rural fringe..was for the people of Worthing as precious as countryside
anywhere in the Downs, because it was the most used and accessible' Herald 21/1/94).
Participants also constructed their opposition as environmental in a general sense by making
reference to the variety of ways in which the residential environmeilt would be affecced:
23. WSG 23/6 94 Objector at the inquiry cited as saying:
the DoT route through built up Worthing would have a grievous impact upon the
pleasant, mature residential environment of the northern part of Worthing.
24. Herald 18/2/94 Objector at the inquiry cited as saying:
the effect of the green route on the urban environment would be serious.
Thus for residents within the area, the construction of one's own position as valid and that
of others within the locality as invalid appears to rest on the delicate strategy of tying one's
own concern about the locality to issues of local community and environment, while
simultaneously tying other's concerns about locality to issues of private property and self
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interest. One's own position is widened while that of others is narrowed.
This analysis is supported by Walsh et al's (1993) study of opposition to the siting of waste
incinerators. They attempted to explain why a protest in one area successfully quashed the
planning application, while in another area protests failed. They attribute this partly to the
way in which claims about impact were framed and note that the unsuccessful activists:
acknowledged in retrospect that they probably should have concentrated their early
efforts on ridding themselves of the NIMBY tag by emphasising the importance of
serious recycling and the proposed incinerator's negative consequences for those
living further from the site. (1993:36)
Hieman (1990) makes a similar observation. He too concentrates on incinerator siting, and
argues that the responses of local people are increasingly that the development should Not
be in Anyone's Back Yard (NIABY), rather then being NIMBY. While in making this
claim he could be categorised with those I earlier depicted as making value judgements
about the worth of protests, he makes the observation that:
Community opponents when adopting this position (NIABY), have greatly
strengthened their solidarity and ability to thwart siting proposals. (1990:360)
In other words participants recognise that in order to be successful they need to present
their complaints as motivated by environmental and social considerations.
Conclusions
This chapter has tackled an issue which preoccupies many of those writing on local
environmental protest, that of the protestors' motivations and values. In contrast to most
work in this area I have made a case for putting aside attempts to distthguislz those wko c&'
be characterised as NIMBYs from those with wider social and environmental concerns.
Taking a social constructionist viewpoint I have argued that the attribution of motives and
values is the business of participants in disputes about new developments, and not of the
sociologist who seeks to understand them. I suggest that a social constructionist analysis
might operate at two levels; first drawing attention to the way in which features of the
social and political context inform the kinds of claims that participants are likely to make,
and secondly examining actual instances of claims making in some detail.
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The analysis illustrates how participants use attributions of NIMBY to undermine the
positions of others and seek to characterise themselves as motivated by wider social and
environmental concerns. I suggest that there is a parallel between the aims of those caught
up in such disputes about developments and the aims of some of those who analyze them -
they are at pains to achieve the categorisation of NIMBY for some participants and not for
others. This observation strengthens the case for providing constructionist analyses which
seek to avoid taking sides in disputes about problems, and instead explore the activity of
claims making.
Freudenberg and Pastor (1991) stress the need for case studies such as this which deal
explicitly with the ways in which participants in disputes 'emphasize the framings that will
encourage the outcomes they consider desirable' (p54). I have shown the degree of
awareness there is amongst participants about the consequences of being labelled NIMBY,
and indicated some of the subtle ways in which they try to avoid having that label attached
to them. This provides an important part of an analysis of the construction of social
impacts. Participants recognise that if their fears or complaints about impacts are labelled
as NIMBY, then their claims that a problem exist or is serious are likely to be dismissed.
Thus motives can be seen as a very important resource for participants in the business of
the social construction of social impacts.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
The main argument of this thesis has been that the social impacts of new developments are
socially constructed. In order to make this argument clearly a variety of literature was
reviewed including that on social impact assessment, social constructionism, the sociology
of the environment, and the planning process. Data from two case studies of disputes over
the siting of road schemes were used to illustrate some of the resources which participants
drew upon in their construction of social impacts. In this concluding chapter I will draw
out the insights gained from the preceding analysis and indicate the contribution it makes
to existing literature. However it is important first to acknowledge the limitations of the
research, and to reflect upon problematic aspects of the analysis.
The Case Studies
There are various aspects of the case studies which might be considered problematic. First
there is the question of how representative the two case studies are of siting disputes.
Obviously disputes over the siting of roads may vary in significant ways from those over
the siting of other new developments - waste incinerators or nuclear facilities for instance.
Although a comparison of the process of the construction of social impacts in case studies
of a variety of sorts of development was beyond the scope of the thesis, preliminary
observations suggest that similar strategies are used in other sorts of siting disputes (for
instance Jordan (1994) notes how distinctions between expert and ordinary people are
drawn upon in disputes over the siting of waste incinerators, and Walsh et al (1993) note
the importance that protestors against waste incinerators attach to depicting themselves as
not NIMBY). This suggests that exploring to what extent the analysis is representative of
a general process of the construction of social impacts would be an interesting and
important area for further research.
The second issue is the extent to which the case studies are representative of disputes over
the siting of new roads. In the 1990s protest about new roads has been characterised by
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campaigns of direct action (see p68). The cases studied here differ from these protests in
a number of significant ways. In neither of the case studies were debates about the
environmental implications of transport policy or the desirability of building more roads
prominent. Protest was largely confined to participation within the public inquiry and the
writing of letters and petitions, in contrast to the more dramatic tactics which characterise
today's road protests. In addition in both cases the disputes remained local and did not
attract wider media interest or public support. However as the focus of the research was
not opposition to the planning of roads per Se, these differences do not present a major
problem. The more extensive and dramatic protests which have occurred recently could be
analyzed in similar ways to the ones used as case studies here. Issues about how the
impacts of the developments are constructed, and how protestors seek to characterise their
own identity in order to make their claims robust are equally relevant in these cases.
Research to explore to what extent the strategies used in the 'conventional' disputes studied
here relate to those used in direct action campaigns suggests another promising area for
future research.
Additional concerns relate to the specific choice of case studies, and to the amount of, and
sort of data collected in each. In much research the choice of case studies is governed by
pragmatic and practical factors as much as by theoretical considerations of suitability. In
this case the research began after Acer Consultants Ltd. had commissioned me to research
the social impacts of the A27 Worthing/Lancing, and so the choice of that case study was
made for me. The choice of the A27 Havant/Chichester was made after discussions with
contacts within the DoT. The main considerations were that the site needed to be in the
South East of England for easy access, and should be an area where there had been some
local opposition to the scheme during the planning process, and where there was some
ongoing debate. The A27 Havant!Chichester was the only scheme which fitted this
description. With regard to the data collected in the Worthing/Lancing study I noted in
Chapter 4 that it would have been desirable to have access to a wider sample of
interviewees. It would also have been interesting to carry out further interviews during the
public inquiry process, however my direct involvement in this process as a representative
of the DoT's consultants made this impossible. The Havant/Chichester case study could
also have been extended to update the progress of the campaign about the A27 roar (data
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were collected up to July 1993). Overall the research aims to illustrate in detail aspects of
the social construction of social impacts. Although more data would potentially provide
additional insights into aspects of this process, and might make the arguments presented
more convincing, the data collected were sufficient to provide an important start at
understanding this process.
Relevant Literature
In order to provide necessary background to the research a variety of literature was drawn
upon. Rather than having one discrete literature review chapter, many of the chapters
provide some discussion of existing research. I began by reviewing some of the literature
on social impact assessment, in order to provide some context for my interest in social
impacts and to illustrate the way in which the concept of social impact is theoretically
underdeveloped. I then argued that social impacts could be regarded as socially
constructed, and so reviewed some of the main debates about social constructionism in
order to introduce the approach clearly. Although social impact assessment has developed
as a distinct field of research it can be conceptualised as part of a sociology of the
environment. In Chapter 3 I provided an introduction to this developing area within
sociology drawing particular attention to debates about the value of constructionist analyses
of environmental issues and problems. Chapter 4 also contains an element of literature
review - existing research on the public inquiry process was drawn upon in order to provide
some background to the disputes explored in the case studies. It was necessary to consider
all of these areas in order to build up an understandable and convincing account of the
social construction of social impacts. However a problem of drawing on so many different
areas is the possibility that none will be reviewed in sufficient detail. Hopefully enough
detail has been provided here to introduce the relevant insights from each of these areas.
In addition to the major areas of literature reviewed, in the course of writing a thesis it
become apparent that there are many other areas of research which it could be relevant to
consider. Those that it might have been particularly useful to consider include the vast
literature on risk, and particularly that relating to lay perceptions and constructions; and the
emerging literature on how to resolve planning disputes through processes of consensus
building. The discussion of discourse analysis presented in Chapter 6 might also have been
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strengthened by a consideration of other forms of discourse analysis. However within the
constraints of preparing a thesis it is not possible to consider all potentially interesting areas
of research. The literature which has been reviewed provides sufficient background for the
arguments which have been developed.
Social Constructionism and Discourse Analysis
The limitations of the thesis which have been considered so far relate to its scope and
comprehensiveness. Perhaps more difficult to resolve are concerns about the sort of
analysis which has been argued for and pursued. In Chapter 2 an introduction was provided
to social constructionism which drew attention to the ontological gerrymandering (or the
greasy pole) which characterises constructivist analyses. In the course of building a
constructivist account of social impacts the difficulty of adhering to a consistent stance has
been particularly apparent. Choices have had to be made throughout about what is to be
treated as a social construction, and what this should mean. For instance in places
participants are referred to as local people as though this is a straightforward description,
while elsewhere the analysis aims specifically to show that such an identity is actively
constructed. This is a situation which those writing about social constructionism (e.g.
Woolgar and Pawluch 1995a) recognise as pervading all such accounts. However even if
this is acknowledged as inevitable and not characterised as a problem (e.g. Collins and
Yearley 1 992a), it is likely to come to seem problematic in the course of developing an
analysis. Perhaps the conclusion is just that a greasy pole is not a very comfortable place
to be, and there are times when balancing becomes very difficult!
Adhering to a social constructionist position also means attempting to remain agnostic about
the reality of the social impacts about which claims are being made. While recognising the
insights that such a stance offers, it is very hard to maintain. This is partly because it is
impossible to avoid having preconceptions and opinions about the situation which you are
studying, and keeping these out of the sociological analysis is difficult and sometimes
frustrating. Like the participants in disputes about social impacts the analyst too has
common-sense ideas about what is going on and what should be done about it. In addition
the stance of agnosticism can seem overly detached and cynical. The research involved
interviewing people who expressed strong opinions and emotions about the social impacts
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of the road schemes. To suggest that the issue of whether these impacts are real or serious
is irrelevant, can sometimes feel like a reluctance to take people seriously.
This sense is sometimes heightened by using a discourse analytic approach to explore the
social construction of social impacts. The approach recommends taking the talk or text of
participants as data and not attempting to go beyond that to draw conclusions about their
attitudes, motives or values. While the analysis produced here illustrates the sense of this
recommendation and the fruitful insights it can yield, at times this is a difficult position to
maintain. Not paying attention to participants' values or motives can be seen as suggesting
that they are valueless or motiveless. This not only runs counter to the researcher's
common sense understanding of the situation, but is likely also to be offensive to those
participating in the research. It is difficult to explain or justify the social constructionist
approach to those who agree to participate in the research. A number of interviewees asked
about the practical outcomes of the research, obviously hoping that it would further their
case in some way. While it was made clear from the start that this was not the aim of the
research at times I felt quite uneasy about this. Of course, as noted in Chapter 3 the
relationship between research and policy or action is always a complex one, and a project
with more practical aims would not necessarily have benefitted participants any more
directly. In addition the dilemma about the ethics of doing research on, but not for, a group
of people, is by no means unique to this project.
It has already been acknowledged that the thesis might have benefitted from a more
thorough review of literature on discourse analysis. One of the problem encountered here,
which wider reading might have helped resolve, is the extent to which discourse analysis
can lead to significant insights about a substantive area of research. The sort of discourse
analysis pursued here is largely concerned with the way in which talk is organised to
achieve specific interactional aims. Most attention is paid to devices and strategies used to
strengthen an argument, construct facts, and present speakers as reliable and credible.
These strategies are important aspects of the construction of social impacts, but might be
better characterised as routine features of arguments rather than anything specific to the
construction of social impacts.
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However given that social impacts have not been analyzed as social constructions before,
these observations about the detailed construction of impacts as real and serious do make
an important contribution to the understanding of the process of social impact. Drawing
attention to the practical importance for participants of constructing winning arguments, and
illustrating how they attempt to do this provides a novel contribution to the literature on
social impacts which has tended to assume that impacts are caused mechanistically by new
developments.
Sociology of the Environment
In Chapter 2 I argued that the concept of social impact is under theorised and that the
literature on SIA would benefit from being more informed by sociology. The literature on
SIA can be characterised as part of a wider literature on sociology of the environment, and
in Chapter 3 I outlined the major debate in this field about the place and usefulness of
social constructionist analyses of environmental issues. I pointed out that the bulk of
research on social impacts has implicitly adopted a realist position, and suggested that
considering social impacts as social constructions would provide useful insights about the
process of impact. The remainder of the thesis drew on data from the two case studies to
illustrate some of the detail of the social construction of social impacts. This analysis
makes a distinctive contribution to the growing body of studies which provide social
constructionist analyses of environmental issues. It is distinctive in that it engages with
debates about social constructionism as well as providing an empirical analysis; and also
in that the analysis is more localised than much of the existing research. It is localised in
two senses: first it concentrates on the construction of environmental problems within
specific localities, while many of the existing studies have chosen to focus on the
construction of global environmental problems such as global warming or acid rain (see
p42-51 for examples); and secondly in that the analysis focuses on the detailed rhetorical
construction of environmental problems rather than looking at their wider social and
political construction.
It is important that social constructionist studies of environmental issues are not considered
as an area distinct from the Environmental Sociology pursued by those I have characterised
as realists. As the discussion in Chapter 3 indicated most 'realists' acknowledge that social
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constructionism provides some useful insights (p53-54), and the majority of social
constructionist analyses slide towards a realist approach at times (p46-47 p55). Thus the
distinction between the two approaches is not as clear as it sometimes appears. It is
unlikely that sociology of the environment will ever be characterised by consensus, after
all few (if any) other areas of sociological enquiry are. In common with other areas of
interest within the discipline sociology of the environment should be broad enough to
encompass a range of theoretical approaches and substantive interests.
The thesis also has relevance for research on public participation in planning disputes and
local environmental debates. I have noted in Chapter 7 how existing studies have tended
to focus on the way in which structural constraints affect interaction between the parties in
planning disputes. I have taken a different angle and concentrated instead on illustrating
the extent to which these divisions (between ordinary people and experts, us and them,
NIMBYs and environmentalists) are actively achieved. Particularly significant is the
conclusion that the identity of 'ordinary person' rather than simply disempowering
participants is one that they actively invoke and utilise in the course of the dispute. Despite
focusing throughout on the rhetorical strategies of participants I have attempted to avoid the
suggestion that power inequalities or structural features of the planning process are
insignificant. Although Giddens' theory of structuration provides some idea about the sort
of framework that might be used to develop such a position it is not clear to what extent
it is compatible with a thoroughgoing constructionist analysis. The relationship between
the structural and active dimensions of planning disputes is an area that needs further
careful thought.
The thesis also relates to an emerging research interest in lay epidemiology or citizen
knowledges (e.g. Irwin, 1995, Brown 1991 & 1993). The observations made here about
the way in which local participants in the disputes about the two road schemes ground their
claims of impact in direct everyday experience, framed the issues as moral ones, and
criticised the DoT's detached and 'objective' stance tie in with this literature. Irwin (1995)
draws together a variety of case studies of disputes between members of the public and
scientists about the severity and incidence of environmental risks. He examines the very
different ways in which lay and expert participants assess risks and points particularly to
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the way in which lay participants rely on contextual knowledge - direct everyday
knowledge and experience - in order to assess risk. For lay participants the issues are
localised. They are concerned with their own health and welfare and that of their friends
and family, and with the safety and amenity of their local environment. Irwin describes the
knowledge of the risks which they accumulate as 'knowledges for doing'- they are highly
practical, case specific and instrumental in orientation (p133). In this respect too they
contrast sharply with the knowledges of experts which tend to make claims to general
theory and strive to retain distance from the particular. The public's contextual knowledge
combines with assessments of the credibility of the institutions responsible for controlling
the risks (see also p99) and often with research carried out by members of the public
themselves. Irwin suggests that lay groups do not simply have a role in criticising expert
knowledge but also in generating new forms of knowledge and understanding of risks, and
stresses that:
the point.. .is not to privilege either 'citizen' or 'scientific' understandings, but rather
note the diversity of knowledges which seem relevant to risklenvironmental issues.
(ibid:1 15)
This lay epidemiology model seems to fit the Havant/Chichester case study particularly
well. In Chapters 5 and 6 I illustrated how local people contrasted the DoT's detached
assessment of the 'roar' unfavourably with their direct experience of it. They rejected the
DoT's technical assessment and responses to the problem, characterising it instead in moral
terms - as something they should not have been subjected to (see p106). Not only did they
draw on their local and commonsense knowledge, but they also engaged in research to try
to prove that their assessment of the problem was correct (see p95). Thus this case study
could be rewritten as another example of lay epidemiology in action. It would make a
novel contribution to this literature due to the nature of the problem about which local
people were making claims. As its name suggests most of the lay epidemiology literature
concentrates on citizens' claims making about potential threats to health (see especially
Brown 1991 & 1993). In this case study local people were not making claims about
something which they characterised as a risk, but about something which they considered
already had direct impacts on their life. Moreover claims about the noise rarely drew on the
effect it might have on health (although this could have been done - see p101), but instead
concentrated on what might be considered more small scale changes to everyday life. This
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case study could also be used to illustrate Irwin's argument that the incorporation of the
contextual knowledge of local people into environmental decision making would result in
a more credible and well-informed process. In this case the consequence of ignoring, or
failing to understand, the local construction of the 'roar' was that a variety of expensive
'solutions' were invested in, none of which led to an abatement of claims about the
problem. In fact the 'solutions' exacerbated complaints. If attempts had been made to
understand the basis and nature of the complaints which local people were making it is
possible that a solution acceptable to both 'sides' could have been reached more quickly
and cheaply.
The analysis which has been carried out here also contributes to the work on lay
epidemiologies in a different way. In exploring how the social impacts of the two roads
were constructed by local people, attention has been drawn to the ways in which they
construct their identity and their knowledge in particular ways in order to make their claims
about impact more robust - a point not so far addressed in the lay epidemiology literature.
I have demonstrated that rather than being neutral descriptions of people, being an ordinary
person or a local person are identities which participants work to achieve, and use to
particular ends. The ordinary and local knowledge which they can claim by virtue of these
identities is also actively worked up. In addition the lay epidemiology approach assumes
a realist position towards environmental risk - the emphasis is on citizens discovering or
uncovering real risks. The analysis presented here differs from this in emphasising the way
in which the reality and severity of problems is actively constructed by local people. The
discovery of social impacts is conceptualised as a social process - as Woolgar writes
'discovery is a process rather than a point occurrence in time' (1988:58).
Understanding Social Impacts
The main aim of this thesis has been to contribute to understanding about social impacts
by considering them as social constructions. Although the case studies are necessarily
limited some general tentative suggestions about the process of social impact can be drawn.
First the analysis has challenged the notion that social impacts are the direct result of
technological changes to the natural environment (see p21). In place of this mechanistic
model of the emergence of impacts I have provided examples of the way in which social
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impacts are socially constructed. Claims about social impact are not the inevitable result
of environmental changes, rather their very emergence and nature is heavily influenced by
a range of social factors.
Couch and KrolI-Smith distinguish between environmental risks or threats, and impacts:
Unlike the certainty of impact, a threat is hemmed in by uncertainty. .threats require
a greater degree of interpretive work..they are frequently open to dispute. (1991:300)
and to date work on social and environmental impacts and that on risk has largely been
seen as separate. 1-lowever the analysis presented here suggests that this distinction is not
so rigid. I have shown the extent to which the existence and severity of impacts is contested
both between 'experts' and 'ordinary people', and between groups of 'ordinary people; the
detailed work which participants engage in to construct the impacts as real, serious, and
requiring attention; and the disputes which arise about the likelihood, existence or nature
of impacts.
In Chapter 1 I noted how the literature on social impacts often employs a distinction
between objective and subjective impacts - with objective impacts being those which are
measurable by experts and subjective impacts being more intangible impacts such as distress
at changes to the local environment. The analysis presented shows that impacts which are
amenable to expert measurement are just as open to dispute and alternative interpretations
as those which have traditionally been considered 'subjective'. I have made no attempt to
assess the likelihood or severity of the social impacts of the road schemes studied. Rather
the emphasis has been on how the impacts were socially constructed by local people. This
focus contributes to an understanding of how complaints about social impacts emerge and
are maintained, and highlights the active role played by local people in deciding what
constitutes an impact and constructing it in a particular way.
Another important, if tentative, finding is that in constructing something as a social impact
people do not necessarily describe its effects in dramatic ways. Rather they draw attention
to small scale changes they have had to make to details of their everyday life - in the case
of the A27 'roar' such things as not being able to hold a conversation in the garden or
having to turn the radio up in order to hear it. These descriptions are used to suggest that
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the impact is severe and needs to be rectified. It might be supposed that more dramatic
claims might serve this purpose better, but the analysis presented here suggests that the
opposite is the case. It is by drawing attention to small changes to mundane life that people
achieve the sense that an impact is real and serious.
An analysis of the social construction of social impacts may not seem directly relevant to
those involved in the practical process of SIA. However if practice does shift from site
specific assessments to more strategic assessments of policies and programs (as Finsterbuch
1994 suggests) then the approach could provide some important insights. Of particular
relevance is the recognition that a range of social factors inform whether there is local
identification of the existence of an impact, and whether complaint about that impact is
maintained. While the detail of impact identification and the organisation of opposition will
differ in each site, there will be commonalities in the process by which impacts are
identified. An awareness of these factors is an essential starting point for any assessment
of the likely social impact of programmes or policies.
In this thesis social impacts have been taken to be those aspects of new developments
which local people consider will affect their lives, or already have affected their lives. This
definition is challenged by a number of writers on SIA who argue that social impacts are
not just what people complain about. Clearly a project may have some affects on social
life which are positive, in addition the recognition that a range of social factors inform
whether an issue is constructed as problematic leads to the realisation that there are likely
to also be a range of factors which constrain the emergence of complaint about other issues.
A SIA should also draw attention to these issues. However the issues which local people
complain about are those which become real problems for the developers (see discussion
p110 about how the problem for DoT was the noise local people made about the noise from
the road). As the analysis in Ch5 illustrated if developers fail to understand how local
people are constructing an impact their attempts to ameliorate impacts may actually
exacerbate complaints (see p113-114). With the case of the A27 roar the DoT responded
to local peoples claims that the road was noisy, but failed to engage with the moral
character of their claims (that they had been treated unfairly, let down etc - see p100). An
understanding of how an impact is locally constructed is a prerequisite to effective dialogue
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between the parties about possible resolutions.
My experience of conducting an SIA (of the A27 Worthing/Lancing) confirmed the
observation made by a number of authors (e.g. Jobes 1985, Freudenberg and Olsen 1983)
that SIA is generally a quick and dirty process. While welcoming the advent of developers'
concerns to identify and ameliorate social impacts, involvement in the practical task of SIA
is likely to be frustrating and compromising for a sociologist. So long as SIAs are
commissioned by developers there is little chance of conducting an unbiased assessment,
and even if this is possible the data ultimately belongs to the developer who is free to
emphasise conclusions which are favourable to their plans and downplay or ignore those
which are more negative. In the UK discussions about the importance of considering social
impacts alongside environmental impacts is just beginning. At this stage the most
productive role for sociologists is to contribute to this debate, whether through advice on
appropriate research methods or through more theoretical discussions which contribute to
an understanding of the process of social impact.
Case studies such as those presented here play an important complementary role to the
practical task of SIA. They provide an opportunity to explore issues such as how social
impacts are experienced and expressed in more detail than is possible in the course of an
actual SIA. The relationship between research and practice in SIA is no less convoluted
than in any other area (see p60), but it is hoped that aspects of the analysis presented here
might inform, or at least interest, practitioners.
In conclusion the aim of the thesis has been to demonstrate that the social impacts of new
developments are socially constructed. Despite the limited scope of the research and the
acknowledgement of nagging theoretical dilemmas about social constructionism, the
research has led to several key insights. I have illustrated that far from being a mechanistic
response to technological changes to the environment, social impact is a fundamentally
social process. Like risks, impacts are the subject of uncertainty, debate and dispute. I
have drawn attention to the detailed rhetorical work that goes into the construction of social
impacts, and drawn attention particularly to the role played by identity in this process. A
number of areas where further research would be useful have been suggested. These
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include testing the applicability of the conclusions drawn about the process of social impact
to other planning disputes; developing a model of the relationship between structural factors
and active construction in environmental and planning disputes; and exploring how
widespread the use of ordinary identity and claims about changes to everyday life are in the
construction of a range of environmental impacts.
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